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Introduction
American Indian tribes, unlike other sovereigns, have a uniquely limited
ability to enforce their criminal laws. Criminal jurisdiction is one of the
most important incidents of sovereignty.1 Criminal laws are a primary
means through which a society protects people and goods, expresses norms
and values, and holds wrongdoers accountable. A crime, although it usually
involves a specific victim, is an offense against the laws of the sovereign;
this is why the state, not the victim, is the complaining party in a criminal
case.
Sovereigns are generally understood to have jurisdiction over anyone
who commits a crime within that sovereign’s territory,2 regardless of
1. See, e.g., ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL PUNISHMENT 56 (2010) (“The territorial scope of a state’s criminal law is
commonly regarded as a manifestation of its sovereignty.”); Markus D. Dubber, Criminal
Jurisdiction and Conceptions of Penality in Comparative Perspective, 63 U. TORONTO L.J.
247, 263 (2013) (“Criminal jurisdiction is just there, unquestioned, as the obvious
manifestation of the state’s penal power, itself the obvious manifestation of the state’s
stateless, its very sovereignty. . . . There is no theory of the so-called territoriality principle
which determines jurisdiction based on the location of the crime within some sovereign’s
territory (or within some sovereignty, for short). Territorial jurisdiction just is.”).
2. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); David Wolitz,
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OREGON L. REV.
725, 730 (2012). The doctrine of territoriality—according to which criminal jurisdiction is
determined by the territorial location of the crime—seems to answer most questions about
which criminal justice system has jurisdiction over which crimes.”). In common law
countries, the “territoriality principle” is so central that even extra-territorial extensions of
criminal jurisdiction are often framed in terms of territory. Lindsay Farmer, Territorial
Jurisdiction and Criminalization, 63 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 225, 241-43 (2013) (describing
territorial jurisdiction as “the central case and organizing idea” into which other cases were
“either fitted . . . or treated as exceptions” and recounting fictions employed by courts to
conclude that an act took place within a particular territory when in fact it did not); Dubber,
supra note 1, at 265-66 (giving example of Canadian statute in which acts occurring in space

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1

No. 2]

TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

339

nationality, plus jurisdiction over the sovereign’s nationals and others
whose actions affect its community for crimes committed outside its
territory.3 When a person travels to another jurisdiction, nationality
normally does not operate as a shield protecting him or her from
prosecution, because jurisdiction in those cases is based on the local
sovereign’s control over its territory.4 Citizenship status, consent, and
are legislatively “deemed” to have taken place in Canada for purposes of jurisdiction).
Diplomatic immunity is an exception to the territoriality principle, but the exception is
limited to those who represent the government and does not generally bar one sovereign
from prosecuting the citizens of another. See Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic
Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic
Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173, 177-78 (1989) (describing how
diplomatic immunity is based on the idea that the diplomat represents the foreign sovereign,
the fiction that the diplomat resides on territory that is under the jurisdiction of the home
country, and the need to permit diplomats to carry out their work without interference).
3. Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists concurrently with, but does not replace, the
territorial jurisdiction of the local sovereign. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is justified by the
relationship between the sovereign and either the defendant or the victim of a crime, or on
the impact of the crime on the sovereign’s integrity. Christopher L. Blakesley,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 108, 116 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008) In addition to
the subjective territorial principle (jurisdiction because an element of the crime took place
within the nation’s territory) and the nationality principle (jurisdiction over nationals who
commit crimes abroad (“the second most important of the five theories [of criminal
jurisdiction] worldwide”)), Blakesley describes four other principles that provide a basis for
the assertion of criminal jurisdiction: objective territoriality (jurisdiction over crimes that
impact the prosecuting nation), the protective principle (jurisdiction over an “offense [that]
poses a danger of causing an adverse effect on a state’s security, integrity, sovereignty, or an
important governmental function”), the passive personality theory (jurisdiction over crimes
that harms the nationals of the prosecuting state), and universal jurisdiction (jurisdiction over
universally condemned offenses, such as piracy and terrorism, that any nation claiming
personal jurisdiction over the offender may prosecute). Id. at 104-15, 121-36. The
relationship between sovereign and individual matters in this context is understood broadly.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction extends to citizens as well as to nationals and foreigners who
commit an offense that affects the sovereign or its people. Id. (describing various bases for
extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the nationality principle, protective principle, and the
passive personality principle).
4. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG: THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 8-20 (2009) (describing the link between territorial
concepts of jurisdiction and the European concept of sovereign control over territory,
enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia). As Raustiala explains, territorial sovereignty was the
basis for the era of European and American empire-building, in which Western powers
extended their territorial reach over lands occupied by non-Western nations, which were not
recognized as having territorial authority because they were not regarded as having “met the
prevailing ‘standard of civilization.’” Id. at 14.
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political participation rights generally have little bearing on the question of
whether a sovereign can prosecute a particular offender.
Unlike most sovereigns, however, American Indian tribes cannot
exercise full territorial criminal jurisdiction. They lack jurisdiction over
certain classes of people within their territory, but the precise contours of
this jurisdiction have never been expressed as a coherent standard. Instead,
the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction is governed by a patchwork of rules.
These rules do not issue from a single source, but from multiple federal
statutes and Supreme Court decisions.
Tribes generally lack jurisdiction over non-Indians,5 while they retain
jurisdiction over “all Indians,”6 including their own citizens7 as well as
“nonmember Indians,”8 but neither Congress nor the federal courts have
carefully considered who is included in this category. Most recently,
Congress restored tribal jurisdiction over some non-Indian domestic
abusers, as long as the non-Indian has sufficient “ties to the Indian tribe.”9
While these rules may initially seem clear, they become muddier the closer
one looks. More importantly, they are not linked to a unifying principle that
explains why tribes lack criminal jurisdiction in certain situations, which
could guide tribes in determining the scope of their jurisdiction in future
cases. Without such a considered analysis, tribal and federal courts risk
relying on assumptions and misunderstandings when determining a tribe’s
jurisdictional reach, and may interpret tribal jurisdiction too narrowly as a
result.
For example, some federal and tribal courts appear to assume that a
tribe’s jurisdiction over nonmember Indians includes only citizens of other
Indian tribes.10 Most of these cases have focused on the question of whether
the federal law permitting tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
violates equal protection because it distinguishes between Indians and non-

5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
7. Courts have long agreed that Indian tribes retain inherent criminal jurisdiction over
members of their tribes who commit crimes in their territory. See generally Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376 (1896); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1978). While tribal
jurisdiction has historically existed to the exclusion of state jurisdiction, see Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 540 (1832), the federal government has long exercised some
concurrent criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying
text.
8. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012).
10. See infra Parts I.C.1-2.
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Indians.11 Courts have answered that question by holding that Congress can
legislate with respect to Indians without violating equal protection. Most
defendants who have challenged tribal jurisdiction in federal court are
citizens of some tribe (though not the tribe prosecuting them), so courts
have relied on their citizenship to justify their inclusion in the Indian
category, and thus their prosecution by a tribe other than their own. These
courts are correct that Congress has the power to so legislate, but a focus on
congressional power has obscured the more difficult theoretical question of
why a defendant’s citizenship in one tribe should have any bearing on
whether that defendant may be prosecuted by another tribe. Even though
the statute affirming tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians12 defines
the “Indian” category to include more than just enrolled tribal citizens,
federal courts rarely have occasion consider its effect on the many members
of Indian communities who are not citizens of any tribe.13
Because of courts’ emphasis on tribal citizenship, the exercise of tribal
jurisdiction over these noncitizen members may seem to present an even
more difficult equal protection problem. If a person is not a citizen of any
tribe, categorizing that person as an Indian may seem to some to be nothing
more than a bald racial classification. Indeed, the first federal court to
review tribal prosecution of an Indian who was not a citizen of any tribe
suggested—citing no authority—that the extension of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-citizen members of the community “appears to
present an equal protection problem” because it subjects the defendant to
11. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 952 (2006); Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134-35 (D. Mont. 2003), aff’d,
160 Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 970 (2006); see also Lara, 541
U.S. at 200, 209 (holding that Congress properly exercised its authority to restore inherent
tribal jurisdiction in this area, but reserving due process and equal protection challenges).
12. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1301 affirms that tribes have inherent authority to prosecute “all
Indians” and defines “Indian” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1153, the law that authorizes
federal prosecution of Indians. The scope of the Indian category under § 1153 has been
interpreted by federal courts to include anyone who is descended from a tribal group
indigenous to the United States and who is affiliated with an Indian tribe that is presently
recognized by the federal government. See infra Part I.C.3 for a detailed discussion of these
statutes and the case law interpreting each of them, including minor variations among
circuits.
13. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial
Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1025 (2011) (“Many . . . nonmember Indians are fully
integrated into their communities, live on the reservation, and participate fully in tribal
religious, cultural, and social life. The Supreme Court's equation of Indianness with tribal
membership-narrowly understood to mean enrollment and voluntary political participationwrites these people out of existence.”).
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tribal jurisdiction “due purely to his blood quantum or particular lineage.”14
Similar questions may eventually animate challenges to the most recent
restoration of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence
offenders. That law subjects some non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction, based
in part on their connection to the tribal community, but requires tribes to
provide heightened due process protections to these non-Indian community
members that are not required in prosecutions of similarly situated Indian
community members.15
The shadow of equal protection would be much less pronounced if the
rules governing tribal jurisdiction were supported by a rationale rooted in a
thorough understanding of tribal criminal power, but those rules are not
usually so presented. After centuries of legislative and judicial silence on
the matter of tribal criminal jurisdiction, the rules that currently govern its
scope are instead the result of a back-and-forth between Congress and the
Supreme Court, in which the Court has limited tribal jurisdiction over
certain categories of people and Congress has responded by restoring it
over some—but not all—of those categories. While anyone who has taken a
course in federal Indian law can no doubt recite the rules, little attention has
been paid to basic theoretical questions about the reasons for the scope of
tribal criminal jurisdiction today. Because the federal government has long
exercised criminal jurisdiction within Indian country, tribal jurisdiction is
most often treated as only one part of the “jurisdictional maze” that governs

14. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1231 (D. Nev.
2014) (“[Tribal prosecution of a disenrolled member] appears to present an equal protection
problem. That is, under such a regime a person may, due purely to his blood quantum or
particular lineage, be subject to criminal prosecution in Indian courts yet be ineligible for
membership in the prosecuting tribe or any Indian tribe, the latter consideration being the
only distinction traditionally held to insulate the blood/lineage nexus from equal protection
infirmity.” (second emphasis added)). The Phebus court may have been referring to a
Supreme Court case in which federal prosecution of an Indian person was upheld against an
equal protection challenge. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647 (1977). The
defendant in Antelope was a tribal citizen, and the Court specifically cited his citizenship
status as a reason for its holding. Id. at 646 (“[R]espondents were not subjected to federal
criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled
members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.”). The Antelope Court acknowledged, however, that
federal law does not actually require that a defendant be an enrolled tribal citizen in order to
be prosecuted as an Indian. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
15. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54 (codified in relevant part at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(4) and (b)(4)(B)). See infra Part I.D for
further discussion of the law.
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criminal justice there.16 In this maze, tribal jurisdiction functions primarily
as a gap-filler, with tribes exercising criminal jurisdiction only over the
people and the offenses that no other sovereign can prosecute.17
Despite a substantial body of scholarship on tribal civil jurisdiction,18
questions about the purpose, guiding principles, and proper scope of tribal

16. Robert Clinton coined the term “jurisdictional maze” in a seminal article. See Robert
N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976) [hereinafter Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze]. Clinton
described tribal jurisdiction at the time as limited in practice, but potentially much broader in
scope, and highlighted several grey areas in which tribes sometimes asserted jurisdiction but
federal law neither expressly affirmed nor prohibited. Id. at 557-60. Indian country criminal
jurisdiction is now commonly described as a “maze.” See, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER
COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT &
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (2013) [hereinafter INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A
ROADMAP], available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_
Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf; Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze:
United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in
Indian Country, 72 N.D.L. REV. 433, 441-42 n.57-60 (citing articles that use the maze
analogy or similar terms); see also AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO
PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007) [hereinafter
AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOf
Injustice.pdf. Several scholars have developed careful critiques of federal and state criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country, see, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and
Tribal Self- Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 832-53 (2006) (describing problems with
the application of federal criminal law in Indian country and suggesting ways to minimize or
repeal federal laws); Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the
Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 707-29 (2006) (presenting
data highlighting the shortcomings of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and
proposing options for minimizing or repealing such jurisdiction), but these critiques simply
identify the reasons that tribal jurisdiction would be better without engaging thorny
questions about its scope.
17. Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze, supra note 16, at 560 (“[W]hile the present scope of
tribal criminal jurisdiction is generally limited to relatively minor crimes committed by
Indians on the reservation [over which no other court has jurisdiction], the potential reach of
such jurisdiction may be substantially broader.”)
18. See generally, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 779 (2015); Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness:
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Civil Jurisdiction, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (2013) [hereinafter
Florey, Beyond Uniqueness]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal
Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010) [hereinafter Fletcher, Resisting Federal
Courts]; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond Reservation Borders, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003 (2008); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osbourne,
“Indian Country” and the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22
ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2005).
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criminal power have remained unexplored.19 No considered analysis has
investigated why tribes need criminal jurisdiction, why that jurisdiction has
been limited at all, and what underlying principles might explain its current
scope. For example, one popular idea is that tribes can exercise jurisdiction
over people who consent to their jurisdiction.20 Consent is a significant part
of the academic literature on civil jurisdiction, but it is rarely invoked to
justify criminal jurisdiction outside the tribal context.21
This article seeks to explain why current rules limit tribal criminal
jurisdiction, and brings together ideas from criminal law, federal Indian
law, and tribal law to suggest a single unifying standard to clarify who
should (and should not) be subject to a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction: tribal
criminal jurisdiction should extend to anyone who is recognized by the tribe
as a member of the community. Though strong policy arguments support
restoring to tribes full criminal jurisdiction over all people who commit
crimes within their territory,22 this article begins by recognizing the current
reality that Congress and the Court have both decided to limit modern tribal
criminal jurisdiction. The two branches have been locked in a give-and-take
over where to draw this line, but they seem to agree that it is potentially
unfair to subject complete strangers to tribal jurisdiction. Part I describes
the cases and statutes that govern this area of law and how they relate to

19. Accord Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, supra note 18 (reconsidering the limits on tribal
court civil jurisdiction according to settled doctrinal principles of personal jurisdiction, but
noting that criminal jurisdiction presents different questions).
20. Compare Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990) (premising tribal criminal
jurisdiction on consent), with Paul Spruhan, Case Note, Means v. District Court of the
Chinle Judicial District and, the Hadane Doctrine in Navajo Criminal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. at
pt. IV (2000-2001), http://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/
spruhan/index.php [hereinafter Spruhan, Case Note] (noting differences between the Duro
Court’s consent framework and the notion of consent articulated by Navajo courts); Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 45, 112-21 (2012) (noting differences
between the understanding of consent expressed in Duro and that used in civil jurisdiction
cases).
21. See infra Part II.D.
22. I share the view of most Indian law experts that tribes ought to have full territorial
jurisdiction, see, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 23
(recommending that tribes be permitted to opt out of federal jurisdiction in favor of restoring
jurisdiction over all people who commit crimes in the tribe’s territory), and principles of
criminal jurisdiction generally support this view, see infra Part II.D. However, all three
branches of the federal government have so far declined to endorse that view. The purpose
of this article is to consider the existing limits on tribal criminal jurisdiction, which leave
tribes with something short of full territorial jurisdiction.
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each other, and highlights the resulting confusion and unanswered
questions.
Part II presents and describes the community recognition standard, and
argues that this standard is the best way to implement the principles that
underlie the current rules governing tribal criminal jurisdiction. It considers
the interests served by criminal jurisdiction, the scope of that jurisdiction in
other contexts, and the particular concerns expressed by federal actors
about Indian tribal jurisdiction, and argues that the current rules seek to
make tribal jurisdiction broad enough to provide for public safety, express
cultural norms, and make individuals accountable to society, but narrow
enough to prevent relative strangers from being prosecuted by tribes’
potentially different and unfamiliar legal systems.
The community recognition standard is drawn from an examination of
the two categories of people who are currently subject to tribal criminal
jurisdiction, but whose status is somewhere between citizens and nonIndians: nonmember Indians and non-Indians with sufficient ties to the
tribe. For nonmember Indians, this model follows the jurisdictional laws of
some tribal courts, which define “Indian” for criminal jurisdiction as a
person who is recognized as such by the community. For non-Indians, this
model follows the recent amendments to the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), which confirms inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
offenders who commit acts of domestic violence against an Indian victim,
and who have sufficient “ties to the tribe”—meaning they live or work on
the reservation, or are in an intimate relationship with an Indian who resides
there.23 Part III contrasts the community recognition standard with a
citizenship-based one and explores how this relates to the larger questions
of how to define legal Indianness in the shadow of equal protection, what it
means to be a member of a political community, and the appropriate reach
of a sovereign’s criminal power.
Community recognition is a flexible standard that can accommodate the
many different ways an individual may be connected to a community,
including but not limited to formal citizenship. It demonstrates that relying
on formal citizenship is not the only way to measure the connection
between an individual and a tribal community, and is therefore not the only
way to ensure that Indian remains a political (as opposed to simply racial)
designation. It empowers the tribal community to define who is included,
but instead of focusing narrowly on consent and political participation, this
23. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, tit. IX, sec. 904, § 204(b),
127 Stat. at 121-22 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304).
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standard considers an individual’s responsibility to the community, and thus
better reflects the functions of criminal law. While many tribes that employ
a community recognition standard limit this category to people of Indian
descent, as required by the federal law that prohibits tribes from enforcing
criminal laws against non-Indians,24 this new standard that could
theoretically permit jurisdiction over people not of Indian descent as long as
they are members of the tribal community. In this way, this standard would
harmonize tribes’ historical practices with the concerns expressed by the
Supreme Court, Congress’ confirmation of jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, and the most recent reinstatement of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndian domestic violence offenders.
In addition, unlike the strong calls for congressional action to restore full
territorial criminal jurisdiction,25 this community recognition standard has
the advantage that it does not require a change in federal law, so courts may
begin using it immediately. Under current law, tribal courts exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.26 Following this law, tribal
legislatures and courts should develop their own definitions of “Indian” for
purposes of criminal jurisdiction that emphasize recognition by, and
obligation to, the tribal community—which is a broad and flexible standard
that reflects the functions of criminal law. It is based on a defendant’s
connection to the prosecuting community, rather than on citizenship in
another tribal nation or status under federal law. In most cases, it will
encompass more people than a rule that limits jurisdiction to citizens.27
Federal courts reviewing tribal assertions of criminal jurisdiction should
defer to tribal law standards for determining whether and how a person is
affiliated with the community, and review cases only to determine whether
the defendant satisfies the federal requirement that he or she be of Indian
descent and be affiliated with a tribe. The community recognition standard
could also permit tribal criminal jurisdiction over community members who
are not of Indian descent, though this would require congressional

24. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); see also United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (noting some degree of Indian descent
required for Indianness under federal law); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012) (defining Indian in
the tribal jurisdiction context by reference to the law governing federal criminal jurisdiction
over Indians, in which context the Rogers rule applies, as described in Parts I.B.2 and I.C).
25. See, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 23.
26. 25 U.S.C. 1301(2).
27. But see infra Part III.C (discussing one way that a community recognition standard
could be narrower than a citizenship standard).
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clarification or significant judicial reinterpretation of the “Indian” legal
category.
Tribal criminal courts today are much more than gap-fillers. Federal
Indian policy recognizes the importance of local tribal self-governance,
which Congress has affirmed forcefully in recent years by restoring and
expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction.28 Many tribal criminal justice
systems, once ignored or overridden because they relied on traditional
dispute resolution mechanisms that were not recognized by American
courts as “real” legal systems, now have complex infrastructures that
include police, courts, lawyers, judges, and jails, just like the criminal
justice systems in other American jurisdictions.29 Because tribal justice
systems can (and often do) incorporate culturally-specific legal norms and
rely on non-adversarial processes, such as peacemaking, commentators
have suggested expanding their jurisdiction and increasing the resources
available to them in order to solve problems like high crime and overincarceration among Native people.30 Tribal courts have a critical, leading
role to play in shaping criminal justice in Indian country, and federal
28. In less than a decade, Congress has passed two major pieces of legislation that
affirm expanded tribal criminal jurisdiction. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 25, 42 U.S.C.). In general, all legislation affecting
tribal criminal justice passed during the modern era has affirmed the primary importance of
tribal justice systems in Indian country. See Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176,
§ 2, 107 Stat. 2004, 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631) (resources for tribal justice
systems); Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3682) (same); Federal Death Penalty
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, 108 Stat. 1959 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 35913599) (providing that the federal death penalty would not be imposed on Indian country
defendants unless the local tribal government requests); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892
(1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)) (the Duro fix) (affirming inherent tribal criminal
jurisdiction over “all Indians”).
29. See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16
(describing the complex institutional and financial infrastructure of modern tribal criminal
justice systems).
30. See, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 131
(noting in chapter on alternatives to incarceration that “tribes are longtime advocates for
alternative approaches”). See generally Ryan Seelau, The Kids Aren’t Alright: An Argument
to Use the Nation Building Model in the Development of Native Juvenile Justice Systems to
Combat the Effect of Failed Assimilative Policies, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 97 (2012)
(identifying over-incarceration as one aspect of the problem faced by Native youth in
juvenile court and proposing tribal control as a solution).
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policymakers are increasingly willing to follow their lead. Questions about
the proper scope of their criminal deserve sustained and careful attention,
which this article seeks to provide.
I. A Patchwork of Rules
Understanding the legal boundaries of modern tribal criminal
jurisdiction31 requires interpreting Supreme Court cases and federal statutes
together. Tribes today possess all sovereign powers, including criminal
jurisdiction, unless those powers have been explicitly taken away by
Congress or held by the Supreme Court to have been implicitly divested.32
Congress has never expressly limited tribal criminal jurisdiction,33 but the
Supreme Court has twice held that tribes lost their jurisdiction to prosecute
specific categories of people.34 Congress subsequently passed legislation to
“affirm” and “restore” tribes’ inherent power to prosecute some—but not
all—of those categories of people.35 Taken together, statutory and common
31. This article is concerned with crimes that occur within tribal territory. It considers
the extent to which tribes’ territorial jurisdiction has been limited over certain categories of
people. It does not answer the related but separate question of whether, with respect to the
people over whom tribes still have jurisdiction, tribal territory marks the outer bounds of
tribal power. See Kelsey v. Pope, No. 14-1537 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2016) (upholding a tribe’s
extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a citizen for a crime committed in the
course of his duties as a tribal official); see also Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 240 (9th
Cir. 1974) (affirming extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over citizens for offenses related to
treaty rights occurring in treaty-defined territory). Many tribal codes assert extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. E.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 253(a)(1) (2010), available at
http://www.navajonationcouncil.org/Navajo%20Nation%20Codes/V0020.pdf; id. tit. 17, §
203 (extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over members); ABSENTEE SHAWNEE TRIBE CRIM.
CODE § 2 (2010) (extraterritorial jurisdiction over members and residents who commit
certain crimes), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/absentee-shawnee/criminal_
offenses.html; CHEYENNE & ARAPAHO TRIBES LAW & ORDER CODE tit. II, subpart D, § 2(a)
(1988) (same), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/cheyaracode/ offenses.html.
Whether the scope of that jurisdiction precisely matches the scope of intraterritorial
jurisdiction described here is a matter for another article.
32. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
33. It has, however, legislated to limit the manner in which tribal courts may conduct
criminal proceedings and the length of sentence they may impose. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(2012).
34. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
35. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit.
VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)) (jurisdiction
over “all Indians”); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 1134, tit. IX, § 904, 127 Stat. 120 (jurisdiction over certain non-Indians). A later statute
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law rules provide that tribes retain criminal jurisdiction as an aspect of their
inherent sovereignty over “all Indians,”36 including tribal citizens and
nonmember Indians. They lack jurisdiction over non-Indians in most
cases,37 except certain non-Indian domestic violence offenders with
sufficient ties to the tribe.38
These rules, instead of adhering to a unifying rationale, have been
created by judicial divestments and congressional restorations of tribal
jurisdiction which appear to be hasty reactions to each other, with Congress
partially undermining each of the Court’s limitations, but never fully
rejecting them. The practical reasons are sometimes apparent,39 but the
theoretical justifications are difficult to discern. The result is a patchwork of
rules from different sources, no clear explanation as to why those rules
exist, and unanswered questions about the precise reach of tribal
jurisdiction in areas that have not been specifically addressed by Congress
or the Court.
This article’s focus is tribal jurisdiction, but to form a complete picture
of criminal justice in Indian country, it is necessary to understand the
related rules for federal and state jurisdiction as well. Within Indian
country,40 the federal government exercises jurisdiction over crimes
amended the Duro fix to remove the year-long limit, making it permanent. See Act of Oct.
28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646.
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
37. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. This is at least true for non-Indians who are U.S. citizens.
At least one tribal court has asserted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who are not U.S.
citizens, holding that the reasoning of Oliphant refers only to the rights of citizens. Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 4 Cherokee Rep. 9, 2005 WL 6437828 (2005).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012); see infra Part I.D (describing the scope of special
domestic violence jurisdiction over non-Indians).
39. For example, Congress has twice restored tribal jurisdiction over a “jurisdictional
gap.” See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cordiano, Note, Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly Two Decades After Duro v. Reina, 41 CONN. L. REV.
267, 268 (2008) (describing how restored tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
addressed a jurisdictional gap created by the Duro decision because neither federal nor state
courts have jurisdiction to prosecute non-major crimes involving only Indians); M. Brent
Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and DOJ’s Proposed
Fix, 28 HARVARD J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 117, 121-22 (2011) (describing how
restoration of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders was necessary
to close a similar enforcement gap, in which U.S. attorneys, despite having jurisdiction,
frequently declined to prosecute non-Indian domestic violence offenders in Indian country).
40. “Indian country” is a legal term denoting the categories of land subject to federal
criminal jurisdiction because of its status as Indian land. Most of this land is classified as a
reservation or is held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of tribes or Indian
people. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Indian country includes “all land within the limits of any
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between Indians and non-Indians41 and certain enumerated major crimes
involving only Indians.42 In some areas, states exercise Indian country
criminal jurisdiction in place of the federal government pursuant to Public
Law 280 or a similar law.43 Absent such a specific law giving the state more
expansive jurisdiction, state jurisdiction is limited to reservation crimes
involving only non-Indians.44 Because the federal statutes and cases
affecting tribal jurisdiction are structured around the default federal/tribal
jurisdictional arrangement, this article likewise focuses on the interplay
between tribal and federal jurisdiction.45 It is important to remember that
Indian reservation” and tribal and individual trust allotments. Id. § 1151(a). It also includes
certain lands held in fee by tribes. Id. § 1151(b). Indian country also includes “dependent
Indian communities.” See also United States v. Candelaria 271 U.S. 432, 443 (1926)
(finding Pueblo fee land subject to the same restrictions as Indian trust land); United States
v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (same). But see Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522
U.S. 520, 532 (1998) (finding fee land owned by Alaska Native corporations is not Indian
country). In this article, I use the terms “tribal land,” and “tribal territory” interchangeably to
describe land over which tribes have jurisdiction. Although largely coterminous, these
categories may not always be identical. I therefore use “Indian country” only when referring
to the federally-defined legal category. For ease of reference, I sometimes use the term
“reservation” as shorthand when referring to tribal territory; it should be understood to
include other types of tribal land as well.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. By its terms, the statute does not extend to crimes committed by
one Indian against another Indian, to Indian offenders who have already been punished by
the tribe, or where a treaty has reserved exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe. Id. While federal
jurisdiction over some Indian-on-Indian crimes was created by a later law, the federal
government may not prosecute an Indian defendant under § 1152 if the tribe has already
prosecuted and punished that defendant.
42. Id. § 1153.
43. Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C.), unilaterally transferred federal
criminal jurisdiction to six states and authorized other states to assume the same. Although
Public Law 280 transferred federal jurisdiction to the states, it did so by extending state
criminal law into Indian country, so the reach of state jurisdiction is actually broader than
federal jurisdiction would be. For example, states can prosecute Indian defendants for any
crime against another Indian, not just a major crime defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Other
states were granted this jurisdiction by specific statutes, such as land claim settlements.
44. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); Draper v. United States,
164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL tit. 9,
§ 678 (2014).
45. State jurisdiction under Public Law 280 is concurrent with tribal jurisdiction, see
infra note 48 (describing the modern scholarly consensus that tribes retain concurrent
criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280), so any general rule about the scope of tribal
jurisdiction would also affect tribes subject to Public Law 280, and the practical effect may
be different for those tribes.
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the existence or non-existence of federal or state jurisdiction as a concurrent
overlay has no direct bearing on the scope of tribal jurisdiction.46 Just
because another government has concurrent jurisdiction does not mean that
tribes lack it.Any question about the appropriate scope of tribal criminal
jurisdiction must be answered first by looking to tribal law. Although
federal law limits tribal jurisdiction in significant ways, federal courts have
recognized that the question of a tribe’s jurisdiction should first be
answered by the tribe itself.47 Tribal law defines the scope of tribal
jurisdiction in the first instance, and the question of whether it complies
with the limits imposed by federal law comes later. A major shortcoming in
scholarly and judicial discussions of tribal criminal jurisdiction is the
tendency to focus primarily on federal jurisdiction, treating tribal
jurisdiction as a gap-filler: an approach that can lead tribes to unnecessarily
limit their own jurisdiction.48
46. The scope of federal and state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country certainly has
practical implications that inform Congress’ policy choices or the Court’s view of history,
which in turn may affect tribal jurisdiction. See infra Part II.A. A statute or case recognizing
federal or state jurisdiction over a specific type of case, however, does not determine
whether tribal jurisdiction exists.
47. See Nat’l Farmer’s Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1984) (finding
scope of tribal civil jurisdiction should be answered first by the tribal court).
48. For example, the existence of federal jurisdiction over major crimes in Indian
country, and the relative absence of tribal courts exercising jurisdiction over those same
crimes, has led the Court to suggest that tribes may not have jurisdiction over major crimes.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978) (assuming that tribal
jurisdiction over major crimes was extinguished by federal law and citing pre-1978 circuit
court authority to the same effect, but acknowledging some “confusion” over the question of
exclusive jurisdiction and declining to decide the question directly). But see United States v.
John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 n.21 (1978) (referring to the question as “disputed” and declining to
resolve); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 n.22 (declining to resolve the
question). Indeed, Congress seemed to assume that tribes lacked jurisdiction over major
crimes during when it passed the Duro fix law. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 101-938, at 132 (1990)
(Conf. Rep.) (report on first Duro fix bill) (referring to tribal jurisdiction as “criminal
misdemeanor jurisdiction”). Today, courts and scholars agree that the authorization of
federal jurisdiction did not divest tribes of their jurisdiction. Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823,
825-26 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that tribes retain jurisdiction to over offenses covered by the
Major Crimes Act, and noting that this was “the conclusion already reached by distinguished
authorities on the subject”); accord COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.04, at
758-60 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds, Lexis Nexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (noting
earlier judicial and regulatory opinions to the contrary but concluding that the Wetsit court’s
conclusion is “the correct one”); PHILIP FRICKEY ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 326 (2d ed.
2008); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 377-81 (5th ed. 2005);
CAROLE GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 528-37 (6th ed. 2010). Similarly, tribes subject to state jurisdiction under Public
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Looking to tribal law is also important to avoid confusing questions of
tribal jurisdiction with questions of federal jurisdiction. The courts’
tendency to conflate federal and tribal standards shows why it is so
important for tribes to define the limits of their own jurisdiction under tribal
law and to clarify whether they intend to adopt or diverge from federal
standards. Federal court review of a tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction
should start with whether it comports with tribal law; only if it does should
the court then consider whether it runs afoul of federal limitations placed on
tribal court jurisdiction (which may be different from the limitations placed
on federal courts’ jurisdiction). Tribes do not legislate in a vacuum, though;
federal law imposes certain limits on tribes’ jurisdiction. This article begins
with a careful review of federal limits, because a thorough understanding of
these limits provides the context necessary to understand how and why
tribes articulate the scope of their own jurisdiction.
A. Jurisdiction Ends at the “Indian”
Before 1978, it remained a legal possibility that tribes had retained their
sovereign power to prosecute all people who committed crimes in tribal
territory.49 But in that year the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, a case involving a white man who lived on the
Law 280 sometimes have been treated as if they lack criminal jurisdiction. See B.J. Jones,
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-state and
Tribal-federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 472 (1998). Today, it is clear that
tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction even if subject to Public Law 280. Walker v. Rushing,
898 F. 2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990); Booth v. State, 903 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Alaska Ct. App.
1995); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra, at 535-38; Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent
Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1627, 1667-91
(1998) (demonstrating that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction);
CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC
LAW 280, at 157-63 (1997); COHEN, supra, § 6.04[3][c] (describing the “nearly unanimous
view” but noting that this “consensus . . . has developed relatively recently”) .
49. Congress and the Court agree that whatever the scope of tribes’ criminal
jurisdiction, it exists because it is an aspect of inherent sovereignty that tribes have retained
despite the imposition of federal plenary power. Federal law provides that tribes, which have
been recognized by the United States government as separate sovereigns since before the
country was formed, retain all aspects of sovereignty that have not been clearly taken away
via treaty or statute or “withdrawn by . . . implication as necessary result of their dependent
status.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. Congress and the federal courts agree that tribes retain
some criminal jurisdiction, but not the full scope of territorial jurisdiction enjoyed by most
sovereigns. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) (“A basic attribute of full
territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the
sovereign’s territory, whether citizens or aliens. Oliphant recognized that the tribes can no
longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.”).
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Suquamish Reservation, and declared that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.50
Early treaties reflected the understanding that tribes were sovereign
nations with “complete territorial sovereignty over their lands.”51 Such
retained jurisdiction would have included the power to prosecute nonIndian defendants.52 Before the 1900s, however, the geographical
separation between Indian and non-Indian communities likely afforded few
opportunities for tribes to exercise that power, or document it if they did.
Moreover, when white settlers committed crimes in Indian country, the
federal government often stepped in to prosecute them, relying on its power
to manage relations between its citizens and the Indian tribes by keeping the
peace, and on its obligation to protect tribes and their lands from incursions
by settlers.53 In the late 1800s and early 1900s federal policies changed,
which brought many more non-Indians within the boundaries of
reservations54 and at the same time crippled tribal justice systems.55 Over
50. 435 U.S. 191, 208.
51. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. L.
REV. 113, 118-23 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, No Supremacy Clause] (analyzing treaty
provisions).
52. Id. at 123 (territorial sovereignty, as recognized by treaties, included “complete
jurisdiction over any non-Indian intruders”); see also supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text
(explaining that sovereigns are normally understood to have jurisdiction over all who
commit crimes within their territory, plus extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals and
others who commit certain crimes).
53. Beginning in 1790, federal laws known as Indian trade and intercourse acts provided
for federal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens (in other words, whites) who committed a
crime or trespass on Indian land. See Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 958-59
(1975) (describing these laws) [hereinafter Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction].
54. See General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The Act authorized a policy of allotting tribal
lands, conveying parcels to individual Indians, and opening up the “surplus” land for white
settlement. See generally Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the
Ghosts of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 144 (2012) (describing how
the federal government’s allotment and sale of tribal lands encouraged and facilitated white
settlement on reservations and disputing the common assumption that these white settlers
expected tribes disappear and therefore did not expect to be subjected to tribal government
jurisdiction).
55. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), undermined tribal criminal justice
systems by extending for the first time federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians
against other Indians on reservations, an extension justified by the belief that tribal justice
systems were not capable of addressing serious crimes. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW
DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN
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the next century, as non-Indian crime became more common on
reservations, most tribes lacked the judicial and financial resources to
prosecute these offenders. By the 1970s, however, tribes began to exercise
this long dormant aspect of their sovereignty by prosecuting non-Indians
who committed crimes in their territory, which finally prompted the Court
to address the question of whether they still possessed such jurisdiction.56
The Oliphant Court ended this practice by holding that tribes, while
retaining criminal jurisdiction generally, were divested of the power to
exercise it over non-Indians.57
The Court’s primary rationale was historical. It first reviewed the
historical record and noted that tribes rarely exercised criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.58 Then it looked for congressional or executive
confirmation of such jurisdiction and found none.59 In the absence of
historical examples and external confirmation, the Court decided that the
power of tribes to prosecute non-Indians who committed crimes in their
territory no longer existed. As others have convincingly argued, the Court’s
“use it or lose it” approach to history and doctrine here is inconsistent with
its previous cases on tribal jurisdiction, in which it assumed tribes retained
all sovereign powers unless a power had been explicitly divested by treaty
or statute.60 The Court also created a circular trap for tribes. Previous
NINETEENTH CENTURY 136-39 (1994). The federal Code of Indian Offenses employed a
criminal justice model to forcibly assimilate Indian people by criminalizing tribal cultural
and religious activities. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 48. Congress further
undermined tribal justice systems in 1953 by extending state criminal jurisdiction over many
reservations. See supra note 43.
56. See Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v.
Tribal Sovereignty?: The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES 261, 263 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2010).
57. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
58. Id. at 197-98.
59. Id.
60. Oliphant has been the subject of devastating critique by Indian law experts because
it reversed the logic of previous cases about tribal powers. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority over Nonmember, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 34-36 (1999); Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and
Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument before the American Indian
Nations Supreme Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (2003) (describing how the Court
“[a]bandon[ed] the Indian law canons of construction”); Melanie Beth Oliviero & A.T.
Skibine, The Supreme Court Decision That Jolted Tribal Jurisdiction, AM. INDIAN J., May
1980, at 2, 6 (“[The Court did not explain] how [it] can find jurisdiction of nonmembers
inconsistent with tribal status or in conflict with the sovereignty of the United States. The
crucial mistake in Oliphant is that the denial of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is a
THE
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federal policies had the intended effect of undermining tribal government
institutions.61 Those policies were later rejected in favor of federal support
for tribal sovereignty,62 but the Court used the resulting lack of strong tribal
government infrastructure as a reason to hold that tribes no longer enjoyed
the full scope of their governmental powers.63 Because of its reverse logic,
the damaging impact of Oliphant eventually extended far beyond criminal
political question which the Court decided in violation of the United States Constitution.”)
The general rule in prior case law was that tribes possess any power inherent in sovereignty
unless that power has been limited by treaty, statute, or it was necessarily inconsistent with
the tribe’s “domestic dependent” status. See Frickey, supra, at 8-13 (describing the
foundational premise that “tribes possess all authority not lost as a result of original
European contact, explicit treaty cessions, or unambiguous statutory language to the
contrary”). Before Oliphant, the Court had only relied on the “necessarily inconsistent”
reasoning twice to hold that tribes lost the “power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased,” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823), and
that tribes lost the power of independent external relations with foreign nations, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). Besides those powers, the exercise of
which could potentially threaten the existence of the United States as a nation, tribes were
thought to possess any power that had not been affirmatively taken away. See Frickey,
supra, at 13-14, 36 (describing the limited category of implicit divestiture prior to Oliphant
and noting that the Court “reopened a category of diminished tribal authority that had been
thought closed forever since the Marshall Court”). In Oliphant, the Court turned this
approach inside out, asking instead whether the Congress had ever affirmed the existence of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and whether tribes had historically exercised
such jurisdiction. Finding little evidence of historical exercise or congressional or executive
confirmation of the power, the Court held that it had been “implicitly divested.” Id. at 197209.
61. See supra notes 48, 54-55.
62. Since the late 1960s, the federal government has followed a policy of supporting
tribal self-determination and dealing with tribes on a government-to-government basis. This
policy was first set forth in President Nixon‘s message to Congress on Indian affairs. Special
Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970). President Nixon‘s
statement rejected the policies pursued in the past where an “Indian community is almost
entirely run by outsiders” and directed Congress to “create the conditions for a new era in
which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.” Id. at 565-66.
Every subsequent President has reaffirmed the policy. Memorandum No. 215, 74 Fed. Reg.
57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (President Obama); Proclamation No. 7500, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,641
(Nov. 12, 2001) (President G.W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov.
9, 2000) (President Clinton); Memorandum No. 85, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994)
(President Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998) (President
Clinton); Statement Reaffirming the Government-to-Government Relationship Between the
Federal Government and Indian Tribal Governments, 1 PUB. PAPERS 662 (June 14, 1991)
(President G.H.W. Bush); Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983)
(President Reagan).
63. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-205.
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jurisdiction. For example, the Court has relied on this backward approach in
subsequent cases to divest tribes of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers of
the tribe in many situations.64
The Oliphant Court’s historical analysis has also been criticized as
inaccurate.65 For example, the Court cited treaty language that affirmed
exclusive tribal criminal jurisdiction within tribal territory and also
provided that the United States would punish its own citizens who
committed offenses against the tribe or its members.66 Such language was
probably not understood by the signatory tribes as a blanket prohibition
against criminally punishing any non-Indians. There is evidence that nonIndians who were married or adopted into tribes, or who otherwise settled
in tribal territory, were treated as members of the community, and were
subjected to tribal criminal jurisdiction.67 The treaties can be read instead as
64. See, e.g., Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Trapped in the Spring of 1978: The Continuing
Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Martinez, 55 FED. LAW.,
Mar./Apr. 2008, at 36, 38; Royster, supra note 60, at 60, 63-66 (describing how the novel
logic of Oliphant has been used to divest tribes of civil jurisdiction).
65. See Royster, supra note 60, at 60 (“The [Court reasoned] that all three branches of
the federal government shared a common historical understanding that tribes could not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This was arguably the most indecent piece
of ‘reasoning’ that the Court has ever produced. It is a textbook model of how to obscure
unfavorable law, relegate contrary facts and precedent to footnotes, and argue using only
highly selective snippets that support the preferred position. As a lawyer's brief, this is
probably ethical. As a decision by the nation's highest court, it is an embarrassment.”); Peter
C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole Is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,
19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 403-40 (1993) (reviewing precedent and historical sources relied
upon by the Court and finding that “the history recounted by the Court certainly does not
support” its conclusion).
66. Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S 191, 197 n.8 (1978).
67. See, e.g., Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 953-54
(describing how early treaties did not prohibit tribes from exercising jurisdiction over nonIndians, but provided for mutual cooperation between a tribe and the U.S. in the case of
crimes between tribal and U.S. citizens and recognized tribal authority to deal criminally
with non-Indians who settled in tribal territory and committed crimes there); see also
Clinton, No Supremacy Clause, supra note 51, at 122 (interpreting prosecution agreements
in treaties as extradition agreements between sovereigns with complete territorial
jurisdiction); Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 954-55
(describing treaty language); see also United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68
(1846) (federal criminal case involving inter-married white man who was prosecuted by the
tribe); see also Bethany R. Berger, "Power over This Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and
Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004) [hereinafter
Berger, Power] (describing other cases of whites prosecuted by tribal courts); Paul Spruhan,
“Indians, in a Jurisdictional Sense”: Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of Non-Indian
Consent to Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 79, 85-91 (2012); Oliphant, 435
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intending to limit tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who were relative
strangers to the community, or as extradition agreements between
sovereigns that did not limit either sovereign’s jurisdiction.
Although most of Oliphant is dedicated to historical analysis, the Court
acknowledged that historical practice alone was not enough to establish that
tribes had been divested of criminal jurisdiction.68 The opinion’s final pages
supplied the missing reasoning, explaining why the Court believed the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to be inconsistent with
tribes’ status as domestic dependent nations.69 First, the Court explained
that any jurisdiction “beyond what is necessary to control internal relations”
of tribes would be inconsistent with their semi-sovereign status.70 This
distinction between internal and external matters appears in other cases
decided at the same time as well,71 and it highlights the Court’s concern
with tribal jurisdiction over outsiders, as opposed to insiders.
Second, tribal prosecution of non-Indians, in the Court’s view, is
incompatible with the United States’ interest in protecting the due process
rights of its citizens:
Protection of territory within its external political boundaries is,
of course, as central to the sovereign interests of the United
States as it is to any other sovereign nation. But from the
formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
United States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United
States to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation
of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes
therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian
citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress.72

U.S. at 197 n.8 (acknowledging that the treaties also provided that whites who settled in
Indian country could be punished by the tribe); Maxfield, supra note 65, at 415 (critiquing
the Court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions).
68. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
69. Id. at 208-11.
70. Id. at 210.
71. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
72. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-10.
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Although the Court emphasized the United States’ interest in protecting the
due process rights of its citizens, a group that in 1978 included Indian
people,73 it viewed this incompatibility as meaning that tribes lost
jurisdiction over only “non-Indian” citizens.74 Oliphant thus carved out a
category of “Indian” people who, although also United States citizens,
could fairly be prosecuted in tribal courts.75
However, the Court offered little support for its conclusion regarding the
due process rights of citizens. U.S. citizens are regularly subject to
prosecution by foreign governments for crimes committed abroad without
significant concerns being raised about whether the substantive or
procedural criminal law of the requesting country differs from American
law.76 The Court did not explain in detail why Indian tribal prosecution
presented more of a threat to the liberty of U.S. citizens than prosecution by
a foreign court. It expressed concern about the fairness of subjecting non73. Indian Citizenship Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1401). The Act collectively naturalized all American Indian people. Prior to the Act, Indians
as a group were considered to be citizens of tribal nations, but not of the United States,
although individual Indian people were sometimes naturalized. See generally Bethany R.
Berger, Birthright Citizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
37 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
74. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-11.
75. This was consistent with an earlier case about federal criminal prosecution, United
States v. Antelope, which held that it did not violate the constitutional rights of Indian people
to be prosecuted federally when a non-Indian charged with the same crime could only be
prosecuted in state court. 430 U.S. 641, 669-70 (1977) (subjecting Indians to prosecution
under federal law, which carried stiffer penalties than prosecution under state law, for crimes
committed in Indian country is not an illegal racial classification); see also Fisher v. Dist.
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (denying Indians access to state courts for adoptions arising
on the reservation not a violation of equal protection).
76. When a U.S. citizen is subject to prosecution abroad, the decision whether to
extradite provides the main opportunity for U.S. courts to intervene should concerns about
the foreign system exist, but foreign courts are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as
tribal courts. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO.
98-958, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND
RECENT TREATIES 23 (2010), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf
(explaining that U.S. courts follow a “non-inquiry rule” based on the idea that “[w]hen an
American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to
submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may
prescribe for its own people”) (quoting In re Extradition of Cheung, 986 F. Supp. 791, 78999 (D. Conn. 1997) and collecting cases that demonstrate how rare it is for the U.S. to refuse
to extradite because of procedural fairness concerns); accord id. at 8 (explaining that, while
extradition usually applies only to offenses that are criminalized in both countries, “the
United States favors the view that treaties should be construed to honor an extradition
request if possible” and so this requirement is construed loosely).
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Indians to tribal justice systems, which it characterized as culturally foreign,
incompetent, and not sufficiently protective of the basic guarantees of due
process protected by the Constitution.77 In reaching its conclusion, the
Court looked for guidance to an 1883 decision about whether an Indian78
could be tried in the federal system.79 Invalidating that prosecution, the
Court had reasoned that the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indians absent express congressional authorization would amount to an
unfair extension of law
over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community
separated by race [and] tradition, . . . from the authority and
power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an
external and unknown code . . . ; which judges them by a
standard made by others and not for them . . . . It tries them, not
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of
their land, but by . . . a different race, according to the law of a
social state of which they have an imperfect conception . . . .80
The Oliphant Court reasoned that “[t]hese considerations, applied here to
the non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak equally strongly against
the validity of respondents’ contention that Indian tribes, although fully
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, retain the power to try
non-Indians according to their own customs and procedure.”81
Yet, the Court did not hold that tribes were divested of their criminal
jurisdiction altogether.82 In fact, it affirmed that tribes retained jurisdiction
over their own citizens that same year in a case called United States v.
Wheeler, in which the Court held that the Navajo Nation retained its
inherent power to prosecute an enrolled tribal citizen.83 In Wheeler and
77. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (“This principle [that tribes gave up the power to
prosecute non-Indians] would have been obvious a century ago when most Indian tribes
were characterized by a ‘want of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice.’ It
should be no less obvious today, even though present-day Indian tribal courts embody
dramatic advances over their historical antecedents.” (internal citations omitted)).
78. Indians were not United States citizens at the time.
79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (citing Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S.
556 (1883)).
80. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571).
81. Id. at 211.
82. Id. at 210.
83. 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978). Because the tribal prosecution was an exercise of
inherent power, the subsequent federal prosecution of Wheeler for the same crime did not
violate double jeopardy. See also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that
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Oliphant, the Court thus drew a clear line between tribal citizens, over
whom the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction presented no conflict with
U.S. sovereignty, and “non-Indians,” over whom the extension of “alien”
jurisdiction was so unfair as to be incompatible with due process rights. In
other words, the Court viewed tribal jurisdiction as fair in some cases and
unfair in others—but limited its concerns about fairness to non-Indian
people, to whom it believed the tribe’s justice system would be “alien.”84
The Court in Oliphant did not explain why it chose to draw this line
between “Indians” and “non-Indians,” nor did it explain whom it meant to
include in each category, but instead left those difficult questions to be
resolved in later cases.
B. Jurisdiction Extends to “Nonmember Indians”
Oliphant prohibited tribal courts from prosecuting non-Indians, while
Wheeler confirmed those courts’ power to prosecute their own tribal
citizens.85 In the gray area between those two categories remained a group
usually described as “nonmember Indians”—people who might be
considered Indians in the Court’s view (and are thus not outside tribal court
jurisdiction under Oliphant), but who are not citizens of the prosecuting
tribe.86 This category includes both people who are enrolled citizens of one
tribe but commit crimes in the territory of another, and also people
considered to be legally Indian by some measures, but who are not formally
enrolled in any tribe. This begs the question of what it means to be legally
Indian when one is not an enrolled tribal citizen.
In 1990, the Supreme Court and Congress reached opposite conclusions
regarding tribal criminal jurisdiction over this group. First, the Court
extended its Oliphant ruling and held that tribes lacked jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians as well.87 Then Congress immediately responded by
tribal criminal jurisdiction over a tribal citizen is an aspect of inherent tribal sovereignty not
governed by the federal Bill of Rights). Wheeler is described in the Court’s opinion as “a
member of the Navajo Tribe.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 314. The Court in Talton described the
defendant and the victim as “both Cherokee Indians.” Talton, 163 U.S. at 379. Although
neither Court specifically discussed the idea of formal citizenship, no questions were raised
as to the status of either defendant as a member of the tribe.
84. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
85. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
86. Impact of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962, S. 963
Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 137 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing
on S. 962, S. 963] (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux, President, National Congress of
American Indians).
87. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
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passing legislation to confirm that tribes do retain criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.88 Unfortunately, this legislation did little to clarify the
scope of this category or Congress’ reasons for differentiating between
nonmember Indians and non-Indians, over whom it did not restore tribal
criminal jurisdiction.
1. Duro v. Reina
The Court, by failing to clarify its reasons for distinguishing between
Indians and non-Indians in Oliphant, opened the door for its holding in
1990 that tribes were also divested of their criminal jurisdiction over
“nonmember Indians.”89 Duro involved an Indian defendant who was an
enrolled citizen of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Indians, but was
living on the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Reservation,90 where he was
accused of killing a fourteen year old Indian boy.91 Duro was initially
charged with murder in federal court, but the indictment was dismissed in
response to a motion by the Attorney General.92 The Salt River Tribe then
charged Duro with the crime of illegally firing a weapon, and Duro
challenged the tribal court’s jurisdiction.93 The facts presented an issue that
was obscured in Oliphant: is tribal prosecution of a person who is “Indian”
but not enrolled in the prosecuting tribe similarly inconsistent with U.S.
sovereignty?
The Duro Court reasoned that nonmember Indians are on the same
footing as non-Indians in terms of the issues implicated by tribal criminal
jurisdiction: they have not consented to be governed by the tribe,94 they
88. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit.
VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)); H.R. REP.
NO. 101-938 (1990) (Conf. Rep.); see infra Part I.B.2 (discussing this legislation).
89. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. The Duro court categorized people into “members” and
nonmembers” of a specific tribe. It did not explicitly define “membership,” but the opinion
clearly equates the idea of membership with formal citizenship in the tribe. See id. at 694
(“Tribal authority over members, who are also citizens, is not subject to these objections.
Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our precedents and justified by
the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation in
tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.”). For a discussion of others ways
to conceive of “membership” in a tribal community, see Part II.
90. Id. at 679.
91. The victim was a citizen of a third tribe. The case thus involved two Indians, neither
of whom was a citizen member of the prosecuting tribe, but both of whom lived and worked
in that tribe’s community.
92. Duro, 495 U.S. at 680.
93. Id. at 681.
94. Id. at 693-94.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

362

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

have no voice in the government,95 and the tribe’s legal system and culture
might be unfamiliar to them.96 Like the Court in Oliphant, the Duro Court
expressed concerns about subjecting outsiders to the cultural and procedural
differentness of tribal courts:
The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes a focus on
consent and the protections of citizenship most appropriate. While
modern tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial
process, they are influenced by the unique customs, languages,
and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are often
“subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments,” and
their legal methods may depend on “unspoken practices and
norms.” It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to
Indian tribal governments. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but these
guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts.
There is, for example, no right under the Act to appointed counsel
for those unable to afford a lawyer.97
The Court reasoned that criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians
presented many of the same concerns that the Court had identified in
Oliphant, but it framed the issue as one of lack of consent, a theme absent
from Oliphant:
The retained sovereignty of a tribe is but a recognition of certain
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent
to be tribal members. . . . A tribe's additional authority comes
from the consent of its members, and so in the criminal sphere
membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.”98
The Court noted that as a nonmember ineligible for citizenship in the Salt
River Tribe, Duro was prohibited from voting, holding political office, or
serving on a jury convened by the tribal court.99 The Court noted lack of
consent and political participation rights as the determining factors, and
found no reason to treat non-Indians and nonmember Indians differently for
95. Id. at 679. Although concerns about lack of due process protections and cultural
foreignness drove the Court’s decision in Oliphant regarding non-Indians, that opinion did
not discuss its frame the Court’s concerns in terms of consent or civic participation.
96. Id. at 693-94.
97. Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 679.
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jurisdictional purposes.100 By using this consent/political participation
rationale, the Court also relied less on the historical record, which it
characterized as “somewhat less illuminating” than the record regarding
jurisdiction over non-Indians.101
The Duro decision left an immediate practical gap in Indian country law
enforcement for tribes not subject to Public Law 280. Although the federal
government has concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute many crimes
committed by Indian people, no federal law authorizes prosecution of an
Indian person who commits a minor crime against another Indian person,102
and states only have jurisdiction over matters in which no Indian is
involved.103 Minor crimes between Indians fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribal courts.104 Federal courts determining jurisdiction do
not distinguish between Indians who are enrolled in the prosecuting tribe
and those who are not, so a federal court would have jurisdiction over an
Indian who committed a major crime, regardless of citizenship status.
Likewise, that same court would lack jurisdiction over an Indian who
committed a minor crime against another Indian, regardless of whether the
defendant or the victim were enrolled citizens.

100. Id. at 684-88.
101. Id. at 688-92. But see H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 132-33 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (report
accompanying the law passed to reverse the Duro holding) (finding tribes had been
exercising jurisdiction over nonmember Indians for over two hundred years, and that the
existence of such jurisdiction had never been questioned).
102. The term “major crime” is used in this article to denote crimes than are listed in the
Major Crimes Act, which established federal jurisdiction only over certain enumerated
crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). The term “minor crime” is used to denote crimes not listed.
The Act originally included only seven offenses, but now includes fourteen: murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, felony sexual abuse, incest, felony assault (including
assault with intent to commit a felony, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault by striking
or beating, and assault resulting in substantial injury, and strangling or choking an intimate
partner), assault on a child younger than sixteen, felony child abuse or neglect, arson,
burglary, robbery, and theft of property valued over $1000. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Use of the
terms “major” and “minor” is not intended as a commentary on the seriousness of any
particular offense. Some offenses listed in the Major Crimes Act could be considered nonserious offenses (e.g., taking property valued at $1000 or more), while some crimes not
listed (e.g., torture or treason) could be considered quite serious.
103. See supra note 44.
104. COHEN, supra note 48, § 9.04.
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Table 1 – Jurisdiction After Duro – Which Courts May Prosecute?
Defendant

Crime type

Indian victim

Non-Indian victim

Major

Tribal & Federal

Tribal & Federal

Minor

Tribal

Tribal or Federal

Major

Federal

Federal

Minor

X

Federal

All crimes

Federal

State

Tribal citizen

Nonmember Indian
Non-Indian

After Duro, a person who qualified as Indian under federal law but was
not enrolled in prosecuting tribe could not be prosecuted by any
government. This even applied to Duro himself because, after the murder
charge was dismissed, the federal court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him
for the minor crime of illegally firing a weapon, while the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him as nonmember Indian.
2. The “Duro Fix”
Congress responded swiftly to the Duro decision by passing legislation
the same year that affirmed tribes’ inherent power to prosecute nonmember
Indians, which closed the gap the Court created.105 It did so by amending
the definitions section of the Indian Civil Rights Act to clarify that a tribe’s
“powers of self-government” include “the inherent power of Indian tribes,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”106 The amendment also added a definition of the term “Indian” as
“any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as
an Indian . . . if that person were to commit an offense listed in that section
in Indian country to which that section applies.”107 Although originally
105. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII,
§ 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
106. Id. The statute was passed in response to the Duro decision holding that tribes also
lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, so it is clear that it was intended to cover
more than enrolled citizens of the prosecuting tribe. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v.
Reina and the Legislation That Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions,
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 767-70 (1993).
107. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012). The law refers directly to a provision of federal law
called the Major Crimes Act, which authorizes the federal jurisdiction over certain crimes
between Indians. That statute does not define the term “Indian,” but the term has been
judicially defined. See infra Part I.C.3. After circuit courts split on the question of whether
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passed as a year-long temporary fix,108 Congress later amended the
provision by removing the sunset date,109 permanently rejecting the Duro
holding.
Table 2 – Criminal Jurisdiction After the Duro Fix – Which Courts May Prosecute?
Defendant

Crime type

Indian victim

Non-Indian victim

Major

Tribal & Federal

Tribal & Federal

Minor

Tribal

Tribal or Federal

Major

Tribal* & Federal

Tribal* & Federal

Minor

Tribal*

Tribal* or Federal

All crimes

Federal

State

Tribal citizen

Nonmember Indian
Non-Indian

* Jurisdiction restored by the Duro fix.

Why did Congress affirm jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but not
non-Indians? A primary rationale for the legislation was the law
enforcement vacuum left by Duro. The congressional record reveals
concern about Indians from other tribes,110 and advocates for the bill also
cited this problem.111 Commentators observed the magnitude of the
the amendment affirmed tribes’ inherent authority to prosecute all Indians or delegated a
federal power to tribes, the Supreme Court addressed the question, holding that the statute
was an affirmation of inherent tribal power. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
Lara is discussed further in Part I.C.1.
108. The original law was temporary, Department of Defense Appropriations Act of
1991, § 8077(d), 104 Stat. at 1892 (providing that the provisions restoring jurisdiction would
be ineffective after September 30, 1991), and Congress expressed its intent to work with
tribes, federal agencies, and states “to develop more comprehensive legislation within the
coming year to clarify the intent of the Congress on the issue,” H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at
133 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), but the promised clarification never materialized.
109. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646.
110. E.g., 102 CONG. REC. 10,712 (1991) (statement of Rep. George Miller) (“[V]irtually
all tribes support it. That means tribes want the jurisdiction but also support letting other
tribes have jurisdiction over their people.”).
111. E.g., The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Hearing on H.R. 972 Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 33
(1991) (Resolution of the International Association of Chiefs of Police on Expansion of
Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes) (referring to visits and marriages “between members
of different tribes”); id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Bill Richardson) (referring to the
jurisdictional void over Indians from one tribe who “reside on, work at, or visit other tribal
reservations” and to “member Indians [who] have spouses from a different tribe”). But see
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problem, given the large number of nonmember Indians living and working
on reservations112 and the even larger influx of nonmember Indians present
at tribally hosted public cultural events, such as powwows and Pueblo feast
days.113 Congress’ focus on patching a jurisdictional gap is underscored by
references in the record to tribes’ loss of “misdemeanor jurisdiction” over
nonmember Indians.114 The revised law fully restored jurisdiction over all
Indian people to the same extent as it exists over tribal citizens, which
includes jurisdiction over major crimes,115 but the legislators envisioned
tribal jurisdiction only in terms of misdemeanors—the one category of
crimes over which the federal courts lack jurisdiction in cases where both
the defendant and victim are Indians.116

Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 137 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux)
(describing nonmember Indian category as including Indians enrolled in other tribes and
Indians not enrolled anywhere); Hearing on H.R. 972, supra, at 153-58 (oral and written
testimony of Professor Richard Collins) (explaining that formal enrollment does not
necessarily reflect the traditional view about who is part of a tribal community); Hearing on
S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 218 (statement of Professor Nell Jessup Newton)
(advocating elimination of language defining Indian in terms of member and referring to
Indians who are not enrolled anywhere, a group she described as “much larger than many
people realize”).
112. See Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 109, 109 n.7 (1992) (describing various factors that have led to the presence
of significant numbers of nonmember Indians on most reservation, including the presence of
Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service employees, inter-marriage between
tribes, and the presence of people who are ineligible for citizenship in their home
communities, making them nonmembers if membership is defined in terms of citizenship);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (“Non-tribal member Indians own property on Indian
reservations, their children attend tribal schools, their families receive health care from tribal
hospitals and clinics.”)
113. See Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 146 (testimony of Donald Dupuis,
Chief Judge of the Tribal Court of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes) (“thousands
of non-member Indians gather on the Reservation each summer for annual pow-wows”); id.
at 181 (“This number of non-member Indians and others increase tremendously on occasions
of special events such as Shalako (the Zuni New Year’s celebration).”).
114. H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 132-33.
115. See supra note 48 (describing common assumption that tribes do not have
jurisdiction over major crimes and recent case law holding to the contrary).
116. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (referring to “the power of tribal courts to
exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction”); Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 25
(statement of Sen. Pete Domenici) (discussing jurisdiction “in misdemeanor cases—and
remember, that’s all there is here”). The reference to misdemeanor jurisdiction probably also
reflected an acknowledgement that tribes could not sentence offenders to more than one year
in jail. See infra note 221 (describing sentence limits).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1

No. 2]

TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

367

Beyond this practical problem, Congress did not elaborate on its reasons
for restoring jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians. The
enforcement-gap explanation also does not explain why Congress chose to
affirm only tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, rather than
clarifying federal or state jurisdiction over these people. A second possible
rationale is that tribes have a long history of embracing members of other
tribes through intermarriage, education, removal, and relocation.117
However, tribes have a long history of embracing non-Indians as well,118 so
this rationale does not fully explain why Congress would distinguish
between nonmember Indians and non-Indians.119 A third possible
explanation is the idea that Indian tribes, whether as a matter of history or
as a result of modern inter-tribal cooperation, share certain basic values that
might render a tribal justice system in one tribe less unfamiliar to another
Indian (even one from another tribe) than it would be to a non-Indian. This
explanation, however, ignores the vast diversity among tribes.120
A less satisfying but perhaps more likely explanation for restoring
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians, is that it reflects
a politically possible compromise between those who would limit tribal
117. Accord Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 444 (Navajo 1999)
(“Given the United States Indian education policy of sending Indian children to boarding
schools, Indians in the armed services, modern population mobility, and other factors, there
are high rates of intertribal intermarriage among American Indians.”); id. at 447-51
(discussing history of Indians from other tribes living in Navajo territory and of individuals
integrating into Navajo society through its clan system).
118. See supra note 67 and infra notes 435-436. For the reasons described in notes 112
and 117, the number of non-Indians incorporated into tribes is likely much smaller, and it is
likely that tribes sometimes embraced Indian outsiders more readily and completely.
119. The frequency with which tribes exercised jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,
and the degree to which federal officials recognized it, differs from their history with regard
to non-Indians. H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (“Throughout the history of this country, the
Congress has never questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor
jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians in the same manner that such courts exercise
misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members.”). This difference in historical practice
accounts for greater emphasis on history in Oliphant. As described at supra text
accompanying notes 68-84, though, historical practice does not fully answer the question,
and each court therefore offered a fairness-related justification for its holding as well.
120. See, e.g., Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (1988) (pointing to “significant
racial, cultural, and legal differences” between tribes, along with the lack of nonmember
consent, to justify holding that tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians); Duro v. Reina, 860 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order
denying rehearing en banc) (quoting Greywater and noting possibility of “hostility or
mistrust” between tribes); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 678 (1990) (discussing diversity
among tribes).
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jurisdiction to enrolled citizens of that tribe and those who would extend it
to anyone who commits a crime within the tribe’s territory. When Congress
restored jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders twenty
years later, tribes sought restoration of full territorial jurisdiction: draft
versions of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 would have completely
overturned Oliphant, and advocates urged the same during hearings on the
VAWA of 2013.121
The possibility that tribal courts might obtain jurisdiction over white
defendants has generated significant concern, especially in potential cases
where those defendants do not live in the tribe’s territory or are viewed as
living “involuntarily” in Indian country.122 This is one reason why the Duro
fix may have encountered less resistance than an Oliphant fix would have
encountered.123 Because its limited affirmation of tribal jurisdiction focused
121. See Tribal Law and Order Act (Draft) (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://
www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/DraftTribalLawandOrderActof2009.pdf;
Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, and Daughters:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 75 (2011), available at
http://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/071411CHRG-112shrg71182.pdf
(testimony of Sarah Deer) (urging restoration of criminal jurisdiction over all offenders for all
crimes).
122. Many whites settled in Indian country as a result of the federal policy allotting
reservations and encouraging whites to settle on those parcels on the assumption that Indian
country would vanish. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-15
(1995) (describing how allotment and surplus land policies resulted in nearly ninety million
acres of formerly tribal lands passing to white settlers); Tweedy, supra note 54, at 133-34
(same); Frickey, supra note 60, at 15 (describing allotment policy). When the United States
later reversed this policy and reaffirmed tribal sovereignty, most of these white landowners
remained on the land. Id. (allotment resulted in a “significant non-Indian population” on
many reservations today); Royster, supra, at 60 (“In the allotment-based cases, the Court has
consistently invoked the interests of non-Indian landowners in the Indian country.”);
Tweedy, supra note 54, at 137-39 (discussing the Court’s concern with whether these
settlers and their descendants would have expected to be subject to the jurisdiction of a tribal
court and questioning its historical accuracy).
123. See, e.g., Stephen Fee, Transcript: Above the Law: Responding to Domestic
Violence on Indian Reservations, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 22, 2014, 12:20 PM EDT), http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-uneven-justice-seen-reservations-victims-domestic-violence/
(quoting Senator Tom Coburn, who opposed passage of the Violence Against Women Act
amendments restoring tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic abusers on the grounds
that they are not tribal citizens, with no mention of the twenty-year-old law providing for
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians) (“You cannot cast tribal sovereignty on me. I’m
not a member of the tribe. . . . There’s no way you can assure and guarantee constitutional
provisions under what passed. So it –this provision will eventually be thrown out, be
challenged, and on appeal they’ll lose, because you cannot guarantee American citizens their
constitutional rights if they’re non-tribal members in a tribal court.”).
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on less of a politically charged issue than a reversal of Oliphant would
have, it has also generated less focused inquiry into the reasons supporting
such an extension of tribal jurisdiction, and has left important questions
about the rationale for affirming tribal jurisdiction over only nonmember
Indians unanswered.
As a result, the law seems problematic to some critics: it treats Indians
and non-Indians differently and rejects using tribal citizenship as the
definitive way to determine who counts as an Indian. If a person’s Indian
status does not in this context hinge on his or her formal citizenship in a
tribe, some may wonder, what is left besides a purely descent-based
classification? The next section discusses how various courts have
answered the definitional questions raised by Duro.124
C. Who Is an Indian?
The Duro fix left open the question of who is included in the category
“nonmember Indians.” Does the designation simply refer to enrolled
citizens of tribes other than the ones seeking to prosecute them? In other
words, did Congress intend to affirm inter-tribal jurisdiction, but not to
disturb the Court’s emphasis on enrolled citizenship as a defining
characteristic of Indianness? Or does the category also include the many
people who live as members of tribal communities, but are not citizens?
Most of the legislative history and case law concerning tribal jurisdiction
has focused on citizens of other tribes,125 suggesting that Congress meant at
least to include those people, but beyond that the congressional record is
ambiguous. For example, the National Congress of American Indians
submitted a statement in support of the legislation that defined the
nonmember Indian category as including Indians enrolled in other tribes
and “those Indians not enrolled in any tribe.”126 More importantly, the law
124. See infra Part II (presenting a jurisdictional standard that relies on community
membership, rather than citizenship or race). A fuller discussion of related equal protection
issues appears infra Part III.A.2.
125. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the availability
of federal services to Indians “without regard to whether their tribal membership is the same
as their reservation residence”); S. 963, 102d Cong. § 2(10) (1991) (finding that law
enforcement needs “require that inherent tribal jurisdiction over all Indians, including
members of other tribes must be recognized and reaffirmed”).
126. Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 137 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux);
see also id. at 25 (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici) (“[D]ay by day, if you limit jurisdiction
to membership and then put a little parenthesis next to it and say ‘(enrolled),’ which is what
the Supreme Court seemed to say, you are leaving large numbers of Indians who are living
right there day by day over whom no one has jurisdiction because there are scores of Indian

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

370

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

itself—which refers to the federal common law test for Indianness—
actually applies to non-citizen community members as well.127
The law affirming tribal jurisdiction over all Indians defines “Indian” by
referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1153.128 Known as the Major Crimes Act, § 1153
grants federal courts criminal jurisdiction over major crimes between
“Indians” occurring in Indian country.129 Neither § 1153 nor Supreme Court
case law provide a comprehensive definition of Indian for federal
jurisdiction purposes.130 Courts have not, however, interpreted the category
living on reservations who are not official members of the reservation and/or tribe or pueblo
they live on for a myriad of reasons. Some think it is intermarriage. That isn’t half the
reason. Some are just not enrolled. This enrollment process is a very technical kind of thing.
In fact, it would be interesting . . . to find out how many Indians are not enrolled at all
anywhere and are Indians living on Indian reservations. I believe there are literally
thousands—perhaps hundreds of thousands.”).
127. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing how the common law standard for federal criminal
jurisdiction has developed and been applied by various circuits). The congressional record
also refers to the federal common law test. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 132 (referring to
a “jurisdictional void” over “those who identify themselves as Indian and are recognized
under Federal law (18 U.S.C. 1153) as Indian”).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012). This definition was added to the Indian Civil Rights
Act by the Duro fix legislation. H.R. 972, 102d Cong. (1991); see also supra Part I.B.2.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
130. The network of statutes creating federal jurisdiction over crimes occurring in Indian
country distinguishes between Indians and non-Indians, but does not define either term
further. Federal Indian country jurisdiction is rooted in either the General Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2012), which extends federal enclave law to Indian country for prosecutions
of interracial crimes (Indian on non-Indian, and vice versa), or the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), which authorizes federal prosecutions of certain intra-Indian crimes.
Indianness is a jurisdictional prerequisite for prosecutions under the Major Crimes Act,
which provides for federal jurisdiction over "[a]ny Indian" who commits certain enumerated
crimes within Indian country. Id.; see United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 594 (9th
Cir. 1977). The prosecution bears the burden of proving Indianness, United States v.
Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012), but is not required to offer proof if the
defendant stipulates that he is an Indian, Ward v. United States, No. 1:13cv01003, 2013 WL
664087, at *2 (D.S.D. 2013) (finding no proof necessary where defendant stipulated Indian
blood and tribal enrollment), appeal docketed, No. 13-01513 (8th Cir. Feb. 6, 2013). For the
General Crimes Act to apply, either the defendant or the victim must be Indian (but not
both). 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The Act establishes jurisdiction over crimes occurring within
Indian country without regard to identity of the defendant by extending “the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of offenses” (federal enclave laws) to Indian country.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian country”). The second paragraph of the
statute sets forth exceptions, specifying that federal jurisdiction “shall not extend” to crimes
where both the defendant and the victim are Indian, or to an Indian defendant who has
already been punished by the local law of the tribe. Id. § 1152. In a crime involving an
Indian victim, a defendant may assert evidence of Indianness as an affirmative defense to
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to apply only to enrolled tribal citizens. The test used by courts is drawn
from a case that involved a different law, which provided for federal
jurisdiction in Indian country but had an exception for crimes committed by
one Indian against another.131 In a case involving whether a white man,
married to a Cherokee citizen and naturalized under Cherokee law, could
avoid prosecution under this exception, the Supreme Court held that legal
Indianness requires both some degree of Indian descent and some sort of
political recognition as Indian.132 Applying that test today in federal
prosecutions under § 1153, which requires a showing of Indian status in
order to permit prosecution, lower federal courts have held that tribal
citizenship is sufficient to demonstrate political recognition, but it is not
necessary.133 Instead, citizenship is one factor to be considered, along with
other factors such as receipt of tribal or federal services, social recognition,
community participation, and even self-presentation.134 While enrollment
alone is enough to demonstrate political recognition,135 an unenrolled
person may still be considered an Indian under federal law if one or more of
the other factors are satisfied.136
What, then, does political recognition look like for a nonmember Indian?
Does this category include members of the resident tribal community who
lack citizenship documents? Does it include those who are ineligible for
citizenship under tribal law? For example, if a tribe requires that its
members possess one-quarter Indian blood in order to enroll, what is the
status of a descendant whose blood quantum is one-eighth? Does the
category include all people of Indian descent?
prosecution under § 1152. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that the government need not allege non-Indian status, but if defendant
properly raises the issue and produces sufficient evidence, the burden shifts to the
government to prove that the victim is not Indian). Indianness matters for different reasons
under the two statutes, but courts use the same standard to determine it. See id. at 1229-30
(explaining that Indianness is an element of the crime under § 1153 and may be a defense to
prosecution under § 1152, but relying on cases arising under both statutes to determine the
substantive standard in a § 1152 case).
131. Act of June 30, 1834, Pub. L. No. 23-161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 730. That law was the
predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
132. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68, 572-73 (1846). This case is
discussed more fully infra Part I.C.3.
133. See, e.g., Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224; United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263
(9th Cir. 1979); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938); St. Cloud v. United States,
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
134. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
135. See infra note 209.
136. E.g., Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224; Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461.
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The circuit courts that have addressed the question of whether someone
is politically recognized as Indian for purposes of federal prosecution all
consider multiple factors, but different courts have selected different factors
to consider and assigned different relative weights to them.137 All agree,
however, that enrollment is not required.138 These cases are instructive, but
do not directly answer the question of the appropriate boundary of tribal
court jurisdiction; in fact, several cases suggest that Indianness might be
governed by different standards for purposes of tribal and federal court
jurisdiction.139
1. Challenges to the Duro Fix
One way that the question about the proper scope of tribal criminal
jurisdiction has arisen is in cases that challenge the law restoring tribal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. The only such case to reach the
Supreme Court was United States v. Lara.140 Lara, who was an enrolled
citizen of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe but lived on the Spirit Lake
reservation, was arrested after he assaulted an officer seeking to enforce an
order excluding him from the reservation.141 He pled guilty to several
counts of misconduct in tribal court and was also prosecuted in federal
court for assault on a federal officer.142 Lara challenged his federal
prosecution.143 He argued that tribes’ power to prosecute nonmember
Indians was a delegation of federal power, so his subsequent federal
prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double
jeopardy.144 The Court rejected this challenge, holding that Congress
restored an inherent tribal power instead of delegating a new one.145
However, it reserved other potential bases for challenge, including the
137. See infra notes 199-206.
138. See infra note 207.
139. See infra notes 213-216 and accompanying text.
140. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636-37 (8th Cir. 2003).
143. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197.
144. Id. at 197-98. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lara that the Duro
fix law amounted to a delegation of federal power. Lara, 324 F.3d at 640.
145. Id. at 198-99, 210. In so holding, the Court resolved a circuit conflict, agreeing with
the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncement in United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir.
2001) (reh’g en banc), that the Duro fix was a restoration of inherent power, not a delegation
of federal power. Enas was an enrolled member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe who was
prosecuted after he stabbed a member of the White Mountain Apache Tribe while on that
tribe’s reservation. Id. at 665.
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argument that a statute classifying by Indianness, but not tribal citizenship,
was an illegal racial classification.146
In Means v. Navajo Nation147 and Morris v. Tanner,148 nonmember
Indian defendants directly challenged tribes’ assertions of criminal
jurisdiction on equal protection grounds. Means, an enrolled citizen of the
Oglala Sioux Tribe, lived on the Navajo reservation for a decade with his
Navajo wife before later moving away.149 During a visit to the Navajo
reservation, he threatened and battered his father-in-law (an Omaha tribal
member) and another (Navajo) man.150 Morris involved a juvenile who was
a citizen of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe and was arrested for speeding
on the Flathead Reservation.151 Lower federal courts affirmed tribal
jurisdiction in each case,152 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.153
The closest cousin to these cases was a Supreme Court decision thirty
years earlier which upheld federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians against
an equal protection challenge. In that case, United States v. Antelope,154
three citizens of the Coeur D’Alene Tribe were convicted of murder in a
robbery that resulted in the death of a non-Indian woman who lived on the
reservation. Two of the defendants were convicted of first-degree
murder.155 Both defendants challenged their convictions, arguing that they
were prosecuted under federal law, which included a felony murder
provision, instead of under state law, which would have required proof of
premeditation and deliberation, because of their race.156 Rejecting the
challenge, the Court explained that federal laws relating to Indian tribes,
“although relating to Indians as such,” are “not based upon impermissible
classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of
Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions. Federal
regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign
political communities.”157 This was enough to uphold the federal law, but
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
1999).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 209.
432 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2005).
288 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134-35 (D. Mont. 2003).
Means, 432 F.3d at 927.
Id.; see also Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 445 (Navajo
Morris, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
Means, 432 F.3d at 935; Morris, 288 F. Supp. at 1143.
See supra note 11.
430 U.S. 641, 642-43 (1977).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645-46.
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the Court continued, “[i]ndeed, respondents were not subjected to federal
criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they
are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.”158 The Court noted,
however, that circuit courts did not require tribal citizenship in order for a
defendants to face federal criminal prosecution, “at least where the Indian
defendant lived on the reservation and ‘maintained tribal relations with the
Indians thereon.’”159 Because the defendants were Coeur D’Alene citizens,
the court did not reach the issue of whether federal criminal law extends to
Indians who are not tribal citizens.
Lara, Means, and Morris, like Antelope, were really cases about federal
plenary power. In each case the court considered, in part, whether the
federal government could carve out a category of “Indian” people and
subject them to different laws, even where those laws might be viewed as
placing Indian people at a disadvantage. As the Court has repeatedly made
clear, Congress—in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs—
may do so without running afoul of the Constitution.160 Congress also has
the power to describe and change the boundaries of this Indian legal
category, as long as the people within that category can fairly be described
as related (by citizenship, descent, or otherwise) to the Indian tribes with
which the federal government has a relationship.161 Whether Congress has
the power to define and legislate with regard to citizens who are also
Indians, however, is only tangentially related to the question of who a
particular tribal government can prosecute and why.
In Lara, Means, and Morris, the federal courts accepted that the
defendants qualified as “Indians” and would be included in the Congress’
restoration of jurisdiction over “all Indians” as long as the law was valid.
The invocation of defendants’ tribal citizenship provided an easy rejoinder
to the question of whether Congress had illegally created a racially defined

158. Id. at 646.
159. Id. at 647 n.7 (citing Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938); United States v.
Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir. 1974)).
160. Id.; see Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., in & for Rosebud
Cnty., 424 U.S. 382, 390-391 (1976) (exclusive tribal jurisdiction over family law issue
arising between tribal members on reservation is not an unconstitutional denial of access to
state courts); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-55 (1974) (federal Indian
preference laws not unconstitutional racial classification); see also Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (tax immunity
for Indians on reservation not unconstitutional racial classification).
161. See infra note 354 (describing various standards for determining the boundaries of
the Indian legal category).
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category of second class citizens.162 All three defendants were enrolled in
other tribes, and easily met a citizenship-based definition of Indianness, so
the courts did not analyze their Indian status further. As in Antelope, the
courts were not forced to consider whether citizenship in a federally
recognized tribe was an absolute requirement for Indianness, and none of
them discussed why citizenship should be required for tribal court
prosecution when it is not required for federal court prosecution.163 Even
more importantly, none of these cases addressed the non-constitutional
questions about the purpose of, need for, or proper limits on tribal criminal
jurisdiction.
Besides the fact of their citizenship in other tribes, the defendants in
Lara and Means were also deeply connected to the communities in which
they were prosecuted, forestalling questions about whether they were being
unfairly prosecuted by an unfamiliar court system.164 Lara was married to a
Spirit Lake tribal member and he lived with her and their children on the
Spirit Lake reservation.165 Means was married to a Navajo woman, had
lived on the Navajo reservation for ten years, and was actively involved in
tribal political and social issues.166 Significantly, the tribal court in Means
did not base its assertion of criminal jurisdiction on Means’ enrollment in
the Oglala Sioux Tribe. Instead, the court based its jurisdiction on Means’
role in and kinship obligations to the Navajo community.167

162. The Lara court described the Duro fix as restoring tribal jurisdiction over Indians
from other tribes. 541 U.S. at 193, 198. The Means court also emphasized Means’
enrollment, although it acknowledged that federal law did not necessarily require enrollment
to demonstrate political Indianness. 432 F.3d at 934-35 (“We therefore can and do leave for
another day the challenging question Bruce invites: whether a person who was racially
Indian, but who was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment in any tribe, would be subject to
tribal court jurisdiction.”). In Morris, tribal law limited criminal jurisdiction to enrolled
members of other tribes, and the court viewed the “voluntary” nature of enrollment, and the
fact that it could be renounced in order to avoid future prosecution, as an important factor in
its holding that the classification at issue was political, rather than racial. 288 F. Supp. at
1133, 1141.
163. See infra Part I.C.3.
164. Morris did not live on the Flathead reservation, but the court pointed out that over
2000 other nonmember Indians did, and that the tribe provided health, social and emergency
services to those people. Morris, 288 F. Supp. at 1142.
165. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196.
166. Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 445-46 (Navajo 1999).
167. Id. at 450; Spruhan, Case Note, supra note 20.
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2. Federal Court Review of Tribal Jurisdiction over Unenrolled People
Tribal communities include many people who are not formally enrolled
citizens. This may be true for several reasons: some people are descended
from tribal members but do not meet the minimum blood quantum
requirements of their tribes;168 some tribes are matrilineal or patrilineal, so
they only permit members of a certain gender to enroll their children in the
tribe;169 some people who are eligible for citizenship simply have not
followed the official procedures to enroll; and some people are not
descended from that tribe at all, but are related through marriage or
adoption. Some of these people are enrolled in other tribes (e.g., a child of
parents from two different tribes may be enrolled in one parent’s tribe, but
not in the other), but some are not enrolled anywhere.170 Many of these
nonmember Indians are fully integrated into their communities, live their
lives on the reservation, and participate fully in tribal religious, cultural and
social life.
Because almost every case in which a federal court was asked to review
the legality of a tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember
Indian involved a defendant who was enrolled elsewhere, the issue of
jurisdiction over unenrolled people has not been carefully considered. The
first federal case to address this question was Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute

168. See, e.g., JILL DOERFLER, IDENTITY, FAMILY, BLOOD, AND CITIZENSHIP AMONG THE
WHITE EARTH ANISHINAABEG xxii, 61-90 (2015) (describing how White Earth constitutional
revision was driven in large part by a desire to change the one-fourth blood quantum
requirement for citizenship); MELISSA TATUM, MIRIAM JORGENSEN, MARY E. GUSS & SARAH
DEER, STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS 46 (2014)
[hereinafter STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY].
169. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 n.2 (1978) (citing
ordinance enacted in 1939 by Santa Clara Pueblo Council disallowing membership in Santa
Clara Pueblo to children born of female members and male non-members); Genealogy,
SENECA NATION OF INDIANS, http://www.sni.org/Culture/Genealogy.aspx (last visited July
22, 2015) (“[T]he mother must be an enrolled member in order for the children to be
enrolled.”).
170. Some may be members of a tribe that is not formally recognized by the United
States government. Members of those tribes may not qualify as Indians for most federal law
purposes, and thus could be treated the same way as non-Indians if the standard used relied
on enrollment in a recognized tribe. E.g., LaPier v. MacCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir.
1993) (enrolled member of Little Shell Band of Ojibwe not an Indian for purposes of federal
prosecution because tribe not recognized); United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th
Cir. 2010), overruled in part by United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015)
(same). As described in Part II, some tribes use a jurisdictional standard that specifically
includes these people. See infra note 255.
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Indians v. Phebus,171 which involved a tribal member who was
involuntarily disenrolled as a result of an internal review of enrollment
criteria.172 After his disenrollment he continued to live on the reservation as
a member of the community while he contested his disenrollment through
appeals to the tribal court and tribal council.173 During this time, he was
convicted of a crime and sentenced to six months in jail by the tribal
court.174 The tribe’s appellate court vacated his conviction, holding that the
tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction.175
While there may have been important tribal law arguments against the
extension of criminal jurisdiction over a defendant in such a situation, the
tribal appellate court did not engage them. Instead, it held that the tribe
lacked jurisdiction because, as a result of the disenrollment, the defendant
no longer qualified as an “Indian” under federal laws defining the limits of
tribal jurisdiction, holding that “Indian” in this context includes only
enrolled tribal citizens.176 This statement misreads federal common law,
which clearly does not require enrolled citizenship to qualify as Indian.177
When the tribe sought a declaratory judgment from a federal district court
that jurisdiction was proper, the federal court granted it in part, holding that
a tribal court may prosecute anyone who would qualify as an Indian under
federal law, including people who are not enrolled.178
However, the court expressed concern about the particular facts of
Phebus, holding that a tribe that had disenrolled someone over his objection
could not later premise a finding of Indianness on his affiliation with that
same tribe.179 The case raised previously unexplored questions about how
disenrollment, especially involuntary disenrollment, should affect

171. 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (D. Nev. 2014).
172. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1225; see also Lynette Curtis, Cast Out of Paiute Tribe,
Disenrolled Confront Struggles, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 22, 2012, http://www.review
journal.com/news/las-vegas/cast-out-paiute-tribe-disenrolled-confront-struggles (discussing
the background and aftermath of the decision that led to Phebus’ disenrollment).
173. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1225; Interview with Tribal Attorney Patrick Murch (Mar.
28, 2014).
174. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1226.
175. Id. at 1226; see also Phebus v. Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, No. CA13-001 (Las Vegas
Paiute Ct. App. June 10, 2013).
176. Phebus, No. CA13-001, at 3.
177. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
178. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1230-31.
179. Id. at 1237.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

378

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

jurisdiction.180 Although federal law clearly protects tribes’ right to
determine their own citizenship,181 and federal court review of tribal
decisions to revoke citizenship is extremely limited,182 recent instances of
tribal disenrollment have garnered a great deal of media attention.183 Even if
these instances involve legitimate exercises of tribal sovereign power, they
do not cast tribal governments in a particularly favorable light. A court
considering the scope of tribal jurisdiction in a case involving a disenrolled
person may have serious fairness concerns, as both the tribal and federal
court did in Phebus. Whether these concerns should be addressed through a
narrowing of tribal criminal jurisdiction is a different question, and one that
neither court effectively addressed.
Although the discussion about nonmember Indians surrounding the Duro
fix legislation seemed to focus on the problem of jurisdiction over Indians

180. Voluntary and involuntary disenrollment could impact jurisdiction differently. See
infra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing how each category would fare under a
community recognition standard).
181. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S
218, 222 (1897) (holding Chickasaw Nation empowered to grant and revoke citizenship,
including naturalization of non-Indian spouses).
182. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69. But see Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85
F.3d 874, 888 (2d Cir. 1996) (claiming “that authority to determine membership questions is
‘complete and absolute’—simply goes too far. While Congress has deferred with regularity
to tribal membership determinations, there is little question that the power to define
membership is subject to limitation by Congress.”)
183. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 172 (Las Vegas Paiute disenrollment); Associated Press,
Disenrollment Leaves Natives “Culturally Homeless” (Jan. 20, 2014), available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/disenrollment-leaves-natives-culturally-homeless (citing several
examples of disenrollment battles and tracing increased visibility of disenrollment battles to
the 1990s); K.C. Meadows, Former Pinoleville Tribal Members Want Their Own Tribe,
UKIAH DAILY J., July 14, 2015, http://www.ukiahdailyjournal.com/general-news/20150714/
former-pinoleville-tribal-members-want-their-own-tribe (discussing a group of nineteen
former members of the Pinoleville Pomo Nation who were disenrolled after a 2005
constitutional amendment changed the tribe’s enrollment criteria); Randi Schaffer, Opinion
Issued by Tribal Judge in Disenrollment Hearing, MORNING SUN, Mar. 23, 2015,
http://www.themorningsun.com/general-news/20150321/opinion-issued-by-tribal-judge-ondisenrollment-hearing (discussing Saginaw Chippewa disenrollment dispute); James Dao, In
California, Indian Tribes with Casino Money Cast Off Members, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/us/california-indian-tribes-eject-thousands-of-member
s.html?_r=0 (discussing disenrollment dispute involving the Picayne Rancheria of the
Chukchansi Indians and other California tribes). Although the media attention has intensified
in recent years, “[d]isenrollment is not a new issue” for tribes. Duane Champagne, The
Debate Over Disenrollment, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 28, 2014),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/06/28/debate-over-disenrollment-155346.
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enrolled in other tribes,184 the concerns expressed in Duro and raised by
some legislators185 about the fairness of tribal court jurisdiction over people
without political rights in that tribe extend to unenrolled people from that
tribe as well. As the tribal and federal courts considering the Phebus case
recognized, these peoples’ status vis-à-vis tribal and federal law may
present more challenging questions than the most common assumptions
about the Duro fix recognize.186 By erroneously assuming that federal law
limits tribal court jurisdiction to citizens of tribal nations, the tribal
appellate court in Phebus unnecessarily restricted its own jurisdiction and,
more importantly, missed an opportunity to engage in a tribal law analysis
of whether jurisdiction was proper under the circumstances.
3. Federal Jurisdiction Cases
To determine whether a person counts as an Indian for purposes of
federal prosecution, courts apply a definition drawn from the 1845 case
United States v. Rogers.187 Under the Rogers test, Indianness requires both
Indian ancestry and political recognition as an Indian.188 The case involved
a white man who had married a Cherokee woman, lived in Cherokee
territory, and had become a naturalized citizen under Cherokee law.189 The
victim in the case was another white man who was also a naturalized citizen

184. See S. 963, 102d Cong. (1991) (draft bill introduced by Sen. Inouye to correct Duro,
which states in the findings section that the tribes’ historical jurisdiction over all Indians
“was seriously disrupted by the Supreme Court's . . . holding that Indian tribes have lost their
inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are members of other tribes”).
185. Newton, supra note 112, at 115 (“Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota expressed
his belief that the Constitution's Bill of Rights should apply to all nonmember Indians,
especially because nonmembers cannot vote in tribal elections or run for office.”).
186. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text (discussing Phebus).
187. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846).
188. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1118 (9th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Keys, 103
F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996)) (finding test to consider “degree of Indian blood” and “tribal
or government recognition as an Indian”); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280-1282 (10th Cir. 2001). For a comparison of the test across
circuits, see generally Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not To Be: Who Is an
“Indian Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 61 (2012); Bryan L. Lewis, Do You Know What You
Are? You Are What You Is; You Is What You Am: Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Current Split in the Courts of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACE &
ETHNIC JUSTICE 241 (2010).
189. Berger, Power, supra note 67, at 1960.
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through inter-marriage.190 Despite significant evidence that the tribe
recognized Rogers as a member, the Court held that he could not escape
federal prosecution under an exception to then-existing federal law barring
federal prosecution of crimes committed by one Indian against another
Indian.191 Regardless of the tribe’s view as to membership, the Court held
that a person must also possess some degree of Indian blood in order to be
considered “Indian” under federal law.192
Rogers involved a person who had been politically incorporated into a
tribal community but was not descended from that community, or from any
tribal community. The Court assumed that Rogers’ naturalized status met
the political recognition prong and focused instead on the descent prong. In
contrast, federal courts today are usually confronted with cases where the
descent prong has been met and the litigation involves the political
recognition prong of the test. One way to establish political recognition is
tribal enrollment. Nearly every tribe today has adopted formal enrollment
criteria and documents enrollment via certificates or lists of members.
When a person has some Indian blood and is enrolled in any tribe, it is
relatively easy for a federal prosecutor to establish jurisdiction.193
Most of the federal court opinions on the question of Indianness
consequently involve the gray area: people who are Indian by descent but
who are not enrolled members of any tribe. One of the first circuit court
cases to cite Rogers was Ex parte Pero, a case involving two defendants
who argued that they were not Indian. One of the defendants, Moore, lived
with his mother on the reservation of the St. Croix Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa, although neither he nor his mother was an enrolled citizen
because of procedural issues and federal agency rules governing enrollment
at the time.194 In an opinion that elucidated the political recognition
requirement and laid the foundation for the modern tests, the court held that

190. Id.
191. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73.
192. Id. at 573. Varying degrees of Indian blood have been found to be sufficient under
federal law, and because some tribes require only descent from an enrolled member, but not
a particular quantum of Indian blood, it would be problematic for federal courts to impose a
blood quantum floor that would effectively exclude some enrolled members.
193. Federal jurisdiction does not require that they be enrolled in the tribe whose territory
encompasses the location where the crime occurred.
194. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938). The other defendant, Pero, argued that
his acceptance of an individual allotment made him no longer an Indian under federal
supervision. Id. at 29-30. The court held that he was still an Indian for jurisdictional
purposes. Id. at 35.
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a child of an Indian mother and half-blood father, where both
parents are recognized as Indians and maintain tribal relations,
who himself lives on the reservation and maintains tribal
relations and is recognized as an Indian, is to be considered an
Indian within the protection of the federal guardian-ward
relationship and within the meaning of "Indian" as used in the
jurisdictional statute in question. The lack of enrollment in the
case of Moore is not determinative of status.195
Circuit courts today agree that enrollment is not required;196 this leaves
the courts to determine alternative tests for political recognition in an era
when formal citizenship has increasingly become the standard. The result is
a varying and inexact set of factors, which courts apply differently in
different circuits.197 Courts agree that “political recognition” in this context
can come from either the federal government or a tribal government,198 so
the factors consider both federal recognition and tribal recognition.
In the Ninth Circuit (the circuit with the most published opinions on this
question), courts have listed four factors that are relevant to proving
Indianness: “1) tribal enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and
informally through the receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 3)
enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as
an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian
social life.”199 These factors are listed in declining order of importance.200

195. Pero, 99 F.2d at 31.
196. See infra note 207 (enrollment not required by circuit courts); supra text
accompanying notes 157-159 (describing Antelope Court’s discussion of enrollment).
197. Although the term "Indian" is judicially defined in this context, courts have upheld
the statute against challenges that it is unconstitutionally vague. E.g., United States v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1264 (1979).
198. See, United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
federal recognition is not required and noting that the deference to tribal recognition “stems
from the recognition that one of an Indian tribe’s most basic powers is the authority to
determine questions of its own membership”); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786-87
(8th Cir. 1976) (noting that courts consider “recognition by a tribe or society of Indians or by
the federal government”).
199. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223 (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th
Cir. 1995)) (listing factors relevant to determining Indianness as a defense to a prosecution
under § 1152); see United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015); United
States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d
840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009).
200. Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114.
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Courts in other circuits have identified similar factors, but vary as to
precisely which factors are relevant and how important each one is. The
Eighth Circuit, for example, considers five factors: 1) enrollment; 2)
governmental recognition through receipt of assistance; 3) tribal recognition
via tribal court prosecution; 4) enjoying the benefits of tribal affiliation; and
5) social recognition as an Indian, including self-identification.201 Tribal
enrollment alone is dispositive, but the other factors need not be considered
in any particular order and are not exhaustive.202 This test places greater
importance on informal forms of community membership because it does
not require that social recognition be considered the least important factor,
and it specifically considers self-identification.203 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit uses a totality of the circumstances approach.204 Factors that are
relevant, but not dispositive, include tribal recognition, federal recognition,
residence on a reservation, and “whether a person holds himself out as an
Indian.”205 The Tenth Circuit also uses a “totality of the evidence”
approach.”206
Federal courts vary in their reliance on specific factors, but all agree that
Indianness for purposes of federal prosecution requires descent and political
recognition, and all agree that formal enrollment in a tribe is not the only
way to demonstrate political recognition.207 All courts also rely to some
extent on informal recognition by a tribal community. Courts have
considered receipt of tribal services or benefits, prior exercise of
jurisdiction by a tribal court, formal non-citizen status under tribal law,
cultural and social participation, social recognition, residence on the

201. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2009).
202. Lewis, supra note 188, at 242 (noting that Eighth Circuit’s factors are “illustrative”
while Ninth Circuit’s factors are “exhaustive”).
203. See Dodge, 538 F.2d at 787 (relying in part on the fact that defendants held
themselves out to be Indian). But see Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764 (self-identification relevant
but not sufficient alone).
204. See United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984).
205. Id. at 456 (approving jury instruction listing those factors but advocating a “totality
of circumstance” approach).
206. United States v. Diaz, 679 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012).
207. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877; United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224-25 (9th Cir.
2005) (citing numerous cases holding that lack enrollment is not determinative and rejecting
dissent’s proposal to adopt enrollment as the single determining factor); United States v.
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1979) (enrollment not an absolute requirement
for proving Indianness); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d
957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005).
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reservation, and self-identification or self-presentation.208 While tribal
community recognition is dispositive if it comes in the form of enrolled
citizenship,209 federal courts have not been willing to rely on tribal
community recognition alone if it comes in the form of social recognition or
a formal tribal law designation short of enrolled citizenship. In other words,
a person may be an Indian in the eyes of the tribal community and yet not
qualify as an Indian under the factors set forth by a particular federal
court.210 Conversely, a person may be an Indian under federal law even
though they are not recognized as such by the tribe.211
The Duro fix provides that Indianness for the purposes of tribal
prosecution should be defined in the same manner as it is for federal
jurisdiction.212 Yet, the cases applying the federal jurisdiction standard
208. E.g., Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2009) (prior tribal prosecution,
descendant status, reservation residence, and lack of participation in cultural activities),
Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764-65 (self-presentation, prior tribal court prosecution, social
recognition), Dodge (self-presentation), United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 889
(D.S.D.), aff’d 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991) (lack of social participation a factor in holding
that defendant was not an Indian), Drewry, 365 F.3d at 961 (participation in tribal summer
program and social life and prior tribal child welfare involvement sufficient to support a find
that the victims were Indian in a prosecution of a non-Indian defendant under §1152);
Pemberton, 405 F.3d at 660 (self-presentation, reservation residence).
209. E.g., United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456,
1461 (D.S.D. 1988); Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764; Drewry, 365 F.3d at 961; Zepeda, 792 F.3d
at 1115.
210. E.g. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.at 846-48 (finding defendant not an Indian under
federal law despite being formally recognized as a descendant under tribal law and having
been criminally prosecuted in tribal court); United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th
Cir. 2010) (same). In each case, both involving unenrolled members prosecuted by the
Blackfeet tribal court, the federal court did not investigate the circumstances of the prior
prosecution or address whether tribal criminal jurisdiction over unenrolled descendant
members was legal under tribal or federal law and, perhaps as a consequence, did not accord
the tribal prosecutions much weight. Cruz, 554 F.3d at 846 n.7, 850; Maggi, 598 F.3d at
1083. But see United States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2011) (basing a finding
of Indian status in part on Blackfeet tribal court prosecution) (“As we observed in Bruce, the
assumption and exercise of tribal jurisdiction over criminal charges, demonstrates tribal
recognition [particularly where defendant] did not challenge the authority of tribal officers to
arrest him or the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction.”).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding defendant is an Indian subject to federal prosecution in federal court where he is
enrolled in a tribe and has used his membership to access services, despite not selfidentifying as an Indian and not being socially recognized as such by his community).
212. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 128-136 (examining the chain of
references necessary to discern the Duro fix's definition of “Indian”). It is especially ironic
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suggest that tribal recognition as a community member may be informal
and, more importantly, may not always coincide with federal recognition as
an Indian. In other words, federal common law indicates that a person may
be eligible for criminal prosecution under tribal law, but not in federal court
under federal law, and vice versa.213 Many of the federal cases involve
defendants who were previously prosecuted in tribal court, suggesting that
the tribe had determined that they were proper subjects for jurisdiction.214
In some of these cases, the defendant, while not enrolled in the tribe, is
officially recognized as a “descendant” or similar marker of tribal
affiliation, a designation short of full citizenship that may render him or her
eligible for tribal services and also may serve as the basis for tribal court
prosecution.215 Courts treat previous tribal prosecution as evidence of tribal
recognition as Indian, but it alone is not sufficient to establish any of the
specifically enumerated factors.216 Although the federal cases do not
directly address the question of whether jurisdiction was proper in the prior
tribal prosecution, they seem to accept the premise that the standard for
Indianness under tribal law may be different from the standard for
Indianness under federal law. Enrolled citizens satisfy both tests, but each
category includes more than just enrolled citizens, and the categories
diverge.

that the Duro fix legislation that affirms tribal criminal jurisdiction over all Indians refers to
the definition of Indianness employed by federal courts because that definition originates
from the Rogers case in which the Court acknowledged that there is in fact a difference
between tribal and federal standards. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573
(1846) (“[A person adopted by a tribe may] become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe,
and make himself amenable to their laws and usages. Yet he is not an Indian [as defined by
federal law].”).
213. Compare Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212 (holding that juvenile male was an Indian
for federal law purposes even though he was not an accepted member of the tribe), with
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (holding that Rogers was not an Indian for federal law
purposes even though he was accepted as a member of the Cherokee community and had
been criminally punished by the tribe).
214. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840; Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073; LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873.
215. See generally Adam P. Bailey, Threading the Needle: The Fort Peck Tribe’s
Associate Membership: A Modern Model for Tribal Affiliation (April 2011) (unpublished
draft on file with author) (analyzing one tribe’s two-tiered membership structure); see also
discussion infra Part III.B.
216. Labuff, 658 F.3d at 878; Cruz, 554 F.3d at 846-48 (defendant prosecuted as
“descendant member” under tribal law but ineligible for federal court prosecution).
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To summarize, tribes clearly have jurisdiction over more than just
enrolled citizens of that tribe. Several federal courts have upheld tribal
jurisdiction over enrolled citizens of other tribes living and working in the
community. However, while those courts point to the fact of tribal
citizenship to justify jurisdiction, they do not discuss why citizenship in
another tribe is a reason to subject the defendant to the prosecuting tribe’s
jurisdiction, while a non-Indian would not be, or whether the defendant’s
community connections were a significant factor.217 Federal courts
considering the reach of federal jurisdiction, and the only federal court to
review tribal jurisdiction over an unenrolled community member, have held
that unenrolled people may qualify as “Indians” as long as there is some
other indication of that person’s connection to a tribal community.218
D. Jurisdiction Extends to Non-Indian Domestic Abusers with Ties to the
Tribe
In 2013, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act again to restore
concurrent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in domestic
violence cases.219 This law partially restored the jurisdiction that the
Oliphant Court held had been divested, but only over a very limited class of
217. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Lara, Means, and Morris).
218. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing federal jurisdiction cases); supra notes 172-179 and
accompanying text (discussing Phebus).
219. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
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non-Indians. First, the law applies only to offenders who commit certain
specified offenses related to domestic and dating violence.220 Second, this
“special domestic violence jurisdiction” is optional, and a tribe wishing to
exercise it must provide additional procedural protections to defendants.221
Third, not all domestic violence offenders are covered by it: the law
specifies that a tribe may not exercise jurisdiction over any defendant who
“lacks ties to the Indian tribe.”222 The statute further defines sufficient ties
to include residence, employment, or being the spouse or intimate partner
of a tribal citizen or an Indian who lives in the tribe’s territory.223 Three
tribes participated in a pilot project through which the U.S. Attorney
General certified that their criminal justice systems satisfied the law’s
requirements, and those tribes began exercising special domestic violence

220. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (2012); see also id. § 1304(a)(1)-(2). As tribal advocates
point out, the inclusion of a very limited class of offenses means that the law has been an
imperfect tool for addressing family violence in tribal communities. Fee, supra note 123.
The Tulalip Tribes’ lead attorney discussed the impact of the law’s provisions limiting tribal
jurisdiction to only a few types of crimes, stating: “Unfortunately it’s not quite gone far
enough. In just three recent cases, we had children involved, and we’re not able to charge on
the crimes that were committed against those children including endangerment, criminal
endangerment, possibly assault, [and] other attendant or collateral crimes.” Id.
221. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(4) (“The term ‘participating tribe’ means an Indian tribe that
elects to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the Indian country of
that Indian tribe.”). If a prison term of any length may be imposed on a non-Indian, these
additional protections include a right to law-trained defense counsel at the tribe’s expense; a
guarantee of law-trained judges, publicly available criminal laws, and recorded criminal
proceedings. Id. § 1302(c). Regardless of the possibility of imprisonment, the tribe must
provide the defendant a trial by a jury that does not “systematically exclude . . . nonIndians.” Id. § 1304(d)(3)(2). With the exception of the jury requirement, these procedural
rights are also guaranteed to Indian (member or nonmember) defendants facing more than
one year of imprisonment, as authorized by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. See 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (amended by Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211,
sec. 234, § 202, 124 Stat. 2261, 2280). Tribes that cannot or do not provide these protections
remain limited to one-year sentences and may prosecute only Indians. Even where a tribe
opts into both laws, however, significant differences remain between the federal law
requirements for prosecuting Indian and non-Indian defendants facing a sentence of one year
or less. A non-Indian defendant charged with a crime of domestic violence and facing one
year or less in prison must be guaranteed all of the rights discussed above. An Indian
defendant charged with the same crime and facing one year or less in prison is guaranteed
none of these rights as a matter of federal law. Compare id. § 1304 (non-Indian rights), with
id. § 1302 (Indian rights). The law thus continues to draw an important distinction between
Indians and non-Indians. See id. §§ 1302, 1304.
222. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
223. Id.
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jurisdiction over non-Indians in February 2014.224 As of the writing of this
article, these tribes had prosecuted several non-Indians under the law, and
none of the defendants had challenged their prosecution in federal court.225
Table 4 – Jurisdiction After VAWA – Which Courts May Prosecute?
Defendant

Crime type

Indian victim

Non-Indian victim

Major

Tribal & Federal

Tribal & Federal

Minor

Tribal

Tribal or Federal

Major

Tribal & Federal

Tribal & Federal

Minor

Tribal

Tribal or Federal

Domestic violence

Tribal* & Federal

State

All other crimes

Federal

State

All crimes

Federal

State

Tribal citizen

Nonmember Indian

Qualifying non-Indian
Other non-Indian

* Jurisdiction restored by VAWA.

It is notable that Congress, in enacting this law, chose to limit tribal
jurisdiction to domestic violence offenders who have a demonstrated
relationship to the tribal community.226 Based on the reports and testimony
provided in support of the legislation, Congress certainly could have chosen
to restore tribal jurisdiction over any non-Indian committing a crime of
domestic violence or sexual assault, regardless of community ties.227 This
224. The three tribes are the Pasqua Yaqui Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation, and the Tulalip Tribes.
225. “[M]ore than two dozen non-Indians have been charged with domestic violence and
dating violence crimes. They all have the right to go straight to federal court and ask to be
released if their rights are being violated. And how many have done so? Zero.” Fee, supra
note 123 (quoting Sam Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Environment &
Natural Resources Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
226. Compare S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012) (indicating extension of tribal criminal
jurisdiction to only those offenders with sufficient ties to the prosecuting tribe), with Louise
Erdrich, Op-Ed, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 27, 2013, at A25, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/opinion/native-ameri
cans-and-the-violence-againstwomen-act.html?_r=0 (implying that the gap in the law has attracted random non-Indian
habitual sexual predators to tribal areas and that VAWA would somehow empower tribal
governments to arrest and prosecute these roving rapists who otherwise have no ties to the
prosecuting tribal communities).
227. See Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence Against Indian
Women: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 196 (2007), available
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suggests a desire to balance the need to close an enforcement gap in Indian
country against the need to maintain some kind of insider/outsider
distinction in order to preserve fairness. With regard to domestic violence
offenders today, the most significant distinction is not between Indians and
non-Indians or members and nonmembers. Rather, it is between those
people who have sufficient “ties to the tribe” and those who are strangers.
Authorizing prosecution of offenders who are not of Indian decent is a
significant change, yet there are thematic consistencies between VAWA
and prior laws. It does not require that the victim be a citizen of the tribe.
An offender can be prosecuted for committing a crime of domestic violence
against any Indian victim, but the offender must have sufficient ties to the
prosecuting tribe.228 Like the Duro fix and Oliphant, which focus on
Indianness, VAWA acknowledges that a tribal community may include
many Indian people who are not tribal citizens that tribes have an interest in
protecting even these non-citizen community members through criminal
jurisdiction. In contrast to the laws focusing on Indianness, however,
VAWA’s test focuses specifically on a defendant’s connection to the
prosecuting tribe; his or her ties to another tribe are irrelevant for purposes
of this test. In this respect, the law echoes the Duro decision, which focused
only on an offender’s relationship to the prosecuting tribe (as opposed to his
status as an Indian under federal law) and acknowledged that substantive
law, procedure, language, and cultural norms vary widely among tribes.229
In enacting VAWA, however, Congress corrected the Duro Court’s
unnecessarily narrow formulation of what it means to be sufficiently
connected to a tribe to make tribal jurisdiction appropriate.
It is clear that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their members. It is
equally clear that they lack criminal jurisdiction over most non-Indians, but
retain jurisdiction to prosecute nonmember Indians. Congress rejected the
Duro holding, but has remained largely silent on Oliphant, so the
Indian/non-Indian distinction remains, and Indianness in this case is not
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg39355/html/CHRG-110shrg39355.htm
(referencing AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 16 (documenting the high rates
of violent and sexual victimization by Native women at the hands of non-Native men,
including both intimate violence and stranger violence)); see also NATIVE WOMEN’S ASS’N
OF CAN., FACT SHEET: MISSING AND MURDERED ABORIGINAL WOMEN AND GIRLS 5 (2010),
available at http://www.nwac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Fact_Sheet_Missing_and_
Murdered_Aboriginal_Women_and_Girls.pdf (noting that aboriginal women in Canada are
nearly “three times more likely to be killed by a stranger” than non-Native women in
Canada).
228. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012).
229. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 678 (1990).
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defined in terms of tribal citizenship. After the 2013 reauthorization of
VAWA, tribes also have jurisdiction over a small subset of non-Indians:
domestic violence offenders who have a sufficient tie to the tribal
community. Although courts and commentators commonly assume that
jurisdiction over people who are not citizens of the prosecuting tribe is
justified by the defendant’s citizenship in another tribe, the VAWA law and
Phebus (in which a federal court ruled that a tribe may, consistent with
federal law requirements, prosecute an unenrolled person) reveal flaws in
this assumption.
The current doctrine seems to be the product of disagreement between
Congress and the Court over the scope of modern tribal criminal power, but
it also suggests the two branches may agree jurisdiction should be limited in
some respect. The rationale behind each jurisdictional rule remains opaque,
but taken together they reveal a recognition of the importance of criminal
jurisdiction to tribal communities and a shared concern about the fairness of
subjecting outsiders to prosecution in a tribal system that may be culturally
foreign, procedurally different, or unknown. Reading the cases and statutes
together, we can discern that federal law limiting tribal jurisdiction seeks to
balance the interests served by tribal criminal laws against the fairness
concerns expressed by the Court. We can also discern a desire to maximize
tribal sovereign power within this framework: Congress has pushed back
when the judiciary has imposed too narrow a limit.
II. The Community Recognition Standard
Two possible standards have occupied most of the judicial and scholarly
discourse about criminal jurisdiction: a racial line (as the Court seemed to
be drawing in Oliphant and as is enshrined through the incorporation of
Rogers as the standard for tribal jurisdiction under the Duro fix) and a
citizenship-based line (as the Court drew in Duro when it defined
membership narrowly in terms of consent and political participation rights).
An examination of how tribes define the limits of their own jurisdiction
reveals another possibility: tribes may fairly exercise criminal jurisdiction
over those people whom the community recognizes as members. This tribal
law standard is remarkably similar to the standard Congress introduced in
VAWA by drawing a distinction between non-Indians who have sufficient
ties to the tribe and those who do not. In both cases, the primary inquiry is
into the relationship between the defendant and the prosecuting tribe.
By asking how the community views the defendant, rather than whether
the defendant has chosen to enroll or to avail himself or herself of tribal
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services, this standard emphasizes that community members have certain
obligations to their communities, rather than characterizing membership as
simply a matter of voluntary association. The emphasis on obligation
instead of consent makes this standard much more reflective of the
purposes and concerns governing questions of criminal jurisdiction. Instead
of relying on a rigid line, the standard focuses on the relationship between
the defendant and the sovereign seeking to exercise jurisdiction. It does not
unduly cabin the idea of membership by focusing on citizenship as the only
possible indicator. While enrolled citizenship does indicate community
recognition, other factors may indicate it as well. Finally, as explored in
Section II.D, it offers a way to understand Indianness that is separable from
the question of descent. Although Indian descent is an important factor in
many tribal jurisdictional laws,230 and even in the VAWA,231 community
recognition potentially offers a way to determine whether someone is
Indian based solely on their relationship to the tribe. If federal law were
amended to permit it,232 the same standard could authorize jurisdiction over
people who are not Indian by descent, but are nevertheless Indian in the
sense that they are recognized as members by the tribal community.233
230. The tribal codes reviewed here were written before the enactment of VAWA. In
light of Rogers and Oliphant, it is not surprising that tribes would have developed the
community recognition standard in defining the term “Indian” and that they would have
done so under the assumption that Indianness required descent. While the descent
requirement may be a product of tribal law standards, it is more likely a nod to federal
restrictions. See discussion supra Parts I.A, I.C.3. Part II.E considers whether the community
recognition standard could more fundamentally alter the Indian/non-Indian line in the
criminal jurisdiction context by eliminating the descent requirement entirely.
231. See supra note 221. For offenders facing less than a year in prison, VAWA
continues the Court’s practice of treating Indians and non-Indians differently because nonIndians with sufficient ties to the tribe may be prosecuted only if they are accorded
additional procedural protections to which Indian people facing a sentence of one year or
less are not entitled. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2). Any person, Indian or non-Indian, is entitled to
most of these procedural rights (counsel, publicly available laws, law-trained and licensed
judges) if facing more than a year in prison. Id. § 1302(c). For those people, the only specific
additional requirement imposed by VAWA is the requirement of a jury pool that does not
exclude non-Indians. Id. § 1304(d)(3). This requirement may have been driven by concerns
about bias that are unique to non-Indian defendants.
232. This could be accomplished through congressional restoration of jurisdiction over a
broader class of non-Indians (a version of VAWA that applies to all crimes), or judicial
rejection of Rogers, which is the source of the descent requirement. See discussion supra
Part I.C.3 (examining the centrality of Rogers in the federal common law standard) and infra
Part II.E (considering the consequences of eliminating the descent requirement).
233. The idea that a person may be a member of a tribal community even though that
person is not descended from the same community for purposes of asking whether the
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A. Tribal Law Approaches to Jurisdiction
A review of publicly available, pre-VAWA tribal codes provides some
insight into how tribes envision and express the limits of their criminal
jurisdiction.234 Tribal law approaches to criminal jurisdiction vary. Some
are broadly worded, providing for jurisdiction over any person who

community can fairly subject that person to criminal prosecution should not be confused
with the argument that descent is irrelevant to indigeneity in other contexts. See Rolnick,
supra note 13, at 1003-06, 1023 (critiquing the Court’s facile equation of ancestry-based
indigenous classifications with illegal racial classifications and acknowledging that Indian
tribes and other indigenous communities are primary structured around kinship and descent).
234. This is not a full-fledged empirical research project. There are 565 federally
recognized tribes. Notice of Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services
from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942 (Jan. 14, 2015). Of
these, 229 are Alaska Native villages. Id. at 1946-48. I did not review the law of Alaska
tribes because most tribes in Alaska do not presently occupy “Indian country” as that term is
defined by federal law, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998), so
criminal jurisdiction in Alaska presents unique issues, INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A
ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 45 (noting that the Alaska Attorney General “takes the position
that its law enforcement authority is exclusive throughout the state, maintaining that Tribes
do not have a land base on which to exercise any inherent criminal jurisdiction”). But see
Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 13250 (2015) (advancing a theory of member-based criminal jurisdiction); Geoffrey D.
Strommer, Stephen D. Osborne & Craig A. Jacobson, Placing Land Into Trust: Issues and
Opportunties, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 508, 511-517, 520-523 (2015) (describing proposed
regulations to permit Alaska Native villages to have land taken into trust and the
consequences of this for “Indian country” status and territorial criminal jurisdiction). About
half of the tribes in the lower forty-eight states operate formal tribal court systems. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Census of Tribal Justice Agencies in Indian Country, 2002, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Dec. 2005), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=543.
I reviewed approximately 100 tribal codes, which likely covers most, but not all, of the
tribes with active court systems. The codes reviewed represent most of the publicly available
codes, as well as some unpublished codes obtained directly from the tribes. Where possible,
I supplemented my review of codes with analysis of the few publicly available tribal court
decisions applying those codes and occasional conversations with tribal judges and
prosecutors. Publicly available version of tribal codes may not reflect recent amendments or
include separately enacted ordinances. In particular, many tribes have updated their criminal
codes in light of the Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act, so
even the provisions cited here may have changed since the information was collected. While
a full empirical investigation would no doubt be useful in determining the most common
legislative approaches and gaining more information into how those approaches are
implemented, such a project would require significant field research and is far beyond the
scope of this article.
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commits a crime within that tribe’s territory,235 or to all people who commit
crimes within the tribe’s territory to the extent that tribal criminal
jurisdiction is allowed under federal law.236 Although federal law still limits
those tribes’ jurisdiction, they have not incorporated those limits into tribal
law.237
235. See, e.g., BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY TRIBAL COURT CODE ch. 1, § 102 (2001),
available at http://www.baymills.org/resources/chapter1_bay_mills_tribal_court.pdf; WHITE
EARTH NATION JUDICIAL CODE tit. 1, ch. 2, § 1(d) (1997), available at http://www.white
earth.com/data/upfiles/files/JudicialCode.pdf; FORT BELKNAP TRIBAL CODE tit. I, § II (1999),
available at http://www.ftbelknap.org/documents/Fort%20Belknap%20Tribal%20Code.pdf;
SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBAL COURT & JUDICIARY CODE § V (2008), available at
http://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/TribalCourtAndJuduciaryCode.pdf (however,
the tribe does not appear to have a criminal code); LUMMI NATION CODE OF LAW tit. 2, §§
1.02.010, 1.02.030 (2003), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/lummi/1Court.pdf; 3
PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE tit. 3, ch. 1-1, § 20 (2015), available at http://www.pascua
yaqui-nsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/index.php.
236. For example, the Skokomish Criminal Code contemplates jurisdiction over all
persons “except that non-Indians must be apprehended and prosecuted in accordance with
applicable federal law and consistent with the rule stated in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978), so long as such rule is good law.” SKOKOMISH CRIMINAL CODE §
9.01.030 (n.d.) (emphasis added), available at http://www.skokomish.org/SkokConstitution
&Codes/Codes/STC9-01.htm; see also FORT MCDERMITT PAIUTE-SHOSHONE TRIBE LAW &
ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 1 (1998), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/fort_mcdermitt/
ch3.pdf (“[W]hen the State of Oregon effectively retrocedes criminal jurisdiction over the
Oregon lands, and the Federal government approves same, the Tribal Court will assume
exclusive criminal jurisdiction except that prohibited by federal law.”).
237. Many of these codes acknowledge federal law as a limitation, but they do not
incorporate the limits or define them further. For example, the Kalispel Law and Order Code
extends tribal court jurisdiction “over Indians and Non-Indians to the full extent allowed by
Federal and Tribal Law.” LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE KALISPEL TRIBE OF INDIANS § 1-2.01
(2015), available at http://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/kalispel/kalispel-tribe/pdf-uploads/
LAW-AND-ORDER-CODE_15.2.23.pdf; see also CHEYENNE ARAPAHO TRIBES OF
OKLAHOMA LAW & ORDER CODE tit. II, § 5 (1988), available at http://www.narf.org/
nill/codes/cheyaracode/courts.html; COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES LAW & ORDER CODE
art. 1, § 101 (n.d.), available at http://www.crit-nsn.gov/crit_contents/ordinances/Law_
and_Order_Code.pdf; LOWER SIOUX COMMUNITY MINNESOTA JUDICIAL CODE § 1.04(2)
(2010), available at http://www.lowersioux.com/pdffiles/Judicial%20Code%20Courts%20
and%20Jurisdiction.pdf; MAKAH INDIAN LAW & ORDER CODE §§ 1.3.01, 2.1.01 (1999),
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/makahcode/index.html; MATCH-E-BE-NASHSHE-WISH BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL ORDINANCE ch. II, § 1
(2012), available at http://www.mbpi.org/PDF/TribalCourt/Judicial_Ordinance.pdf; TRIBAL
GOVERNMENT OF MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WI JUDICIARY & LAW & ORDER CODE art.
VIII, § 120-33 (n.d.), available at http://ecode360.com/12174985; PAWNEE TRIBE OF
OKLAHOMA LAW & ORDER CODE tit. I, § 5 (2005), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/
codes/pawneecode/courts.html; PRAIRIE ISLAND MDEWAKANTON DAKOTA COMMUNITY
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Broader statutory language is more protective of tribal sovereignty,
leaving courts free to determine whether a particular defendant is subject to
tribal jurisdiction. The tribal courts may formulate a specific test, or they
may use various tests, but the legislation itself does not constrain the court’s
inquiry to particular factors. These tribal codes cast the widest possible
jurisdictional net, placing the onus on the defendant to challenge
jurisdiction and leaving the tribe free to adapt to changes in federal law that
may expand tribal jurisdiction to certain non-Indians. A major change, such
as VAWA’s restoration of jurisdiction over certain non-Indian domestic
violence offenders, can be incorporated into tribal law without a revision to
the jurisdictional scope of their criminal courts. However, these codes offer
little clarity regarding the tribe’s vision of who is subject to its jurisdiction.
They leave room for courts to adopt varying standards, opening the door to
potential unfairness, and their lack of a clear definition could result in
courts unduly limiting jurisdiction.
Others limit criminal jurisdiction to “Indians” but provide no further
definition of the term.238 These codes were no doubt written with an
JUDICIAL CODE tit. 1, ch. II, § 1 (n.d.), available at http://prairieisland.org/wp-content/
themes/tempera-child/docs/Judicial%20Code%20Title%201%20Courts.pdf; LAW & ORDER
CODE OF THE SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE ch. 2, § 2.020 (2006), available at
http://www.sauk-suiattle.com/Documents/L&Ocode2006.pdf; SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBAL
CODE ch. 71, subch. III, § 71.302 (2012), available at http://www.saulttribe.com/images/
stories/government/tribalcode/CHAPTR71.pdf; LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE UTE INDIAN
TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY RESERVATION tit. I, ch. 2, § 1-2-3 (2013), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/ute_uintah_ouray/t1.pdf; WASHOE TRIBAL CODE, tit. I, § 120-030 (2012); WINNEBAGO TRIBE OF NEBRASKA TRIBAL CODE tit. I, art. I, §§ 1-103, -104
(1994), available at http://www.winnebagotribe.com/images/tribal_court/tribal%20code%
2009-21-11/2011%20 TRIBAL%20CODE.pdf.
238. Some of these codes refer to Indians generally. For example, the Chitimacha Code
extends criminal jurisdiction “over all offenses committed by an Indian within the
boundaries of the Chitimacha Indian Reservation.” CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF
JUSTICE tit. 1, § 106 (2009), available at http://www.chitimacha.gov/sites/default/files/CCCJ
%20Title%20I%20-%20Courts%20with%20amendments.pdf; see also ELY SHOSHONE
TRIBAL CODE, tit. IV, ch. 1, § 1.300 (2008), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/
ely_shoshone/civil_1.pdf; TRIBAL COURT ORDINANCE, KLAMATH TRIBAL CODE tit. 2, ch. 11,
§ 11.09(e) (2000), available at http://klamathtribalcourts.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
Title-2-Chapter-11-Tribal-Court-Ordinance-11-22-03.pdf; STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE
CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1-106 (2009), available at http://www.standingrock.org/data/
upfiles/files/Title%20(1)%20I%20-%20COURTS.pdf; YOMBA SHOSHONE TRIBE LAW &
ORDER CODE tit. I, ch. A, § 3 (2001), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/
yombacode/yomba1trct.html#b. Others specifically mention nonmember Indians. The
Northern Cheyenne Law and Order Code provides for criminal jurisdiction “over all
offenses committed by Tribal members or other Indians on the Reservation.” NORTHERN
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awareness that federal law from 1978 to 2013 prohibited tribes from
prosecuting non-Indians. They ensure a closer match between tribal and
federal standards, but they also incorporate the federal Indian-only
limitation into their tribal law. As federal law regarding tribal jurisdictional
limits changes, as it did in 2013 with passage of the VAWA amendments
authorizing tribal jurisdiction over certain non-Indians, these tribes will
need to amend their laws in order to extend jurisdiction to the fullest extent
allowed by federal law.239 Like the territory-based codes, these laws provide
CHEYENNE LAW & ORDER CODE tit. IA, ch. 14, § 1A-14-2 (2008), available at http://
indianlaw.mt.gov/content/northerncheyenne/codes/2008_updated_law_and_order_code/title
_ia.pdf; see also ABSENTEE SHAWNEE CRIMINAL LAW CODE § 2 (2010), available at http://
www.narf.org/nill/codes/absentee-shawnee/criminal_offenses.html; COUSHATTA TRIBAL
CODE tit. 1, § 1.2.04(c) (2004), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/coushatta/
coutitle1.html (“The Court shall have subject matter jurisdiction over all criminal actions in
which an Indian is alleged to have violated the criminal provisions of this Code. . . [i]n civil
expulsion actions, the Court shall have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether or
not the non-member defendant, whether Indian or non-Indian, has violated the criminal
provisions of this Code, whenever, pursuant to tribal law, such violation would be grounds
for expulsion.”); Persons Subject to Criminal Jurisdiction, MILLE LACS BAND STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 112 (2011), available at http://www.millelacsband.com/pdf/mltitle 05judbranch.pdf;
Territorial Applicability, 17 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 203 (2015), available at
http://www.navajonationcouncil.org/Navajo%20Nation%20Codes/ V0030.pdf; SAC & FOX
TRIBAL CRIMINAL CODE tit. 10, § 2 (n.d.), available at http://sacandfoxnationnsn.gov/sites/sfnation/uploads/documents/SF_CODES_Law/code_of_laws/10_Criminal_Off
enses_-_ch_0_intro_-_2014-12-11.pdf; SHOALWATER BAY INDIAN TRIBE CODE OF LAWS tit.
2, § 2.00.03 (1995), available at http://www.shoalwaterbay-nsn. gov/assets/PDFs/Law-Order-Codes/SHO-TITLE-2-LAW-and-ORDER.doc; SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CODE tit.
4, ch. 1, § 4-01.050 (2003), available at http://www.swinomish.org/ media/3694/0401pre
limprov.pdf. The Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians of Michigan and Indiana takes a
similar approach, but does not use the term “Indian.” The tribal courts have jurisdiction over
“violations of Pokagon criminal law by members of the Band or by other Native Americans
on the Reservation.” POKAGON BAND TRIBAL COURT CODE NO. 10-21- 2002, § 3(A)(1)(b)
(2002), available at http://www.pokagon.com/sites/default/files/assets/department/govern
ment/form/2012/tribal-court-code-842-639.pdf; see also CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE
COOS, LOWER UMPQUA & SIULSAW INDIANS TRIBAL CODE tit. I, ch. 1-1, § 1-1-23 (2014),
available at http://ctclusi.org/sites/default/files/1-1.pdf (“The Tribal Court chooses not to
exercise its right of criminal jurisdiction over any American Indian or Alaskan Native found
within the jurisdiction of the Tribes . . . until such time as the Tribal Court establishes a
criminal code of offenses.”) (emphasis added).
239. See, e.g., CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA RESERVATION CRIMINAL CODE
ch. 1, § 1.02 (2014), available at http://ctuir.org/system/files/Criminal%20Code.pdf. Since
the enactment of VAWA in 2013, several tribes have done so. E.g., FORT PECK TRIBES
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 2, § 106(b) (specifically providing for criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders where criminal jurisdiction was
formerly limited to Indians).
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no further guidance as to the definition of Indian, leading to potential
confusion about its definition and increasing the likelihood that tribal courts
will rely on assumptions or incorporate a blanket adoption of federal court
definitions.
For purposes of understanding how tribes interpret the scope of their
jurisdiction, codes that set forth a specific standard for determining who
may be prosecuted are of greater interest. Although they cabin tribal courts
more, these laws provide a clearer statement of the tribe’s jurisdictional
vision. Three types of code incorporate a more specific definition of
“Indian.” One type adopts a citizenship-based definition of Indian,
extending tribal criminal jurisdiction to Indians enrolled in the prosecuting
tribe or any other tribe.240 This definition of nonmember Indian as an Indian
who is a citizen of another tribe is more narrow than the definition provided
under federal criminal law.241 While it is possible that these tribes chose
intentionally to limit tribal jurisdiction to enrolled citizens, it is more likely
that this limitation reflects the common assumption that “Indian” is
240. Some also include people who are eligible for enrollment under tribal law, but may
not be enrolled. See TOHONO O’ODHAM CRIMINAL CODE tit. 7, § 1.4 (n.d.) (jurisdiction over
any Indian), available at http://www.tolc-nsn.org/docs/Title7Ch1.pdf; id. § 1.16 (defining
Indian); NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE tit. 1, § 1-1-12 (2014), available at http://www.nezperce.
org/~code/index.htm (jurisdiction over any Indian); id. § 1-1 (defining Indian); PRAIRIE
BAND OF POTAWATOMI NATION LAW & ORDER CODE tit. 15, § 15-1-1 (2014), available at
http://www.codepublishing.com/KS/Potawatomi/#!/Potawatomi15/Potawatomi1501.html#1
5-1-1 (jurisdiction over all Indian persons); id. tit. 1, § 4-1 (defining Indian); NOTTAWASEPPI
HURON BAND OF POTAWATOMI TRIBAL CODE tit. VIII, ch. 6, § 101 (2013), available at
http://nhbpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Title-VIII-06-Law-and-Order-Code-Amend
ed-8.21.20141.pdf (jurisdiction over offenses committed by any Indian); id. § 201 (defining
Indian); CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GOSHUTE RESERVATION 25 C.F.R. § 11.114 (2008),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title25-vol1/pdf/CFR-2012-title25vol1-sec11-114.pdf (criminal jurisdiction); id. § 11.106 (defining Indian); CHICKASAW
NATION CODE tit. 17, § 201.9 (2012), available at https://www.chickasaw.net/Documents/
Long-Term/Chickasaw-Code/Title-17.aspx; COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 610.200
(2010), available at http://www.coquilletribe.org/docbin/610TribalCourt_002.pdf; OGLALA
SIOUX TRIBAL CODE ch. 1, § 1 (2010), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/oglala_
sioux/chapter01-courtproc.html; YANKTON SIOUX TRIBAL CODE tit. I, § 1-4-3 (1995),
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/yanktoncode/yanktoncodet1provisions.html
(jurisdiction over offenses committed by an Indian); id. § 8-8 (defining Indian); NISQUALLY
TRIBAL CODE tit. 24, § 24.03 (n.d.), available at http://www.nisqually-nsn.gov/files/1213/
7356/7168/Title_24_-_Judiciary_and_Judicial_Procedure.pdf (jurisdiction over offenses
committed by an Indian); id. tit. 10, § 10.02.06 (defining Indian); SQUAXIN ISLAND LAW &
ORDER CODE tit. 9, ch. 9.12, § 9.12.020 (n.d.), available at http://squaxinisland.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Law-and-Order.pdf.
241. See supra Part I.C.3.
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synonymous with “enrolled tribal citizens” in all contexts, rather than a
decision about how the term should be defined for criminal jurisdiction
purposes.242 By tying jurisdiction to citizenship, these laws restrict tribal
criminal jurisdiction to a narrower category of people than would be subject
to federal criminal jurisdiction (the standard referenced in the Duro fix).
Furthermore, if a tribe with a citizenship-based definition of Indian chose to
exercise its jurisdiction under VAWA, tribal law would have to be amended
to expand the jurisdictional reach of tribal criminal courts.
Another type of code extends jurisdiction to anyone who would be
considered Indian under the laws authorizing federal criminal
jurisdiction.243 In these courts, a person may be prosecuted under tribal law
if he or she would be eligible for prosecution under federal law. This
requires that the person be of Indian descent and politically recognized as
an Indian, but does not require citizenship in a tribe.244 Tribal courts in
242. See supra Part I.C.1.
243. See SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS CODE ch. 71, subch. III, §
71.302 (2012), available at http://www.saulttribe.com/images/stories/government/tribal
code/CHAPTR71.pdf (criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians”); id. ch. 71, subch. II, §
71.210 (defining Indian); MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS CODE tit. I, § 1-2-1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%201%20General%20Provisions.pdf (tribal policy of asserting criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians); id. § 5-8 (defining Indian); SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA CODE ch.
22, § 22-1101 (2009), available at http://www.meskwaki.org/Titles/Title%2022.%20
Exclusion.pdf. An additional seventeen tribes employ the federal definition because tribal
jurisdiction is exercised through federal administrative courts called Courts of Indian
Offenses (C.F.R. courts). 25 C.F.R. § 11.114 (finding C.F.R. courts have jurisdiction over
any Indian); 25 C.F.R. § 11.106 (2008) (defining “Indian” for purposes of CFR jurisdiction
as “a person who is a member of an Indian tribe which is recognized by the Federal
Government as eligible for services from the BIA, and any other individual who is an
‘Indian’ for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153”). The following tribes rely on CFR
courts: Ute Mountain Tribe, Te-Moak Band of Western Shoshone, Winemucca Indian Tribe,
Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, Caddo Nation, Comanche Nation, Delaware Nation, Eastern
Shawnee Tribe, Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, Modoc
Tribe, Otoe-Missoura Tribe, Ottawa Tribe, Peoria Tribe, Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma,
Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma, and Skull Valley Band of Goshutes. 25 U.S.C. §
11.100; 78 Fed. Reg. 14,020 (Mar. 4, 2013). These administrative courts were established by
the Department of the Interior prior to the 1930s as a way to exercise jurisdiction over minor
offenses in Indian country in the absence of a Western-style tribal justice system. They were
often staffed by non-Indian judges and served an assimilative function, punishing Indian
people for engaging in traditional activities. B.J. Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the
Justice System 3-4 (2000) (monograph). Today, CFR courts continue to operate only in
tribes that have not established a separate tribal court system.
244. See supra Part I.C.3.
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these jurisdictions would presumably apply the definitional factors
identified by federal judges in their circuit.245 These codes move beyond
citizenship, but they remain unnecessarily tied to a set of standards
developed with very different concerns in mind.246
Although the Duro fix references federal jurisdiction standards, tribal
and federal courts are situated very differently vis-à-vis criminal
defendants, and the concerns about the scope of jurisdiction for each are
quite different in the criminal context. The federal government has limited
criminal jurisdiction within Indian country.247 Its territory-based power
functions as a backstop: it extends only to places like national parks and
unincorporated territories, where there is no local government to exercise
criminal jurisdiction.248 Federal jurisdiction within Indian country exists
because Indian country is federal territory and because the federal
government has unique powers over Indian affairs.249 This federal power
generally excludes state jurisdiction, but it operates in tandem with tribal
jurisdiction.250 In other words, the proper scope of federal criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country is a matter of congressional plenary power.251
Tribal criminal jurisdiction is more analogous to state criminal
jurisdiction, except that it has been limited by Congress and by the Court.
245. Because tribal courts are not federal courts, they may not be obligated to follow the
test developed by any particular circuit, but the codes’ reference to federal criminal laws
point judges in the direction of the circuit and district courts generally. For a related
discussion of the relationship between tribal civil jurisdiction laws and federal court review,
see Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts, supra note 18, at 1003-04. Accord Clinton, No
Supremacy Clause, supra note 51, at 241-42 (arguing that tribal courts are not bound by the
decisions of the lower federal courts or even the United States Supreme Court).
246. The difference between the tribal code provisions that refer to federal criminal law
and the provisions that simply refer to federal law limitations on tribal jurisdiction is that the
former direct courts to look directly at federal courts’ interpretations of Indianness, whereas
the latter might permit a tribe to ignore federal court’s interpretation because it has never
been expressed as an explicit limitation on tribal jurisdiction.
247. See Garnett, supra note 16, at 442-49.
248. 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 1151-1153 (2012); see Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109
U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (referring to territorial courts as courts of “special and limited
jurisdiction”).
249. Garnett, supra note 16, at 444.
250. See John J. Francis, Stacy L. Leeds, Aliza Organick & Jelani Jefferson Exum,
Reassessing Concurrent Tribal-State-Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Kansas, 59 U. KAN.
L. REV. 949, 951-53 (2011) (describing the general rules governing criminal jurisdiction on
Indian lands, in which recognition state or federal jurisdiction generally preempted the
exercise of the other, but the existence of federal jurisdiction was concurrent with tribal).
251. See Skibine, supra note 106, at 768 n.6.
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Whereas federal criminal jurisdiction extends only so far as Congress has
determined it must, tribal criminal jurisdiction exists within the tribe’s
territory except to the extent Congress or the Court has determined it must
be limited.252 Moreover, while the federal government has a unique
relationship with all those who fit into the legal category of “Indian” and
has plenary power to define that category for purposes of federal
jurisdiction, individual tribes may rely on different factors to determine
whether a person is amendable to their jurisdiction. While tribes must
accommodate the limits imposed by federal law, it is odd to assume that the
limits on federal jurisdiction must match the limits on tribal jurisdiction, as
the two systems have very different purposes and histories.
Tribal laws that refer directly to federal standards incorporate a body of
common law developed in cases that concern the proper scope of federal
power, not tribal power. There is only one federal case (Phebus) addressing
the scope of the Indian category for purposes of tribal jurisdiction.253
Furthermore, circuits differ in the precise factors they have developed to
implement the standard for Indianness under federal criminal jurisdiction
set forth in Rogers (the only Supreme Court precedent), and a closer look at
the federal cases suggests that they may not rely on the same factors if the
question of tribal jurisdiction were presented.254 For these reasons, tribes
that look directly to federal common law standards may be missing an
important opportunity to develop their own factors for implementing the
Rogers test. Because their scope of jurisdiction is tied to a finding of
Indianness under federal law, these tribes will also be required to amend
their codes if they wish to exercise jurisdiction under VAWA.
B. Community Recognition in Tribal Statutory and Common Law
Of greatest interest for purposes of this inquiry are the tribal codes that
acknowledge the existence of federally imposed limits on tribal criminal
jurisdiction but implement those limits through a tribally developed
standard. Written before VAWA was enacted, these codes acknowledge
federal limits in terms of Indianness. While they all define “Indian” to be
broader than citizens of federal-recognized tribes, they do not refer

252. See supra note 49 (citing Wheeler); supra note 60 (citing Frickey).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 172-179 (discussing Phebus).
254. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing federal jurisdiction cases); supra note 212 (noting
irony of using the Rogers standard to determine the limit of tribal jurisdiction given that
Rogers, although not exempt from federal prosecution in the Court’s view, had been
separately prosecuted in tribal court).
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automatically to federal standards.255 Some of these codes simply specify
that the definition of Indian includes people who are not enrolled citizens of
federally recognized tribes,256 leaving it to the courts to determine which
factors are relevant. Others provide a more specific definition of the
requirements for Indian status under tribal law; those codes rely on factors
that include descent from a tribal member,257 recognition by the federal
government for any purpose,258 and recognition by the tribal community as
an Indian.259
The codes that expressly rely on community recognition outside of
formal citizenship present the most interesting contrast with federal law.
For example, the San Ildefonso Pueblo code defines “Indian” to include
“[a]ny resident of the Pueblo who is considered Indian by the traditions,
customs, culture, and mores of the Pueblo of San Ildefonso.”260 The Little
Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians, the Little River Band of Ottawa
255. For example, some tribes define Indian to include members of groups not typically
recognized as Indian by the federal government, including Native Hawaiians, members of
state-recognized tribes, members of unrecognized tribes, and Canadian Indians. See SALISH
AND KOOTENAI TRIBAL CODE, tit. I, ch. 2, § 1-2-1-103 (jurisdiction over “any Tribal
members, American or Canadian Indian, or Alaska Native”); SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE tit.
7, ch. 1, § 4.0 (defining “Indian” as a member of an Indian Tribe, but defining “Indian
Tribe” to include any group recognized as such by the Snoqualmie Tribe); id. tit. 3, ch. 1, §
5.0 (jurisdiction over American and Canadian Indians, Native Alaskans, and Native
Hawaiians); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE tit. 2, § 2.1.2 (defining Indian to include members of
federally recognized tribes and anyone “who is recognized as a Canadian Indian”).
256. E.g., SHOSHONE AND ARAPAHO TRIBES OF THE WIND RIVER RESERVATION LAW &
ORDER CODE § 1-2-1.
257. E.g., COLVILLE LAW & ORDER CODE § 1-1-363; FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI LAW &
ORDER CODE § 1-1 (direct descent from a member plus one quarter Indian blood).
258. The White Mountain Apache defines Indian as including “any other person
recognized by federal law as an Indian for any purpose[.]” WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE
JUDICIAL CODE § 1.1 (2012), available at http://www.wmat.nsn.us/Legal/Judicial%20Code
%20-%2007.02.2012.pdf. The code also provides that the tribal court has subject matter
jurisdiction over criminal actions involving “Indians.” Id. § 2.1. The Poarch Band of Creek
Indians defines the term as including “[a]ll enrolled Tribal Members, or other federally
recognized Indians[.]” POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS TRIBAL CODE tit. 4, § 4-1-2 (2014),
available at https://www.municode.com/library/tribes_and_tribal_nations/poarch_band_
of_creek_indians/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=THTRCOPOBACRIN_TIT4JU. The
tribe’s civil jurisdiction provisions, by contrast, refer to enrolled members and “members of
other federally recognized tribes[.]” Id. § 4-1-1.
259. See infra notes 260-265 (collecting codes that rely on recognition by the tribal
community).
260. PUEBLO OF SAN ILDEFONSO CODE tit. II, § 2.4 (1996), available at http://thorpe.
ou.edu/codes/san-ildefonso/san-ildefonso.html.
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Indians, and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
exercise criminal jurisdiction over “any person of Indian blood who is
generally considered to be an American Indian by the [tribe].”261 The Leech
Lake Band of Ojibwe tribal code definition includes “Indians who are
recognized as such by an Indian community . . . for any purpose.”262
Similarly, the Hopi Tribe exercises criminal jurisdiction over enrolled tribal
members and those “who ha[ve] Indian blood and [are] regarded as an
Indian by the society of Indians among whom he lives.”263 The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation code defines
“Indian” to include “any other person on the Reservation who is recognized
by the community as an Indian, including a Canadian Indian or an Alaska
native.”264 The Pueblo of Santa Clara defines “Indian” to include enrolled
tribal members, Indians enrolled in other tribes, and “[a]ny resident of the
Pueblo who is considered Indian by the traditions, customs, culture and
mores of the Pueblo of Santa Clara.”265
These definitions depart from federal definitions most clearly by
expressly permitting the tribal courts to determine whether the prosecuting
community views the defendant as an Indian. They reject the federal
government’s over-reliance on citizenship, political participation, or receipt
of governmental services as the appropriate determinants of belonging, at
least for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. Instead, they offer a vision of
membership that is neither exclusively descent-based nor merely a matter of
formal citizenship or consent.266
These codes permit the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over people
affiliated with the governing tribe who may not be eligible for enrollment
261. LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA INDIANS WAGANAKISING ODAWAK TRIBAL
CODE OF LAW tit. IX, § 9.102 (2015), available at http://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/
TribalCode.pdf.
262. LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TRIBAL CODE tit. I, pt. 2, § 1(B)(1) (n.d.), available at
http://www.llojibwe.org/court/tcCodes/tc_coTitle1-Judicial.pdf.
263. HOPI CODE tit. III, ch. 1, § 3.1.10 (2012), available at http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Hopi-Code.pdf.
264. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION TRIBAL CODE ch. 200,
§ 200.010(1) (2011), available at http://www.warmsprings.com/.docs/_sid/7d79c07acd
34155ef1cf9ec524fb57ac/pg/400/rid/10286/f/200_courts.pdf
265. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO CODE tit. 1, ch. 1 § 1.1 (2006). A separate provision extends
the court’s jurisdiction to “[a]ll [c]rimes enumerated in this Code and committed with-in the
territorial jurisdiction of the Pueblo by Indians.” Id. tit. 1, ch. 2, § 2.3.
266. Most incorporate a requirement of Indian descent, which is consistent with both
Rogers and Oliphant. Without such a limitation, the community recognition standard could
apply to a person without Indian ancestry as well. See supra Part II.E.
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because they do not meet blood quantum requirements, or because the tribe
determines eligibility for enrollment based on descent from either the
mother or the father and the defendant is descended from the other parent.
They also permit prosecution of adopted or intermarried people even if
those people are not eligible for citizenship or particular tribal rights. These
codes acknowledge that a person may be connected to a tribal community
in a variety of ways, from legal rights and benefits to residence, family ties,
and cultural and social participation.
The Navajo Supreme Court elaborated on this form of community
membership. In Navajo Nation v. Hunter, the court construed the term
“Indian” in the Navajo criminal code to refer to a person whose ancestors
were indigenous to what is now the United States and who is considered
Indian by his or her community.267 It added that if a non-Navajo “assumed
tribal relations,” he or she would be considered Indian by the Navajo
community.268 This type of community membership is not a matter of
formal adoption, but a matter of Navajo common law.269 In Means v. Chinle
Judicial District, the court described this form of membership under Navajo
common law:
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a
Navajo, that is not the only kind of “membership” under Navajo
Nation law. An individual who marries or has an intimate
relationship with a Navajo is a hadane (in-law). The Navajo
People have adoone’e or clans, and many of them are based
upon the intermarriage of original Navajo clan members with
people of other nations. The primary clan relation is traced
through the mother[.] A hadane or in-law assumes a clan relation
to a Navajo when an intimate relationship forms, and when that
relationship is conducted within the Navajo Nation, there are
reciprocal obligations to and from family and clan members
under Navajo common law.270
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ (EBCI) court uses a similar
approach in their case law.271 The EBCI’s court has looked to federal
267. 7 Navajo Rptr. 194, 196 (Navajo 1996).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 198.
270. 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 450 (Navajo 1999) (internal citation omitted).
271. Legislatively, the Band’s rules about jurisdiction are a bit unclear. Although the
EBCI Tribal Code provides that its criminal provisions apply to “all members of any
federally recognized Indian tribe,” EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE ch. 14, §
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criminal law standards for guidance, but has applied the test in a manner
that emphasizes a broad notion of community membership.272 Citing two
federal circuit cases, the court considered “whether the Government has
provided [the defendant] with assistance reserved only for Indians, whether
the person enjoys the benefits of tribal affiliation, and whether [the
defendant] is recognized as an Indian by virtue of her living on the
reservation and participating in Indian social life.”273 It held that a person
who qualified as a “First Lineal Descendant” under tribal law was an Indian
for purposes of criminal prosecution,274 but a person who qualified as a
“Second [Lineal] Descendant” was not.275
Under EBCI law, a first descendant is a child of an enrolled member who
does not possess the minimum blood quantum (1/16) required for
enrollment. A first descendant may inherit trust property, access Indian
health services, take advantage of Indian (but not tribal) preference in
hiring, and access tribal education funds (but with a lower priority than
enrolled members).276 According to the court, a first descendant is treated in
the same manner as an Indian from another tribe when seeking assistance
from the Council or tribal administrative bodies.277 A first descendant may
not hold elective office, vote in tribal elections, purchase trust property, or
14.1.1 (2000), available at https://www.municode.com/library/nc/cherokee_indians_eastern
_band/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH14CRLA_ARTIINGE_S14.1.1A
PPESUCRJUCHCO, the Code further provides that EBC law applies equally to all persons
“regardless of race, age, or sex,” id. ch. 14, § 1.5(a), and that tribal police and courts may
impose fines and penalties on “non members, as well as members,” id. ch. 14, § 1.5(c)-(d).
Even if federal law prohibits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a particular defendant,
the code provides that a person may still be subject to civil suits for damages, revocation of
tribal licenses, and exclusion from tribal land for any criminal offense. Id. ch. 14, § 1.2.
Thus, although the code defines nonmember Indians as enrolled members of other tribes, its
other provisions leave room for broader exercise of jurisdiction over nonmembers and
provide an alternative in the event a federal court disagrees with a tribe’s interpretation. In
its case law, the Band cites the federal common law standard, in which enrollment is a
sufficient, but not necessary, factor, but it applies the test in a manner that emphasizes
community recognition over federal recognition.
272. In re Welch, No. SC 03-13, 2003 WL 25902440, at *4 (E. Cherokee Ct. Oct. 17,
2003); E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert, No. CR 03-0313, 2003 WL 25902446, at *2
(E. Cherokee Ct. May 29, 2003).
273. Lambert, 2003 WL 25902446, at *3.
274. Id. at *1, *3.
275. E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Prater, No. CR 03-1616, 2004 WL 5807679, at *2
(E. Cherokee Ct. Mar. 18, 2004).
276. Lambert, 2003 WL 25902446, at *1.
277. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1

No. 2]

TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

403

enroll in the tribe, but the court found that they “are participating members
of this community and are treated as such.”278
A second descendant is a grandchild of an enrolled member who does
not possess the minimum blood quantum required for enrollment.279 Second
descendants may also access Indian health services, but they do not have
access to benefits reserved for members.280 With the possible exception of
tribal educational benefits and inheritance of trust property, their rights
under tribal law are likely similar to those of first descendants. In Prater,
the defendant had a child who was enrolled in the tribe and had lived most
of her life in tribal territory, but the court found that she was not treated as
an Indian by members of the community.281 The court held that she was not
an Indian for jurisdictional purposes under section 14-1.5 of the EBCI
code.282 It did not, however, hold that no second descendant could qualify
as Indian under ECBI law.
C. Community Recognition as a Model Tribal Standard
Tribes that employ a community recognition standard have created a
novel, flexible standard for criminal jurisdiction.283 Tribal courts that rely
on this standard are able to engage in a context-sensitive analysis into
whether the defendant is an Indian in the eyes of the tribal community. This
278. Id. at 3.
279. Prater, 2004 WL 5807679, at *1.
280. Id.
281. Id. at *1, *2.
282. Id. at *2. The defendant in Prater did qualify for federal Indian health services. It is
likely that she would have been be eligible for prosecution in federal court, where receipt of
federal benefits would trump the lack of tribal community recognition. See supra text
accompanying notes 199-206 (describing factors relevant to a determination of Indianness in
federal cases).
283. It is notable that neither the Navajo Nation nor the EBCI include a community
recognition standard in the primary jurisdictional provisions of their codes. NAVAJO NATION
CODE tit. 17, § 203; id. tit. 7, § 253(A)(1) (criminal jurisdiction over “any person” who
commits an offense in Navajo territory”); EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE ch.
14, §14.1.1 (criminal provisions applicable to “all members of any federally recognized
Indian tribe”). This suggests that many more tribes may apply a community recognition
standard than specify it in their codified laws. The Navajo Code, however, acknowledges a
distinction between Indians and non-Indians in a provision authorizing civil prosecution of
non-Indians. That provision was amended after the Means case to include a community
recognition test: “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over any person who, by reason of assuming tribal relations with the Navajo
people or being an “in law” or hadane or relative as defined by Navajo common law, or
tradition, submits himself or herself to the criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.”
NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, § 204(C).
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allows tribes to determine the nature and strength of the defendant’s
connection, recognizing that it may take different forms. The standard
emphasizes recognition by the tribal community, as opposed to recognition
by the federal government (a key factor in federal criminal cases),284 which
is a more appropriate way for tribal courts to determine if they have valid
jurisdiction.
Ideally, for tribal courts to implement this standard, they would elaborate
the basis for a finding of jurisdiction, as the Navajo and EBCI courts did.
Because many community members are also enrolled citizens, whether in
their home community or elsewhere, a community recognition standard will
often lead to the same result as an enrollment-based standard. The
reasoning, however, would be different. Evidence of enrollment in the
prosecuting tribes would likely be dispositive evidence of community
recognition, but defendants enrolled elsewhere could only be prosecuted on
the basis of their non-citizenship ties to the prosecuting tribe, which was the
Navajo Supreme Court’s approach in Means.
A community recognition standard could also sweep more broadly than
an enrollment-based standard to encompass anyone who is recognized as a
community member even if not enrolled in any tribe, as in Lambert. Factors
that may indicate community recognition for unenrolled people include
family relationships (e.g., descent, adoption, inter-marriage, or hadane),
receipt of or eligibility for tribal services (e.g., health care, housing, general
assistance), prior prosecution by tribal court, political participation, noncitizen status under tribal law (e.g., as a descendant or resident), cultural
participation, and religious or clan affiliation.
For a defendant who is enrolled in another tribe, but is a stranger to the
prosecuting tribe, the opposite result would obtain: jurisdiction would be
permitted under an enrollment-based standard, but not under a community
recognition standard.285 Visitors from other tribes who attend pow wows or
feast days present an interesting example. Using a community recognition
standard, a court could find it had no jurisdiction over visitors who are
merely attending as tourists. On the other hand, the same court would likely
284. See supra text accompanying notes 160-161 and 199-211 (explaining that the scope
of federal plenary power is at the heart of federal cases considering the legality of tribal and
federal prosecutions, and how federal criminal courts view federal government classification
as an Indian as a factor distinct from tribal government recognition).
285. The defendant in Morris v. Tanner is an example: the facts of the case do not reveal
that the defendant, although enrolled in Leech Lake, had any connection to the Flathead
community. See supra note 164 (discussing Morris). This potential narrowing effect is
discussed at length in Part III.C.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1

No. 2]

TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

405

recognize jurisdiction over visitors who participate or visit relatives or
friends who are member of the local tribe, or who are members of related
tribal communities.286
These factors are similar to those used by federal courts determining the
scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. For defendants who are not enrolled
anywhere, a community recognition standard would frequently lead to the
same result as applying the federal common law standard. There are,
however, important differences. For example, federal courts emphasize
recognition by a government, so they consider receipt of tribal services and
official non-citizen status under tribal law, but not the kind of family
relationships that were central to the Navajo court’s decision in Means. A
tribal court relying on a community recognition test could consider a
variety of indications of community ties and would not be limited to those
that indicated governmental recognition. Where the federal courts do
consider such community engagement factors, they fall under the heading
of “social recognition” which, at least in the Ninth Circuit, is the factor
accorded the least weight. A community recognition test would permit
prosecution of some defendants who might fail to meet the federal standard,
as demonstrated by cases like Cruz, where the defendant was prosecuted by
the tribe but was not considered Indian for purposes of federal
prosecution.287
On the other hand, several factors relevant to Indian status under federal
law would not be relevant to a community recognition test. Selfpresentation by itself, which is a factor considered by some federal courts,
would in most cases not be relevant to a test that considers whether the
community claims the defendant, and thus whether the defendant owes
some responsibility to the community. Recognition by the federal
government as an Indian, including receipt of federal services, would also
not matter. The community recognition standard focuses on a person’s
status within the tribal community rather than his or her relationship to the
federal government. In contrast, federal courts place more weight on
286. There is evidence that Congress was specifically concerned about visitors from
other tribes when it passed the Duro fix legislation. See supra notes 110-113 and
accompanying text (discussing this concern). Absent tribal jurisdiction over these offenders,
no government could prosecute them for minor offenses and this analysis is not meant to
suggest that Congress had no power to restore jurisdiction over these offenders. However,
because many people have connection to the prosecuting tribe and citizenship in another
tribe, the population of strangers enrolled in other tribes may be relatively small. See supra
Part III.C for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
287. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing Cruz).
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evidence of federal recognition and receipt of federal benefits, which makes
sense because they are concerned with the defendants’ eligibility for federal
prosecution. A community recognition standard would likely not permit
prosecution of those who qualify as Indians for some federal purposes but
are not part of any tribal community, as the EBCI court determined in
Prater, where the defendant qualified for Indian health services, but was
not otherwise a treated as an Indian by the community.288 Finally, the fact
of enrollment in another tribe, which is dispositive under the federal
common law test (regardless of ties to the tribe in whose territory the
offense occurred), would not be sufficient alone to establish Indian status
under a community recognition test. 289
An individual who voluntarily renounces his or her tribal citizenship
could potentially break the community ties that form the basis for criminal
jurisdiction, but the individual must do more than just formally disenroll.
For example, a defendant who voluntarily disenrolls but remains living in
or connected to the tribal community could still be prosecuted. A defendant
who has been involuntarily disenrolled, like the defendant in Phebus, who
was effectively demoted from citizen to descendant member by a change in
enrollment rules, could also be prosecuted as long as he or she maintains a
tie to the tribal community.290
288. See supra notes 281-282 and accompanying text (discussing Prater).
289. Some of these codes are worded in a way that would permit prosecution of Indians
from other tribes, regardless of enrollment status in that tribe and regardless of connection to
the prosecuting tribe. E.g. LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TRIBAL CODE tit. I, pt. 2, § 1(B)(1)
(n.d.), available at http://www.llojibwe.org/court/tcCodes/tc_coTitle1-Judicial.pdf (jurisdiction
over any Indian who is “recognized as such by an Indian community”); HOPI CODE tit. III, ch.
1, § 3.1.10 (2012), available at http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/HopiCode.pdf (definition of Indian includes anyone who is “regarded as Indian by the society of
Indians among whom he lives”). The approach described in these codes seems to combine the
idea that an Indian is anyone who is integrated into a tribal community with the idea embraced
by the citizenship-based codes that nonmember Indians are Indians from other tribes.
Employing this approach, a person without significant ties to the charging tribe could
nevertheless be prosecuted on the basis of his ties to another tribe. My focus here is on the
community recognition test for membership vis-à-vis the charging tribe. In Part III.C, I address
the question of jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes who lack community ties to the
charging tribe.
290. This is not to say that a tribal court may not find other flaws with a tribal process
that permitted involuntary demotion from citizen to subject, especially for non-punitive
reasons. However, these issues are more properly addressed in tribal court review of the
disenrollment, or in the context of a specific case, than in a blanket ruling that tribes cannot
prosecute disenrolled members. The issue presented by this class of people is discussed
further at infra Part III.B.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1

No. 2]

TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

407

The community recognition standard closely resembles the federal
VAWA standard as both emphasize ties to the prosecuting tribal
community. This makes sense, because the VAWA standard was written
specifically to sketch the boundaries of tribal jurisdiction. The definition of
community ties set forth in the VAWA, under which a non-Indian
defendant must live or work in the tribal community and be in a
relationship with an Indian person that gives rise to a domestic violence
charge, provides another example of how a community recognition standard
might be applied in practice. Because the law only applies to domestic
violence crimes, a person who is employed by the tribe must also commit a
covered offense against an intimate partner, deepening his ties to the tribe.
The advantage of the VAWA formulation is its predictability: it sets
forth clear factors for determining community ties and leaves little room for
judicial interpretation, which helps protect against bias. A tribe could
similarly enumerate a clear set of factors sufficient to show community
recognition, alone or in combination, but such a test could vary among
tribes to reflect the unique relational structure of each community. For
example, residing on the reservation is a strong indicator of community
membership in some communities, but it may have little relevance on
reservations with a significant non-tribal population. Outside of the
domestic violence context, residence or employment alone may not be
sufficient to indicate community recognition.
A community recognition approach analyzes the relationship between
individual and community in a way that emphasizes existence and
obligation, not simply political participation, consent, or voluntary
association.291 By asking how the community views the person, rather than
how the person identifies himself or herself or whether the person is
formally enrolled, this standard focuses on obligation as opposed to
consent. It offers a vision of community membership as a reciprocal
arrangement in which the individual is granted certain rights, privileges, or
status in the community and also assumes certain obligations with respect
to that community. Community membership, according to this standard, is
more than a fleeting, voluntary association. It cannot simply be discarded
when inconvenient.292 This approach to the relationship between individual
291. See infra Part III for additional discussion.
292. Community recognition is not a prison. A person could expatriate by voluntarily
disenrolling, leaving the community, and severing all ties. In this case, a person would
probably no longer be recognized as a member of a tribal community. By looking beyond
formal citizenship, however, the standard would permit prosecution of a person who
formally disenrolled, but remained living in (and committing crimes in) the community.
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and community reflects the kinship model described by the Navajo court in
Hunter and Means and treaty language that differentiates between outsiders
who assume tribal relations and those who do not.293
The community recognition standard is neither the broadest possible
articulation of tribal jurisdiction, nor the clearest and easiest to implement.
Tribes adopting it may find it necessary to articulate a factor test similar to
the federal common law or VAWA standards. It does, however, allow tribes
to work within existing federal law limitations while focusing on the
purposes and appropriate scope of tribal power. The standard invites tribal
courts to examine the relationship between the tribal government and the
defendant, to rely on that relationship as a basis for the exertion of criminal
power, and to more directly confront any potential concerns about whether
it is fair for that tribe to prosecute that defendant.
D. Community Recognition as a Federal Standard
The community recognition standard is useful for tribal courts
considering the limits of their own criminal jurisdiction because it
recalibrates the focus to the reciprocal relationship between community and
individual and gives courts the flexibility to acknowledge the multiple ways
this relationship might manifest. This section asks whether it could also
work as a unified federal law standard to demarcate the limits of tribal
jurisdiction.
Recall that federal law governing the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction
provides only the following: 1) a tribe may prosecute all Indians, 2) the
term “Indian” includes anyone who could be prosecuted in federal court
under § 1153, 3) federal jurisdiction under § 1153 extends, as a matter of
federal common law, to anyone who is of Indian descent and is politically
recognized as an Indian, 4) a tribe may not generally prosecute non-Indians,
and 5) a tribe may elect to prosecute non-Indians who have sufficient ties to
the prosecuting tribe and who commit crimes of domestic violence against
Indian people.294 When a federal court reviews the legality of a tribe’s
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, the federal court should defer to the tribal
court’s findings and conclusions regarding the scope of that tribe’s
jurisdiction, the definition of “Indian” used by that tribe, and the factors that
tribe uses to determine jurisdiction, including any findings regarding
293. See Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 449-50 (Navajo 1999);
see supra note 67 (discussing treaty provisions); supra notes 267-270 (discussing Navajo
law).
294. See supra Part I (describing the source of these rules and highlighting unanswered
questions about their precise scope).
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community recognition. Federal court review of the jurisdictional standard
is properly limited to testing whether the tribal court’s approach violates the
overall federal law requirement that a person be Indian—that is, he or she
has some Indian descent and some political affiliation with an Indian tribe,
or some claim to Indian legal status under federal law—or be a non-Indian
with sufficient ties to his victim and the tribal community such that VAWA
authorizes prosecution. A tribe’s approach may be narrower than what is
allowed under federal law, and the role of a federal court is to determine
only whether that approach exceeds to outer bounds of what is permissible
under federal law. A federal court should uphold the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over an Indian as long as it is based on factors that indicate
tribal community recognition.295
But is community recognition the best substantive standard for
determining the bounds of Indianness in the context of tribal court
prosecutions? Federal Indian law doctrine includes a presumption that
tribes retain all aspects of their inherent sovereignty that have not been
expressly lost.296 This means that, whether or not tribes exercise a particular
aspect of sovereign power frequently, they retain that power unless and
until it is expressly limited by Congress or, as the Court found in Oliphant,
implicitly divested because its exercise would be inconsistent with the
United States’ sovereign interests.297 This rule suggests that federally
imposed limits should be interpreted as narrowly as possible, foreclosing
tribal criminal jurisdiction only where absolutely necessary to effectuate the
Court’s concerns. To work as a unifying standard, community recognition
should maximize tribal sovereignty, while exempting people over whom the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction would be unfair (in the view of the federal
government) because of a lack of familiarity with a system that differs from
295. Contrast a deferential approach with the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Cruz and
Maggi, which accorded only minimal weight to a tribe’s determination that the defendants
qualified as descendant members, referring to it as the least important of all the relevant
factors, and ultimately held that the defendants were not Indians under federal law despite
evidence of some community recognition. See United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846-48
(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010). Deference to a
community’s determination of membership would also help avoid the potential problem of
federal judges relying on stereotypical views of Indianness. See Carole Goldberg, Descent
into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1380-88 (2002) [hereinafter Goldberg, Descent into
Race] (describing cases in which the courts have limited the application of Indian laws to
those individuals who appear in the Court’s view to be culturally Indian).
296. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also Frickey, supra
note 60, at 8-13.
297. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209-10 (1978).
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other American systems in key ways. This article argues that relying on a
flexible understanding of tribal community recognition is best way to
accomplish this balance.
Tribal sovereignty here is more than just a phrase. Understanding its
meaning requires inquiring why sovereigns need the power to criminally
punish and how to ensure that tribes can function largely as other
governments do in this regard. In the criminal context, this does not simply
mean prosecuting as many people as possible. Rather, it means examining
the governmental interests served by criminal jurisdiction to ensure that
tribal governments are able to protect those interests. Criminal laws
perform public safety, expressive, and accountability functions. A careful
examination of these interests, informed by criminal theory and the
practical realities of modern tribal governments, reveals why a community
recognition standard strikes the most appropriate balance between
maximizing sovereignty and ensuring fairness.
A primary function of criminal law is to ensure public safety. Criminal
laws proscribe certain conduct, including conduct that harms other people.
Criminal law is “a means of protecting individual rights and other valuable
goods”298 through deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation of
criminals.299 Whether a society responds to a violation with incarceration or
through less coercive means, criminal laws play an important role in
establishing and enforcing basic rules of conduct that keep people and
goods safe. This practical focus of criminal law informs most nonphilosophical discussions of the importance of criminal jurisdiction, and
reinforces the link between criminal law and territorial jurisdiction.
Sovereigns cannot keep people safe if they lack criminal jurisdiction over a
subset of people within their borders.
Criminal laws and criminal procedure also reflect the cultural and moral
consensus of a society.300 Criminal law is “critical to community identity”
because it “codif[ies] the moral foundations of the community.”301 While
298. CHEHTMAN, supra note 1, at 43.
299. See Morris K. Cohen, Moral Aspects of Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1007-17
(1940) (discussing justifications for criminal punishment) [hereinafter Morris Cohen, Moral
Aspects].
300. See Washburn, supra note 16, at 784-85, 840; Garnett, supra note 16, at 440 (“The
criminal law purports to proclaim and vindicate the particular moral commitments of
particular communities.”); Id. at 1077 (“It is one of the functions of the criminal law to give
expression to the collective feeling of revulsion toward certain acts . . . .”).
301. Washburn, supra note 16, at 834. As Washburn points out, the dominant role of the
federal government in prosecuting local crime in Indian country undermines this function for
tribal governments. Id. at 784.
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most societies criminalize violence and theft, the definition of some
activities as criminal (e.g., incest, statutory rape, or polygamy) varies
depending on the cultural beliefs of each society.302 Different societies may
also choose to address crime differently. For example, one society may rely
primarily on imprisonment as a means for addressing crime, and another
may rely primarily on restitution. One society may guarantee particular
rights to defendants in court that another system does not protect, or it may
outlaw certain types of punishment that another jurisdiction permits. Even
among societies with similar criminal laws, individuals in a given society
share an interest in having in force a system of criminal laws specific to that
society, which requires a belief that the government with power over that
territory has the power to enforce those laws.303
Another central purposes of criminal law is accountability.304 Criminal
law “provides the institutional framework within which . . . perpetrators of
public wrongs can be called to account (held responsible) for those
wrongs.”305 This purpose underlies the focus on retribution as a justification
for punishment.306 The law defines which moral wrongs will require such a
public calling to account, provides procedures for public adjudication and
condemnation, and sets forth consequences for wrongdoing.307 In so doing,
it provides “an appropriate formal, public response” to criminal conduct.308
Punishment is justified as a necessary response to the moral choice made by
an actor who commits a crime.
Public safety concerns are significant for Indian tribes. They, like other
sovereigns, are responsible for prescribing and enforcing basic codes of
conduct that keep people safe within their borders, and criminal jurisdiction
is the primary means through which they accomplish this. Tribes, like other
governments, need the power to arrest, prosecute, and punish (or not
302. Within the United States, this expressive function may be one reason that criminal
law is understood to be a matter for the states. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564
(1995) (noting that states are the primary sources of criminal power in the federal system).
303. See CHEHTMAN, supra note 1, at 40 (“[T]he fact that German courts claim the power
to punish every act of arson perpetrated in Korea would hardly ground the belief in Korea’s
criminal laws against arson being in force.”).
304. See Washburn, supra note 16, at 784-85, 840.
305. R.A. Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 125, 126 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011).
306. Id. at 127-28.
307. See id. at 126.
308. Id. This public condemnation and response is important for conduct that is viewed
as an independent moral wrong and for conduct that is legally prohibited but may not be
morally wrong.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

412

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

punish) all people who commit crimes in their territory. Indeed, tribal
sovereignty was historically understood to include the idea that tribes—
together with the federal government—were primarily responsible for
maintaining and enforcing general criminal laws within their borders.309
The public safety function of criminal law has been at the center of
debates about tribal criminal jurisdiction.310 Many Indian reservations have
high crime rates.311 Although no single factor can explain crime, one factor
associated with high crime rates seems to be the perception that Indian
reservations are “lawless” places where criminals can operate beyond the
reach of criminal laws.312 This perception is driven largely by the fact that
tribes cannot prosecute most non-Indian criminals, and the view that the
federal government, which has jurisdiction over those offenders, will not
bother to prosecute them.313 American Indians are also more likely than
309. Worcester v. Georgia, a case that helped defined tribes’ status in the United States
and lay the foundation for federal Indian law, involved Georgia’s efforts to arrest and
prosecute a white man in Cherokee territory. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 537-38 (1832). The Court
clearly held that Georgia’s criminal laws have no reach or effect in Cherokee territory and
described tribes as “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries within
which their authority is exclusive.” Id. at 557, 561-62.
310. See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime and the Law, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 709, 713, 738-39 (2006) (arguing that the encroachment of federal jurisdiction and the
role of federal prosecutors in Indian country undercut the ability of tribal governments to
maintain public safety).
311. See, e.g., John Dougherty, Problems in Paradise, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 28,
2007), http://www.hcn.org/issues/347/17026 (describing violent crime, including the murder
of a tourist, on the Havasupai Reservation); Timothy Williams, Brutal Crimes Grip an
Indian Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/
us/wind-river-indian-reservation-where-brutality-is-banal.html (discussing crime, and efforts
to fight it, on the Wind River Reservation); Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer
Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html (describing
high crime rates on reservations).
312. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 17 (attributing
high crime rate to a jurisdictional scheme that results in under-enforcement and “displaces
tribal authority”); see also Michael Riley, Promises, Justice Broken, DENVER POST (Nov. 11,
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_7429560 (first article in a series on crime
and jurisdiction in Indian country called “Lawless Lands”).
313. See, e.g., Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away with
Almost Anything, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Feb. 22, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://www.theatlantic.
com/national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with-almost-anything/
273391/ (describing increased crime by non-Indians on the Fort Berthold Reservation in the
wake of the Bakken oil boom and how jurisdictional rules make it difficult to investigate and
prosecute); Riley, supra note 312; Troy A. Eid, New Mexico High Court Ruling May Make
Indian Country Safer, LAW360 (May 27, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/659636/
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people of other races to be victims of violent crimes,314 and the perpetrators
of this violence are very often non-Indians.315 Native women in particular
have extremely high rates of violent victimization, and their abusers are
most often non-Indian.316 Enforcing public safety in most cases requires
that a sovereign exercise criminal jurisdiction over all people who commit
crimes within the sovereign’s territory. Any crime threatens public safety,
no matter who commits it, and public safety cannot be ensured if certain
criminals are free to operate beyond the constraints of local law.
new-mexico-high-court-ruling-may-make-indian-country-safer
(describing
how
the
patchwork of jurisdictional rules makes Indian country less safe). Although the federal
government has jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian offenders, recent data shows that U.S.
Attorneys declined to prosecute half of all Indian country cases. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF
INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS (2010), at 3, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
100/ 97229.pdf. But see Indian Country Investigations and Prosecutions 2011-2012, U.S.
DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2013/05/31/tloa-report-cy-20112012.pdf (showing fewer cases declined).
314. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 1-3 (NCJ 173386, Feb. 1999), available at http://bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf. Federal statistics, based on census categories, do not differentiate
between Indians on and off the reservation. Id. at 35-37 (describing data sources and noting
that most do not distinguish between reservation and non-reservation crime); see also
Address by Sarah Deer, in Conference Transcript: Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing Justice in
Indian Country, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 347, 377-81 (2012-2013) (delivered to the Berkeley
Law Thelton E. Henderson Center for Social Justice Symposium, Berkeley, Cal, Sept. 27-28,
2012) (discussing difficulty presented by using national crime data to describe victimization
of Native women). It is not clear, therefore, how rates of violent victimization among
Indians on the reservation compare to the rates for other groups.
315. GREENFIELD & SMITH, supra note 314, at 7.
316. Id. at 4, 7; AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 16, at 4-5. National
sexual assault statistics also fail to distinguish between Native women on and off the
reservation. See Timothy Aqukkasuk Argetsinger, VAWA’s Loudest Advocates Further
Silence Native Women, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Mar. 24, 2013), http://
indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/vawas-loudest-advocates-further-silencenative-women-148312 (questioning the widespread use of Department of Justice statistics
regarding inter-racial victimization rates of Native women because those statistics include all
Native women, the majority of whom live in urban areas, and therefore obscure the reality
faced by Native women living in Indian country); accord Address by Sarah Deer, supra note
314, at 381 (“So we really can’t say for sure whether most Native women who experience
crime on tribal lands are more likely victims of Native people or non-Native people.”). But
see id. at 380-81 (acknowledging that the comparative rates of inter-racial victimization of
Native women in Indian country is unclear, but calling the debate “a bit of a distraction” and
arguing that “studies showing that most perpetrators of violence against Native women are
non-Native are certainly compelling reasons to fix Oliphant”).
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Theoretically, federal jurisdiction might be enough to ensure public
safety for tribes, even where tribes lack jurisdiction to criminally prosecute
non-Indians. In practice however, the experience of those who rely on
federal prosecution suggests that federal jurisdiction alone has failed to
ensure public safety on reservations, and may even undermine it.317 Instead,
federal jurisdiction has resulted in under-policing, ineffective
investigations, and declined prosecutions, feeding the perception of
reservations as places without criminal laws.318 The public safety purpose
of criminal law, then, is best served by full territorial jurisdiction.
The expressive function of criminal law also suggests that it is important
for tribes to have criminal jurisdiction over all lawbreakers in their territory.
In general, for criminal laws to effectively function as expressive
instruments, a sovereign must have jurisdiction over all people who violate
those laws within its borders, including foreigners.319 Potential lawbreakers
must believe that the sovereign with primary authority over that territory
can and will enforce its own criminal laws. This refutes the argument that
tribes do not need jurisdiction over everyone as long as some government
has the authority to prosecute; the expressive function of criminal law is
one reason that federal jurisdiction is not enough.
However, the expressive function also reveals why exercising criminal
jurisdiction over people who are complete strangers to that culture and its
values might be viewed as unfair. Tribes have the right, like other
sovereigns, to determine how crimes are defined and addressed. Like states,
tribes may vary in their definitions of crimes and their procedural approach
to justice, and they have the right to enact criminal laws that reflect this.320
On one hand, tribes need the power to punish everyone who commits
crimes within their borders, because having people the tribe cannot punish
undermine the tribe’s rule of law. On the other hand, if the criminal law is
317. See supra note 310 (citing Washburn); supra note 313 (citing articles on underprosecution).
318. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 17.
319. See CHEHTMAN, supra note 1, at 57-58 (explaining that crimes committed by or
against foreigners undermine public confidence in the existence and effectiveness of the
system of laws just as much as do crimes by or against citizens).
320. Some of this potential variation is smoothed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012). The Indian Civil Rights Act extends many of the
protections found in the Bill of Rights to tribal governments, ensuring that due process rights
in criminal cases will roughly parallel those in state and federal courts, limits the length of
sentence that a tribal court may impose, and authorizes federal habeas corpus review of
tribal criminal court prosecutions, offering additional protection against unfair decisions. See
generally id. § 1302(a)-(c), § 1302.
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an expression of each society’s unique value system, it is potentially unfair
to impose that system on someone who is unfamiliar with or opposes that
value system. Of course, one might similarly argue that it is unfair for any
state to prosecute a citizen of another state because the criminal laws in
each state reflect different values. Whether fairness concerns related to the
expressive function of criminal law should outweigh the public safety
interest in territorial jurisdiction ultimately turns on how different the
foreign court is. Similarity trumps difference for interstate jurisdiction, but
currently law suggests that it does not for tribal courts, which the Supreme
Court has described as extra-constitutional321 and which may be based on
very different cultural value systems.322
Finally, the accountability function of criminal law requires citizens to be
accountable to their community. Only members of a community can
effectively be called to account before the rest of the community, and the
community’s response will be most significant its for members. Unlike the
public safety and expressive purposes of criminal law, a sovereign’s
criminal laws need not reach everyone within its territory in order to make
its citizens accountable. A focus on accountability thus recalibrates the
focus of criminal jurisdiction from territory to community.
The Court sharply curtailed tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in
Oliphant, driven in large part by the idea that tribal court systems are
different.323 An important part of this difference was the possibility that
321. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337
(2008) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004)) (“Tribal sovereignty, it
should be remembered, is ‘a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution.’”)
322. See generally FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1997); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems
and Tribal Society, in JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS 108 (Wanda D. McCaslin
ed., 2005); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175 (1994); JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN
HOPI TRIBAL COURT (2008); Carey N. Vicenti, The Reemergence of Tribal Society and
Traditional Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 134 (1995); Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as
Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness: [Re]Incorporating Customs and
Traditions Into Tribal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. (2000-2001), http://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/triballaw-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/index.php; Gloria Valencia Weber, Tribal Courts:
Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994).
323. Although the Court used the neutral language of difference, the implication of its
reasoning and the cases it chose to rely on clearly implied a judgment that tribal courts are
inferior to Western courts. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 97-115
(2005). Instead of relying on the case law from the previous two decades that affirmed the
competence of tribal courts and recognized their importance to tribal governance, the Court
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non-Indians would not be guaranteed the same procedural protections that
they would have under federal constitutional law.324 This concern reflects
the expressive and accountability functions of criminal law by suggesting
that it would be unfair to subject certain people to tribal criminal
jurisdiction because it would subject them to an unknown system of legal
values, and because it would require them to answer for their wrongs
according to a standard set by a foreign community.325
The Court understood that lack of criminal jurisdiction would potentially
leave a serious crime problem on reservations, but, reversing the approach
of prior case law, it held that Congress must weigh this “consideration” and,
if it chose to, act affirmatively to recognize or restore tribal criminal
jurisdiction.326 Congress then chose to restore inherent criminal jurisdiction
over a limited subset of non-Indians to address reservation public safety
needs relating to domestic violence and sexual assault.327 That restored
jurisdiction depends on tribes restructuring their criminal justice systems to
ensure that defendants receive the same procedural protections applicable in
non-tribal systems.
relied on the explicitly racist reasoning of assimilation-era cases that denigrated tribes as
savage and refused to acknowledge the existence tribal sovereignty. Id. at 76-79. This was an
odd choice because those two ideas about Indian policy had been clearly rejected by
Congress and the Executive at least twice since cases like Crow Dog were decided. See
Rolnick, supra note 13, at 981-83 (describing Indian Reorganization Act era); id. at 986-89
(describing self-determination era).
324. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978) (“As
previously noted, Congress extended the jurisdiction of federal courts, in the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1790, to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian
Country. In doing so, Congress was careful to extend to the non-Indian offender the basic
criminal rights that would attach in non-Indian related cases. Under respondents' theory,
however, Indian tribes would have been free to try the same non-Indians without these
careful proceedings unless Congress affirmatively legislated to the contrary.”) The Court
only briefly acknowledged that many tribes at the time of the case had Western-style court
systems, and that Congress extended certain procedural guarantees to tribal courts through
enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Id.
325. The Court reasoned that, in light of their extra-constitutional status, tribal criminal
jurisdiction infringes upon the overriding sovereignty of the United States because it could
potentially subject U.S. citizens to criminal prosecution without constitutionally guaranteed
protection. Id. at 210. The reference to citizenship, however, sheds little light on the line
drawn by the Court between insiders and outsiders. Id. at 211. While members of a tribal
community were considered citizens of foreign nations in the past, all Indians (tribal
members and nonmembers) were recognized as federal and state citizens more than a
century ago. See supra note 73 (describing Indian Citizenship Act).
326. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.
327. See supra Part I.D.
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This interplay suggests that, despite Congress’ and the Court’s
disagreement about the proper scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction, they
seem to share a concern about the potential unfairness of extending tribal
jurisdiction to people located within a tribe’s territory who are otherwise
strangers to the tribe and its criminal justice system. This limitation seems
rooted in the idea that the expressive and community accountability
functions of criminal law can be achieved if jurisdiction is limited to people
who are part of the tribal community, and assumes that the potential
differentness of tribal justice systems makes extending jurisdiction beyond
that community a subject of concern. At the same time, both branches
acknowledge the public safety needs of tribes and are at least nominally
committed to a jurisdictional regime that facilitates that purpose.
But the Court’s concern about unfamiliarity is overblown. Today, the
similarities between tribal and non-tribal courts usually outweigh the
differences.328 While tribes are not governed by the Constitution’s
requirements related to criminal procedure, nearly all of these requirements
do apply to tribal courts because they are included in the Indian Civil
Rights Act,329 a fact that the Oliphant court brushed aside,330 but which
undermines the Court’s reliance on historical notions of differentness. In
fact, a recent federal commission recommended restoring full territorial
jurisdiction, emphasizing the degree to which Western approaches to
criminal justice have influenced tribal systems.331 Like Congress did in
enacting the VAWA, the commission conditioned its recommendation on
closing the remaining procedural gaps between tribal and Western courts.332
The idea that tribal courts are still so different as to justify exceptional

328. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 117 (contrasting
tribal justice systems of the late 1800s, when the extension of federal jurisdiction to Indian
country crime was premised on the notion that they were insufficiently punitive, with
modern tribal justice systems, in which incarceration often plays a central role).
329. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
330. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
331. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 17-22 (describing
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the ICRA and noting that several tribal courts provide
additional protections, most notably the guarantee of counsel for indigent defendants, not
required by the ICRA).
332. Id. at 17-27; accord Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law
and Tribal Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 43355 (2013-2014) (arguing that the federal government, through legislation restoring tribal
criminal jurisdiction, allocation of tribal justice funding, and application of comity principles
to tribal court decisions, has pushed tribal criminal courts in a more Western direction).
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limitations on criminal jurisdiction is fundamentally unsound, but it
nevertheless reflects current law, and therefore must be taken into account.
Moreover, while many modern tribal courts are similar to Western
courts, the power to be different is important. The right to sustain and
nurture cultural differentness through separate governance is an important
aspect of the sovereignty tribes retain.333 Tribal governments can govern
illiberally334 and they can craft court systems that are procedurally quite
different from the standard U.S. adversarial model.335 Given this, the
Court’s concern about exposing outsiders to unfamiliar systems and
cultures echoes concerns about subjecting certain foreign travelers and
diplomats to the jurisdiction of foreign nations with culturally different
criminal justice systems.336
Criminal jurisdiction is a core aspect of sovereignty, but it has a dark
side as well: sovereigns can and do wield criminal power as a tool of
conflict, domination and subordination.337 Critical theorists argue that the
primary function of criminal laws is to preserve a system of social
stratification.338 Particularly when applied to those groups with little or no

333. See generally POMMERSHEIM, supra note 322, at 99-135.
334. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799,
816 (2007).
335. See generally Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The
Law of Equality and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 157-74
(Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (describing fundamental differences in values and
procedure between Navajo and Western court systems).
336. See Elizabeth Helen Franey, Immunity, Individuals and International Law 63 (June
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics), available at http://
etheses.lse.ac.uk/309/1/Franey_Immunity,%20individuals%20and%20international%20law.
pdf (noting that immunity is sometimes necessary for diplomatic and state officials to
function “in a foreign state with a different culture, and different laws” and to guard against
the risk that they “may inadvertently infringe the criminal law through ignorance of cultural
differences”).
337. See, e.g., Joachim J. Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal
Punishment, 99 AM. J. SOC. 911, 922 (1994).
338. Some of these are arguments about poverty and class domination, see, e.g., Malcolm
M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Note on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 467-70 (1992), while others focus
on the criminal law’s role in maintaining racial hierarchies, see, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16 (1st ed.
2010), or gender hierarchies, see, e.g., Meda Chesney-Lind, Girls’ Crime and a Woman’s
Place: Toward a Feminist Model of Female Delinquency, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 5, 1419, 25-26 (1989). See generally RANDALL G. SHELDEN, CONTROLLING THE DANGEROUS
CLASSES (2d ed. 2007).
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political or economic power,339 this social control function of criminal law
suggests that criminal power should be limited to prevent governments
from using their criminal laws as tools of hierarchy to oppress powerless
groups.
This is an important critique that tribes should consider, but it is better
addressed at the substantive level. This article addresses a very limited
question about tribal criminal justice systems: who must tribes have
jurisdiction over in order to accomplish the aims of their criminal justice
systems? Fortunately, the community recognition model presented here
provides a simple answer. It balances the tribes’ needs with the concerns
expressed by the Supreme Court. It is a modest proposal that would not
even put tribes on par with other governments when it comes to the scope
of criminal jurisdiction (as that would require full territorial jurisdiction and
a rejection of the Court’s concerns about differentness and fairness). It is
important to distinguish between expanding jurisdictional scope (e.g.,
which lawbreakers the tribe can reach) and expanding the substantive scope
of tribal criminal powers (empowering tribes to mete out harsher
punishments or define more activities as criminal). Critiques of criminal
justice as social control are primarily concerned with substantive
expansions because they are critiques of systems where jurisdictional scope
and the existence of criminal power are rarely questioned.340 Tribes are
alone in having their jurisdiction so severely curtailed, and one premise of
this article is that jurisdiction must exist and be clearly defended before an
effective critique of the content of tribal criminal power can be made.
The community recognition model could also set the stage for tribes to
build criminal justice systems that do not create or maintain racial, gender,
or class-based hierarchies. In contrast to other recent efforts to fortify or
expand tribal criminal jurisdiction, this model does not rely on the punitive
nature of tribal courts to justify existing or expanded tribal jurisdiction.341
Indeed, this model views the Supreme Court’s fairness concern as reflecting

339. SHELDEN, supra note 338, at 61-62.
340. E.g., Ahmed A. White, The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws and the
Jurisprudence of Authoritarian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 737-44 (2005-2006)
(describing how habitual offender laws substantively expand the state’s criminal power).
341. By contrast, the two recent legislative restorations of tribal jurisdiction, the Tribal
Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act of 2013, primarily address the
question of who a tribe may punish and for how long they may incarcerate those people, and
both require that tribal courts go further toward a United States model of individual rights in
order to expand their power to imprison. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304 (2012).
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in part the right of tribes to build criminal justice systems that are different
from the punitive Western model.
Short of pure territorial jurisdiction, the community recognition
framework for determining proper subjects for criminal jurisdiction makes
the most sense: even if a tribe cannot enforce criminal laws against all who
enter their territory because of fairness concerns, it is still fair for the tribe
to enforce its criminal laws against all people who have integrated into the
tribe to the extent that they are familiar with the community, enjoy some
benefits (even informal benefits) of tribal affiliation, and have some
obligations toward the community. The community recognition model
emphasizes an individual’s obligation to community, which provides an
important philosophical basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, and
in so doing it addresses the concerns about fairness and differentness
outlined in Oliphant.
Any imposition of federal limitations on tribal criminal jurisdiction
infringes on tribal sovereignty and strips tribes of self-determination,
because it fails to allow each tribe to determine for itself who should be
covered by tribal criminal laws. Specifically, these limitations prevent
tribes from exercising full territorial criminal jurisdiction, which is a power
rarely questioned for other sovereigns. The community recognition standard
acknowledges federal fairness-based limitations without sacrificing selfdetermination any more than is required. While there is a compelling
argument that Congress should amend the law to restore full territorial
jurisdiction,342 the community recognition standard offers a way to interpret
existing law in a manner that maximizes tribal jurisdiction, without
requiring any legislative change.
The Oliphant Court used the Indian/non-Indian distinction to
differentiate individuals whose relationship to Indian tribal nations make
them members of a special legal class,343 but the Court’s concerns about
“foreignness” are less about a person’s Indian ancestry than they are about
whether a person has an adequate connection to a tribal community so that
342. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 3-4, 23 (citing a
“public safety crisis” and “[i]nstitutional illegitimacy” as costs of the current system and
recommending restoration of territorial jurisdiction). See generally Samuel E. Ennis,
Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An Argument for
a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 553 (2008).
343. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-12 (1978); accord Garnett,
supra note 16, at 440 n.50 (noting that both the Oliphant and Duro opinions “recognize the
tie between the moral authority and legal reach of the criminal law and membership in the
community for which that criminal law speaks”).
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the tribe’s law would not be unfamiliar to them, and that the different due
process protections applicable to tribal court prosecutions would not result
in an unfair surprise.344 The community recognition approach best
addresses these concerns. This test asks whether the community considers
the person to be an Indian—whether the individual is sufficiently integrated
within the tribal community that others recognize him or her as a member.
It does not require that the individual be a citizen, or even a lifelong
member of the community. It does not require any specific form of
membership, such as formal enrollment or political participation. Instead, it
addresses the Court’s concerns about familiarity by ensuring that a
connection exists between individual and community, but retains flexibility
as to the precise form of that connection.
While the community recognition standard speaks to the Supreme
Court’s concerns about fairness and familiarity, it also defers to tribes to
determine the appropriate limits of their own powers. It is faithful to the
federal approach to the Indian category, in which Indianness is shorthand
for having a sufficient connection to an indigenous entity that is politically
recognized by the United States.345 It is also consistent with Congress’s
approach in the VAWA, which distinguishes between non-Indian domestic
violence offenders according to whether they have sufficient ties to the
community and have victimized a member of it.
This standard provides an alternative basis for upholding tribal court
jurisdiction in Means and Lara. Although the federal courts in those cases
focused on the defendants’ status as enrolled citizens of other tribes, both
defendants were also members of their local tribal communities.346 They
344. This is not to suggest that, even in the view of the Supreme Court, a criminal
defendant must be familiar with the specific provisions of tribal law in order for jurisdiction
to be fair. Many tribal citizens are unfamiliar with their own government’s criminal laws,
just as many state citizens are unfamiliar with each state’s particular laws. I thank Paul
Spruhan for this insight.
345. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). The Ninth Circuit makes this
explicit by requiring that the defendant be affiliated with a federally acknowledged Indian
tribe. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is . . . the existence of a
special relationship between the federal government and the tribe in question that determines
whether to subject the individual Indian affiliated with that tribe to exclusive federal
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian country.”) Because tribal jurisdiction serves
different purposes than federal jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 246-254, and
in light of the kinship relationships between some recognized tribes and tribes that are either
unrecognized or located across an international border, it is notable that some tribal codes
define Indian to include members of unrecognized tribes. See supra note 255.
346. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Lara and Means).
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were married to tribal members, had family within the tribe, and lived and
worked in the community.347 Their crimes arose out of their relationships
with other tribal community members.348 Had the federal courts focused on
the defendants’ connection to the tribal community in which they were
being prosecuted, as the tribal court did in Means, they could have provided
a well-reasoned explanation for jurisdiction, rooted in the work of criminal
law. Instead, the federal courts’ focus on enrolled citizenship left
unanswered questions about why citizenship in one tribe should matter in
determining the jurisdiction of another.
E. Community Recognition and Non-Indians
The community recognition standard need not necessarily be limited to
people of Indian descent. While many tribal criminal codes, including some
that employ a community recognition standard, also incorporate a
requirement of Indian ancestry,349 this may be a nod to the Oliphant and
Rogers rules instead of an expression of tribal ideas about community
membership. However, some tribes define community recognition without
requiring Indian ancestry.350A focus on community membership and
reciprocal obligations calls the logic of Oliphant into question as it applies
to non-Indians who are integrated into tribal communities. With VAWA’s
restoration of tribal jurisdiction over certain non-Indian community
members,351 federal law has moved closer to the community recognition
model expressed by these tribes.
The VAWA includes a carefully crafted standard for determining which
non-Indian offenders may properly be the subject of tribal jurisdiction,
which relies on the offender’s “ties to the Indian tribe.”352 This suggests that
Congress wanted to fix the problem of federal courts not prosecuting
enough domestic violence offenders, but also wanted to retain an element of
community connection. If under-prosecution was the only issue, Congress
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. E.g., GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA CODE tit. 9, § 102 (2012),
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/grand_traverse/index.html; HOPI CODE tit. III, ch.
1, § 3.1.10 (2012), available at http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/HopiCode.pdf.
350. E.g., SANTA CLARA LAW & ORDER CODE tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1.1 (2006); LEECH LAKE
BAND OF OJIBWE TRIBAL CODE tit. I, pt. 2, § 1(B)(1) (n.d.), available at http://www.llojibwe.
org/court/tcCodes/tc_coTitle1-Judicial.pdf; supra notes 270 and 283 and accompanying text
(describing Navajo law).
351. See supra Part I.D (describing VAWA).
352. Id.
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could have restored jurisdiction over all non-Indians who commit domestic
violence or sex crimes against Native women on reservations—but it
instead only restored jurisdiction over those with sufficient “ties to the
tribe.”
Breaking for a moment from the confines of Rogers,353 the community
recognition standard presents an alternative way to define the Indian legal
category. At its most basic level, the “Indian” legal category refers to
indigenous groups recognized as having a government-to-government
relationship with the United States, and the people with sufficiently strong
connections to those recognized groups to be fairly within the reach of laws
arising out of that relationship.354 A person who is not Indian by descent,

353. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (arguing that Rogers—although
incorporated by reference—is a poor standard for tribal criminal jurisdiction because that
case concerned the wholly different question of whether an intermarried white Cherokee
citizen should be considered an Indian for the purposes of escaping federal criminal
jurisdiction).
354. Skibine, supra note 106, at 768 n.6 (“[T]he constitutionality of the Duro legislation
hinges on the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs. Because this power is derived
from Congress' power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, it follows that this plenary
authority is limited to Indian tribes and their members. The term “Indian,” therefore, must be
understood as being limited to members of Indian tribes.”). Professor Skibine notes,
however, that “membership” may be understood in different ways and concludes that a
person should be considered a member “so long as that tribe considers such person a
member.” Id. One way the federal government drew this line was to differentiate between
those people who “maintained tribal relations” and those who did not. See, e.g., LUCY
MADDOX, CITIZENS INDIANS: NATIVE AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS, RACE, AND REFORM 109
(2006) (discussing the Court’s holding in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that Indians who
maintained tribal relations were wards subject to congressional plenary power); Sharon
O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1464 n.8 (1991) (describing census categories that
differentiated between “civilized” Indians and those who “retain[ed] their tribal character,”
as well as between “out of tribal relations” and “sustaining tribal relations”). This standard
had a clearly assimilationist purpose: federal policy encouraged Indian people to leave their
tribes and adopt non-Indian customs. Rolnick, supra note 13, at 979-81 (describing the
relationship between allotment policy, citizenship, and assimilation); Bethany Berger, Red:
Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 634-35 (2009) [hereinafter Berger,
Red]. The people who left were then excluded from the Indian legal category in an era when
the federal government’s goal was to reduce or eliminate the presence of Indian people.
Rolnick, supra note 13, at 981. In this regard, modern enrollment rules help to counter
assimilationist pressure, as Indian people who move away may still remain tied to their
tribes—and thus legal Indians—as formal citizens. Enrollment, then, is one method of
“maintaining tribal relations” despite distance. William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal)
Jurisdiction (August 28, 2015), at *31 n.117, *40 n.161, *45 (unpublished draft, on file with
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while unlikely to be an enrolled citizen today,355 may nevertheless be
considered a member of the community. If “Indian” is defined to include all
people who are members of a tribal community under the community
recognition standard, eliminating the reference to descent in the Rogers
definition, then a tribal court could redefine Oliphant’s bright line rule
(even if the case remains good law) to permit tribal jurisdiction over all
people who are recognized members of a tribal community, regardless of
their ancestry.
Eliminating the requirement of Indian descent entirely, while a
significant departure from modern interpretations, is a more accurate
reflection of historical practice.356 A recent concurring opinion authored by
author). It is not, however, the only indicator of tribal relations, and the community
recognition standard acknowledges this.
355. Most tribes today have descent requirements for tribal citizenship. Kirsty Gover,
Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in
Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 271-72 (20082009) (citing increased proportion of documented tribal constitutions using lineal descent
rules (forty-four percent) and blood-quantum rules (seventy-one percent)). But see Berger,
Red, supra note 354, at 652 (noting that Cherokee citizenship requires documented descent
from base rolls, which included inter-married whites and Black former slaves known as
freedmen, but describing present-day efforts to limit citizenship to those descended from
Cherokee-by-blood rolls). For a nuanced account of the history of, and current controversies
related to, the citizenship status of the Cherokee freedmen, see CIRCE STURM, BLOOD
POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA (2002).
356. As Robert Clinton observed in 1976, “Both intermarriage and the adoption of
ethnologically non-Indian people into Indian tribes require that ‘Indian,’ when used in [the]
context [of federal criminal jurisdiction], take on a social as well as a racial meaning.”
Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze, supra note 16, at 514; see also Nofire v. United States, 164
U.S. 657, 662 (1897) (“[The victim, a white man married to a Cherokee woman] sought to
become a citizen, took all the steps he supposed necessary therefor, considered himself a
citizen, and that the Cherokee Nation in his lifetime recognized him as a citizen, and still
asserts his citizenship. Under those circumstances, we think it must be adjudged that he was
a citizen by adoption, and, consequently, the jurisdiction over the offense charged herein is,
by the laws of the United States and treaties with the Cherokee Nation, vested in the courts
of that Nation.”); Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 615 (1896) (federal criminal
jurisdiction depends on whether the victim, a Black man living in Choctaw territory, is
determined to be a “negro[] who ha[d] been adopted into the tribe . . . [and therefore] within
the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals”); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896)
(federal court had jurisdiction over case about murder of a Black man who was not a
Cherokee citizen by a Black man who became a Cherokee citizen when the Nation
incorporated the freedmen). (Unlike Rogers, these cases did not require the Court to
determine whether naturalization led to Indian status for federal jurisdiction purposes
because they involved a specific treaty provision securing to exclusive tribal jurisdiction all
cases “in which members of the Nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties.”
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Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit advocates eliminating the descent requirement from the definition of
Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. In its most recent
opinion concerning the test for federal criminal jurisdiction, the majority of
the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed that Indianness requires “some
quantum of Indian blood”357 in addition to political affiliation with a
present-day tribe. Judge Kozinski disagreed in his concurrence, contending
that the requirement of “Indian blood” standing alone rendered the statute
an unconstitutional racial classification.358 He suggested instead “applying
the [Major Crimes Act] to all members of federally recognized tribes
irrespective of their race.”359
Judge Kozinski’s critique assumes that tribes include both members of
Indian descent and members not of Indian descent.360 He castigates the

Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokees, July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799, quoted in
Alberty, 162 U.S. at 502.) As Clinton explained,
Since Nofire has never been overruled, it calls into question the prong of the
traditionally accepted test for Indian status which requires an Indian to be in
part genetically descended from person of Indian blood. At the very least, for
purposes of ascertaining tribal court jurisdiction, tribal adoption of non-Indians
might render such persons Indians.
Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze, supra note 16, at 516 n.60; see United States v. Rogers, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68 (1846) (federal criminal case involving inter-married white man
who was prosecuted by the tribe); see also Berger, Power, supra note 67 (describing other
cases of whites prosecuted by tribal courts); Spruhan, supra note 67, at 85-91; Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197 n.8 (1978) (acknowledging that treaties also
provided that whites who settled in Indian country could be punished by the tribe).
357. United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). The court overruled a
prior case, United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010), which had added a
requirement that a person’s “Indian blood” be traceable to a federally recognized tribe. Id.
358. I disagree with Judge Kozinski on this point and instead share the majority’s view,
Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1110, that a federal statute that classifies Indians in whole or in part on
the basis of ancestry is not necessarily an illegal racial classification. See supra Rolnick,
supra note 13, at 995-96 (describing various constitutional arguments for upholding Indian
classifications); id. at 1003-06 (critiquing the Court’s facile equation of ancestry-based laws
concerning indigenous peoples with racial classifications).
359. Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1116 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
360. See id. at 1117 (“[The] political affiliation prong may provide a non-racial basis for
limiting [federal jurisdiction] only to tribe members. But not all tribe members are subject to
the [Major Crimes Act].”). It is not clear to whom Judge Kozinski is referring when using
the term “tribe members.” With few exceptions, tribes’ formal membership rolls probably do
not include people who lack any indigenous ancestry. While modern tribal communities do
include some non-Indians who are recognized as informal members of the community, these
people probably make up only a small fraction of informal community members on most
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majority for continuing to rely on Rogers in determining who is subject to
federal jurisdiction as an Indian:
Rogers is a nearly 170-year-old case, authored by Chief Justice
Taney, in which the Court held that an adopted, non-racially
Indian tribe member wasn’t subject to an exemption from federal
criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed by an “Indian”
against another “Indian.” In defining “Indian” for purposes of
the statute, the Court noted that the law “does not speak of
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,--of the family of
Indians,” and justified the federal government’s exercise of
power over “this unfortunate race” in part based on the need “to
enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to save
them if possible from the consequences of their own vices.”
Reliance on pre-civil war precedent laden with dubious racial
undertones seems an odd course for our circuit law to have
followed . . . . [Rogers is] obsolete [and] clearly distinguishable
[because it] stands for the limited proposition that “a white man
who at a mature age is adopted into an Indian tribe does not
thereby become an Indian” when the adoption occurs for the
purpose of evading prosecution. A case that does no more than
prohibit a tribe from making membership exceptions designed to
circumvent criminal punishment is a weak reed upon which to
rest the federal government’s unfettered ability to racially
discriminate between tribe members.361
By advocating for elimination of the descent prong, which would leave
only the Ninth Circuit’s political recognition prong (one that recognizes
forms of tribal affiliation beyond citizenship),362 Judge Kozinski effectively
advocates for replacing the federal jurisdiction standard with one that
considers only governmental recognition (including tribal community
recognition) to determine “Indian” status. If the federal courts were to
follow Judge Kozinski’s suggestion, tribes would be free (but not required)
to eliminate the descent requirement from their definitions of “Indian” for
purposes of criminal jurisdiction, which would potentially permit them to
reservations. To the extent that Judge Kozinksi imagines a substantial population of Indians
without indigenous ancestry, he is likely factually incorrect.
361. Id. at 1118 (citations omitted).
362. See id. at 1114. But see Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1282 (declining to eliminate the
descent prong).
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prosecute people not of indigenous descent, in a way still consistent with
Oliphant, by legally categorizing them as Indians. To be sure, categorizing
these people as “Indians” departs significantly from modern jurisprudence,
and is therefore properly the subject of an entirely separate analysis. In
addition, there are sound reasons to incorporate a descent requirement in
other contexts, especially given the centrality of ancestral tracing to
determining whether a group is indigenous to a particular area. Criminal
jurisdiction is unique because, to the extent that Congress and the Court
have determined that it must be limited, the factors that seem to matter most
are community connection, obligation, and familiarity, none if which
strictly require that a person be of Indian descent. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that, in addition to presenting an alternative to
citizenship based classifications, a community recognition standard
potentially offers an alternative to descent-based Indian classifications.
III. Community Recognition Versus Citizenship
As a legal term, Indianness designates an individual who is sufficiently
affiliated with a tribal community such that he or she is properly subjected
to the special federal laws governing the relationship between the United
States government and Indian nations. Most federal laws passed since the
1970s simply equate Indianness with tribal citizenship eligibility: a person
is an Indian for federal purposes if he or she is an enrolled member of, or
eligible for enrollment in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.363 It is
tempting to assume, as the Duro Court did, that formal citizenship is the
best (or only) way to determine the proper limits on tribal criminal
jurisdiction. The citizenship standard is consistent with a larger trend in
federal law to define the boundaries of legal Indianness through reference
to formal citizenship in a federally recognized tribe. The community
recognition standard employed by some tribal courts, however, presents an
alternative way to understand membership in and affiliation with a tribal
community, and it invites a comparison between the two. A close
examination of the most common rationales for preferring the citizenship
standard shows why community recognition is a better standard for criminal
jurisdiction and suggests that it could work in other contexts as well.
363. Margo Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer at the Core of
Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 281 (2001); see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §
450b(d)-(e) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (limiting eagle take permits under the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act to members of federally recognized tribes and requiring a
permit application to be accompanied by an enrollment certificate).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015

428

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

A. A Critique of the Citizenship Standard
There are at least three advantages to an approach that equates tribal
citizenship with legal Indianness. First, because citizenship criteria are
governed by tribal law, this approach defers directly to tribal governments
to say who is a member of the tribal community, and therefore a proper
subject of the federal rules that apply to tribal nations. Second, affirmative
enrollment is clearly a “political” classification, rather than a potentially
“racial” one, and therefore is a safer basis for classifying a person as an
Indian in an era when equal protection concerns haunt federal Indian law.
This easily meshes with the idea that Indianness is a purely political
designation because it emphasizes a form of voluntary citizenship in a tribal
nation, a status that can be viewed as completely unrelated to race. Using
tribal enrollment as the basis for Indianness thus helps insulate Indian rights
against accusations that Indian laws provide illegal special rights to a racial
minority group. Third, emphasizing formal enrollment as the proper test for
legal Indianness reflects the view, expressed by the Duro Court, that
consent-based citizenship is the only plausible justification for tribes’
exercise of governmental powers.364 The common desire to equate legal
Indianness with tribal citizenship is likely a product of all these forces:
respect for tribal self-governance, a desire to distance Indian classifications
from racial ones, and a consent-based view of tribal power. Perhaps
because of these coalescing interests, reliance on tribal citizenship is rarely
questioned. However, comparing citizenship with a community recognition
standard reveals several problems with relying on formal citizenship as the
sole litmus test for Indianness under federal law.
1. A Complicated and Contested Category
The Indian legal category, in all its varied iterations, is supposed to refer
to those people sufficiently affiliated with a recognized tribal government
that they are fair objects of federal Indian law. It is a “political
classification” because it hinges on an individual’s relationship to an entity
with which the United States has a political relationship. Deferring to tribal
citizenship rules, rather than formulating an alternative definition, signals a
powerful recognition of Indian tribal sovereignty in that it defers to tribes
364. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990). As Alex Skibine has pointed out, “The use
of a ‘consent of the governed’ theory confused Justice Brennan, who, in his dissent,
remarked that no constitutional rule exists stating that one cannot be prosecuted unless one
can vote, run for office, and sit on a jury.” Skibine, supra note 106, at 775 (citing Duro, 495
U.S. at 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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themselves to say how the “Indian” category should be constituted, and
affirms exclusive tribal jurisdiction over questions of membership. On the
surface, it gets the federal government out of the business of determining
Indianness and instead permits tribes to make their own decisions about
who their members are, with federal benefits and rules applying only to
those people tribes choose to enroll.
The Supreme Court affirmed tribes’ inherent power to determine
membership rules free from federal interference the same year it decided
Oliphant.365 In so holding, the Court affirmed tribes’ plenary authority over
membership decisions as a core component of sovereignty and selfgovernance, even if those decisions are alleged to violate fundamental
guarantees of liberty. A federal law defining Indianness solely in terms of
tribally defined citizenship criteria affirms tribal authority over such
matters. Deferring to tribal citizenship decisions in this way also advances
the policy of self-determination,366 a policy that rejects paternalism and
supports tribal self-governance.
Even though it seems as if federal law simply defers to tribes’ own
determinations about community membership by incorporating enrollment
as the definition of legal Indianness, characterizing enrollment rules this
way actually obscures the pervasive influence federal law has on modern
tribal enrollment rules, and fails to account for the shifting and contested
nature of tribal enrollment rules today. Formal membership rolls are a
relatively recent phenomenon; prior to their widespread usage, membership
in a tribe was a matter of kinship, residence, community integration, and
initiation in a religious or clan structure.367 The practice of keeping formal
365. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
366. See supra note 62.
367. See Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for
Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 459 (2001-2002) [hereinafter Goldberg, Members
Only?]; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact
of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1123, 1129-31 (1994); see also Jessica
Bardill, Tribal Sovereignty and Enrollment Determinations, AM. INDIAN & ALASKA NATIVES
GENETICS RES. CTR, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (NCAI), http://genetics.ncai.org/tribalsovereignty-and-enrollment-determinations.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (launched June
2012); KENT CARTER, THE DAWES COMMISSION AND THE ALLOTMENT OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES, 1983-1914, at 12 (1999) (“The accuracy of written rolls had never been a major
issue [before allotment] because ‘in a community as small and informal as the Indian
republics, the recognition of citizenship rested more upon family and neighborhood
knowledge than upon official registration[.]’”); Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht,
Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383,
394 (2015) (discussing kinship-based rules of belonging during the post-contact, preconstitutional era as “permanent” and not subject to revocation through disenrollment).
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lists of enrolled members has roots in the allotment era, when the federal
government pursued a policy of breaking up tribal landholdings with
individual parcels assigned to each tribal members and opening the
“surplus” lands for white settlement.368 The first enrollment lists were
compiled by federal agents tasked with counting and identifying tribal
members for purposes of assigning allotments or paying annuities as the
federal government sought to break up tribes and assimilate individual
Indians.369
Today, citizenship criteria vary across tribes, but nearly all incorporate a
descent requirement, such as the requirement that a person demonstrate that
at least one ancestor appeared on the original tribal roll.370 Many also
incorporate a degree of ancestry (blood quantum) requirement, usually onequarter.371 For some tribes, any Indian ancestry is sufficient, but others
require a minimum degree of ancestry from that tribe.372 Some tribes
require patrilineal descent,373 whereas others require matrilineal descent.374
A few tribes require something more than descent, such as parental
residence on the reservation375 or maintenance of contact with the tribe.376
Naturalization is infrequent today,377 and naturalization of people with no
Indian heritage at all seems to be especially rare.378
368. Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 367, at 457-58.
369. See CARTER, supra note 367, at 12 (describing the connection between tribal
citizenship rolls, federal control these rolls, and the policy of allotment).
370. Gover, supra note 355, at 271-72.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. See supra note 169 (citing Santa Clara and Seneca ordinances).
374. See supra note 169.
375. Gover, supra note 355, at 272.
376. E.g., LUMBEE CONST. art. II, § 2, available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/756e16_
72e7de6efe2f40549c0c49fcc88c8ad3.pdf (“Notwithstanding eligibility otherwise, no
person’s application for enrollment shall be accepted if the applicant has not historically or
does not presently maintain contact with the Tribe. Enrolled members may not be
disenrolled for failure to maintain contact with the Tribe, in accordance with a tribal
ordinance adopted under this Constitution.”); see also Lumbee Tribe of N.C., An Act to
Provide for Tribal Enrollment, No. CLLO-2010-0121-01 (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://media.wix.com/ugd/269399_948d7896b8b248128c743a448d2365b8.pdf (enrollment
ordinance providing that present-day contact may be demonstrated through frequent visits to
tribal territory and “knowledge of Lumbee churches, schools, and communities, or []
knowledge of community-based and/or tribal leadership” and requiring that tribal members
recertify their enrollment every seven years).
377. Constitutions adopted by tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act
sometimes had naturalization provisions, which may have reflected historical practices of
incorporating spouses and adopted children into the community as full members. Today,
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It is difficult to tell whether tribes would have adopted these descent
requirements if the federal government had not first refused to recognize
anyone as Indian who did not have a sufficient degree of Indian blood.379
To many scholars, tribal blood quantum rules cause particular concern
because the federal government’s use of blood quantum was linked to a
policy vision in which successive generations of intermarriage between
Indians and whites would eventually result in the wholesale disappearance
of Indians as a separate people.380 This history has likely influenced tribal
law regarding citizenship.381 On the other hand, descent plays an important
role as a way to determine who belongs in a kinship-based society,382 so it
is incorrect to assume that descent is only a factor in tribal citizenship
because of federal influences. Blood quantum, in this context, can also
operate as a rough proxy for kinship obligations or degree of connection to
the community.383
In either case, the idea that citizenship rules are a pure reflection of tribal
notions of belonging deflects attention from the complicated evolution of
the Indian legal category—a history shaped by racial stereotypes and a
heavy federal hand.384 Citizenship rules are undoubtedly influenced by
federal criteria, which are in turn influenced by racist perceptions of
Indians. When federal law refers to tribal citizenship rules to determine who
these provisions appear to be used infrequently, and naturalization is sometimes explicitly
prohibited. This is not to say that non-Indians and Indians from other tribes do not
commonly integrate themselves into tribal communities. Rather, their integration is not
accomplished through formal naturalization.
378. Although the subject of tribal naturalization laws requires further study, I am not
aware of modern day examples of tribes naturalizing people who are not of Indian descent.
379. But see John P. LaVelle, The General Allotment Act “Eligibility” Hoax: Distortions
of Law, Policy, and History in Derogation of Indian Tribes, 14 WICAZO SA REV. 251, 260-62
(1999) (refuting the argument that the federal government “imposed” blood quantum on
tribes).
380. See, e.g., Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J.
GENOCIDE RES. 387, 387-88 (2006); J. KEHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD:
COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 12-25 (2008).
381. See Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367, at 397.
382. Goldberg, Descent into Race, supra note 295, at 1390; see also Bethany Berger,
Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 23, 34 (2013) (pointing out that
descent-based citizenship comports with international norms and that jus sanguinis, or
decent-based determination of citizenship, was long the dominant rule outside of the United
Kingdom and the United State).
383. See KIM TALLBEAR, NATIVE AMERICAN DNA: TRIBAL BELONGING AND THE FALSE
PROMISE OF GENETIC SCIENCE 64-65 (2013).
384. See id. at 66.
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is Indian, it may appear as if the federal government has gotten out of the
business of trying to decide who qualifies as an Indian, because any
potentially objectionable limitation on membership—for example, a
minimum blood quantum requirement—appear to be solely the
responsibility of the tribal government. Unless and until tribes can refine
their citizenship rules to weed out federal influences, however, the idea that
citizenship-based definitions of Indianness are entirely reflective of tribal
self-determination is little more than a fiction.385
Relying on citizenship to determine Indianness means according a highly
contested and constantly shifting category paramount importance in
determining all things relating to Indian rights and tribal power—including
access to federal benefits, applicability of federal laws, and tribal
jurisdiction. Assuming there is only one legitimate way to define Indianness
for all purposes also avoids important questions about what is at stake with
any particular classification, and what kind of analysis should guide the
classification scheme in light of its purposes. The foregoing analysis of
criminal jurisdiction standards is just one example.386 The trend toward
equating Indianness with tribal citizenship means that tribal enrollment
rules have a far greater significance today than they ever have in the past.
Modern tribal citizenship rules serve specific purposes, and therefore
may not provide a good measure of legal Indianness in other contexts. For
example, in many tribes, formal enrollment determines which community
members can vote in tribal elections, run for political office, and sometimes
who can own tribal land.387 Those rules may not say anything at all about
who lives in the community, who has kinship obligations to the community,
how religious leadership is determined, who can participate in certain
events, or who can benefit from the protections and services provided by
the tribal government. Criminal jurisdiction rules are another example of a
classification with a specific purpose: criminal jurisdiction is usually
385. See Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367, at 390 (contrasting “federally
imposed notions of tribal ‘membership’ and ‘enrollment’ with “norms of indigenous
belonging and kinship”); see also United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 9, U.N. DOC. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“Indigenous
peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in
accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned.”)
386. See supra Part II.D.
387. See JOANNE BARKER, NATIVE ACTS: LAW, RECOGNITION, AND CULTURAL
AUTHENTICITY 82 (2011) (“specific rights that issue from [enrolled] membership include
voting in tribal elections; holding tribal office; sharing in tribal revenue; the use of tribal
lands and natural resources . . .; and housing, health care, and education”) (citing Goldberg,
Members Only?, supra note 367).
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described in its own section of a tribal code, and it is unlikely that any
tribe’s citizenship rules were crafted with the question of criminal
jurisdiction in mind. For this reason alone, formal citizenship—even in its
ideal form—is an ill-suited classification to determine who is the
appropriate subject of criminal power, and this mismatch should raise
questions about whether it should be relied on in other contexts.
Over-reliance on formal citizenship rules also presents additional
problems. For several reasons, tribal citizenship encompasses only a narrow
subset of community members. First, some tribes prohibit dual citizenship,
so a person with significant ties to more than one tribal community may not
be enrolled in one because he or she has chosen to enroll in the other.388 For
those eligible to enroll in more than one tribe, the decision about where to
enroll may be influenced by the relative financial resources of each tribe.
Second, tribal enrollment criteria are heavily contested, because they
determine access to financial resources and political power.389 Enrollment
lists grew out of the lists compiled by federal officials to determine who
should be entitled to share in tribal money and property,390 and they still
serve that purpose today. Any standard that limits who can access tribal
financial resources is bound to be contested because of concerns about
limited resources. The same is true for any standard that limits who can
hold and exercise political power in the tribe.
Superficially, tribal citizenship may seem like a clean categorical marker,
especially because tribes keep and regularly update enrollment criteria and
lists of enrolled members. Enrollment therefore presents an attractive option
for defining legal Indianness in all contexts. But the reality of tribal
community membership is much more complex than what is captured on
membership rolls. If formal citizenship is to be the sole indicator of
Indianness for all purposes, including eligibility for federal benefits,
exercise of tribal jurisdiction, and enjoyment of tribal benefits, it has to
become more than simply a list of Indian people compiled by federal
officials for purposes of distributing land allotments or annuity payments
(the historical basis of membership rolls), or a tightly guarded list of who
can share in tribal money or inherit tribal land. The maintenance of
388. No federal law expressly prohibits dual enrollment, but the standards for federal
recognition require that a petitioning tribe demonstrate that its members are not enrolled
elsewhere. See KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 95-96 (2010). Federal funding
formulas may also count tribal members in a way that discourages dual citizenship.
389. See generally Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367; see also BARKER, supra
note 387, at 146-85.
390. See BARKER, supra note 387, at 88-93.
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membership rolls and the use of formal enrollment procedures is a
relatively new phenomenon for tribes when it comes to determining
belonging, community participation, and eligibility for services. The limited
purposes served by enrollment and the disputes surrounding it suggest that
it is not the most reliable way to define the boundaries of a tribal
community for all purposes.
2. Indianness and Equal Protection
The term "Indian" has always been a legal term of art, but its meaning
has been shifting and inexact. At first, "Indians" simply meant the
"numerous and warlike tribes" of "fierce savages" that inhabited North
America prior to European arrival.391 Indian was seen as the opposite of
white,392 and there was no need to define the term further, because
relatively clear distinctions of phenotype, culture, language, and geography
separated most Indians from most non-Indians. Federal policy focused on
keeping Indians separate from settlers, so it probably seemed unnecessary
to precisely define the edges of such a clear category. For indigenous
peoples, tribal affiliation was more important than Indian identity.393
Although some tribes were closely related to neighboring tribes and some
even governed through formal confederations or alliances, tribes across
North America were far more culturally diverse and geographically
scattered than they are today.
Eventually, federal courts began to face questions about the boundaries
of legal Indianness, and the Indian category was reshaped by perceptions
about religion and culture.394 Indian policy at the end of the nineteenth
century was characterized by an effort to disempower tribal governments,
forcibly assimilate Indians into American culture, and break up tribal
landholding with the goal of eliminating the "Indian problem" by turning
Indians into whites.395 As Congress and the courts considered which groups
and individuals would be the subject of the federal plenary power over
Indian affairs, the answers tended to focus on whether the people in
391. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586, 589 (1823).
392. LAURA GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN
RACE 50 (2007) (describing the white/Indian duality).
393. See Goldberg, Descent into Race, supra note 295, at 1374, 1389; Rolnick, supra
note 13, at 1007.
394. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1010-13.
395. See id. at 979-81 (describing assimilation policy); see also Charles F. Wilkinson &
Eric R. Briggs, The Evolution of Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 143 (1977)
(describing how assimilation was proposed as a “solution to the ‘Indian problem’”).
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question practiced European or traditional religions, whether they were
sedentary farmers or nomadic hunters or herders, and whether they had
been educated in American school systems.396
When Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, which
aimed to reestablish and support Indian tribal governments, after several
decades of forced assimilation, and increase Indian control over Indian
affairs, it had to define who would qualify as an "Indian." It did so by
relying on three possible indicators: enrollment in a recognized tribe
coupled with Indian descent, descent from a member of a recognized tribe
coupled with residence on the reservation in 1934, or possession of "onehalf or more Indian blood."397 Federal law thus recognized that the Indian
legal category is comprised of people who maintain ties with tribal
communities, whether through enrollment or residence, as well as people
who are descended from those communities. The blood quantum
definition—uncoupled as it was from any requirement of tribal enrollment
or reservation residence—may have been a way to account for the
decimation of tribal governments and co-mingling of tribes that occurred as
a result of federal removal and assimilation policies. It also enabled the
federal government to extend its supervisory authority over communities of
Indians not affiliated with any tribe by acquiring land for them and
organizing them into sedentary communities.398 The blood quantum
definition reflected federal use of blood quantum to define Indian status in
prior eras399 and blood quantum and descent are still used in some federal
laws to determine Indianness.400 It is this aspect of the federal Indian
category, which focuses on descent and percentage of ancestry, that creates

396. See generally United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616-18 (1877) (holding that
Pueblo people are not Indian for federal purposes because they are civilized, pastoral,
intelligent, Spanish-speaking and Catholic); see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28,
39-47 (1913) (holding that Pueblos are Indians under federal law because they are primitive,
simple, and governed only by crude customs).
397. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012).
398. Gover, supra note 355, at 281.
399. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,
51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 9-45 (2006) (describing pre-IRA uses of blood quantum).
400. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012) (specifying that immigration exceptions only apply
to American Indians “who possess at least 50 per centum of blood of the American Indian
race”); see also Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1016-17 (describing descent-based laws and
judicial resistance to them).
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the most consternation among those who consider Indianness to be an
illegal racial classification.401
Most of the time, people who qualify as legal Indians are the same
people who make up the Indian racial category.402 The racial dimension of
the term “Indian” did not present a problem for courts until the late
twentieth century, when courts began to interpret the Equal Protection
Clause as barring race-based legal classifications in almost any
circumstance.403 If racial classifications were illegal, then how could
Congress pass and the courts enforce special laws relating to Indians—a
category that at least partly refers to race?
The Supreme Court first addressed this conundrum in Morton v.
Mancari, a 1974 case that upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs Indian
employment preference against an equal protection challenge.404 In the
shadow of increasing debate over the constitutionality of race-based
affirmative action programs, the policy was challenged as an illegal racial
classification.405 The Court had not yet determined the level of
constitutional scrutiny that would be applied to benign racial classifications
(those intended to benefit a minority group).406
Consequently, there were several options available to the Court to
uphold the Indian preference law. First, the Court could have labeled the
classification as at least partially racial and applied intermediate scrutiny
because it was a program designed to benefit, rather than harm, a minority
group. Alternatively, the Court could have applied strict scrutiny, but held
that the government's interest in carrying out its unique trust responsibility
was a sufficiently compelling interest, or that the Bureau's particular history
of discrimination against Indians justified the modern preference in hiring
and promotion. Finally, it could have recognized that the federal
government's unique relationship with indigenous nations, which is
401. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 997, 1016-17 (describing criticism of descent-based
Indian classifications).
402. See id. at 1007-14 (explaining how the Indian racial and legal categories evolved
together and influenced each other).
403. See id. at 989-90, 997.
404. 471 U.S. 535 (1974).
405. See Carole Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do with It?: The Story of Morton v.
Mancari, in RACE LAW STORIES 237 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008)
(describing how the case arose in the context of unanswered questions about the
constitutionality of university affirmative action programs and how the plaintiffs and at least
one amicus brief on the side of the BIA explicitly framed the dispute as one about raceconscious remedies).
406. Id.; Rolnick, supra note 13, at 989-90.
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affirmed in treaties and in the text of the Constitution itself, means that
Indian classifications are not subject to standard equal protection analysis,
even if the classification is in part race-based.407 Instead, the Court chose to
avoid questions of race and equal protection entirely; it characterized the
Indian classification as “political, rather than racial” and held that it was
“rationally related” to the government's unique obligations towards Indian
tribes.408
In the decades since Mancari was decided, the constitutional limits on
race-based programs have hardened. Racial classifications are always
subject to strict scrutiny, even if intended to benefit, rather than
disadvantage, minorities. Moreover, the goal of rectifying generalized
historical discrimination against a group is not a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to permit a race-based program to withstand strict
scrutiny.409 And even where a compelling interest is identified, the Court
has carefully scrutinized the manner in which race is considered, striking
down uses of race that it views as unnecessary to achieve the stated goal.410
It has therefore become increasingly important to characterize laws singling
out Indian people as involving political classifications as opposed to racial
ones.
Formal citizenship in a federally recognized tribe provides an easy
political demarcation. The Mancari Court referred to citizenship when
describing Indian classifications as political.411 Many federal statutes use
citizenship to define Indianness.412 Those that do not continue to be dogged
by concerns that they may draw illegal race-based distinctions.413 Several
Supreme Court opinions preceding Duro also focused on citizenship as the
407. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1015-25 (describing these options and explaining
how the Court’s choice to characterize the rule as “political, rather than racial” had
important ramifications for how Indian status has been conceptualized by courts ever since).
408. Mancari, 471 U.S. at 553-54 n.24.
409. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); id. at 239 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion); id. at 505-06 (opinion of the Court); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 289-90, 307-10 (1978).
410. E.g., Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (remanding
challenge to race-based university admissions policy and holding that strict scrutiny requires
that such policies must be necessary to achieve the university’s goal of diversity, which
includes an inquiry into whether other measures might achieve the same goal, in order to be
legal).
411. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
412. See supra note 363 (same point).
413. See supra note 401 (describing criticism of various laws singling out Indians but not
defining Indianness in terms of enrollment).
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basis for tribal power.414 While the move towards citizenship-based
definitions of Indianness in federal law has been gradual, it closely tracks
the increasing judicial distaste for racial distinctions of any kind, and is
undoubtedly driven in part by a desire to square the field of Indian law with
the Mancari political classification framework. In other words, the Duro
Court was following a trend in federal law of avoiding equal protection
problems by attempting to define Indian status as correlated to citizenship
in a federally recognized tribe. Yet, as Parts I and II of this article
demonstrate, formal citizenship is not the only way to measure whether a
person has a sufficient connection to an Indian tribe, and it is therefore not
the sole constitutional option for defining the boundaries of the Indian legal
category.
3. Consent and Shrinking Tribal Power
Although the Duro rule was superseded by statute, its reasoning that
consent and political participation is the only permissible basis for
subjecting someone to tribal jurisdiction remains influential. In cases
concerning tribal power over non-Indians in Indian country decided in the
years between Oliphant and Duro, the Court slowly moved from
distinguishing between Indians and non-Indians to distinguishing between
members and nonmembers. The Court’s focus on consent as a basis for
jurisdiction developed in tandem with this shift.
The Court first employed the member/nonmember language in Wheeler,
a case that confirmed tribal criminal jurisdiction over an enrolled citzen of
the tribe, and Montana v. United States, a case that prohibited tribes from
regulating hunting and fishing by non-Indians living on private property
within reservation boundaries.415 In each case, the Court suggested a broad
rule that tribes presumptively lacked jurisdiction over “nonmembers”
within their territory.416 In Wheeler, this rule limiting tribal jurisdiction was
dicta because the case did not involve nonmembers;417 Oliphant, decided
the same year, limited tribal criminal jurisdiction over some people and
explained the distinction as one between Indians and non-Indians.418
414. See infra Part III.A.3.
415. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1984).
416. See id. This broadly stated rule was inconsistent with past decisions recognizing
broad tribal power over all within the borders of a tribe’s territory. It was also unnecessary to
Montana’s holding that the tribe could not regulate hunting and fishing by a non-Indian on
land he lived on and owned in fee simple within the boundaries of the reservation.
417. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 314 (1978).
418. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
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Montana concerned a white person who was neither an Indian nor a tribal
member, but the Court used the phrase “nonmember” instead of “nonIndian” and highlighted his lack of connection to the community, rather
than his race, as the reason the tribe could not regulate his actions.419
In subsequent cases concerning the limits of tribal civil jurisdiction, the
Court embraced and expanded upon this newly announced presumption,
which turned prior assumptions about tribal governmental power inside out
by moving from a territory-based vision of tribal sovereignty to a consentbased one.420 Tribes are sovereigns with power over their members and
their territory,421 yet the increasing emphasis on tribal citizenship in federal
law has fed the idea that tribes should only be able to exercise
governmental power over those who consent to be governed, even within
their territory. Over the past thirty years, the Court’s jurisprudence on both
civil and criminal jurisdiction has carved massive holes in tribes’ control
over their territory. In the criminal context, this has come in the form of
categorical prohibitions against the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
certain groups of people. In the civil context, what began as a rule that
exempted certain types of land within a reservation from certain forms of
tribal jurisdiction422 has evolved into a blanket presumption that tribes lack
power over anyone who has not consented to be governed by them.423
The importance of consent shows up in the basic rule that tribes are
presumed to lack power over the activities of nonmembers within their
territory, as well as in one of the two exceptions to that rule, which
recognizes tribal power over nonmembers who have consented (usually via

419. Montana, 450 U.S. at 550.
420. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 359 (2001); Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008).
421. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832)
(describing territory sovereignty of Indian nations).
422. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67 (holding that tribe cannot regulate hunting and fishing
by nonmembers on nonmember-owned fee land, but approving of lower court’s holding that
tribe can regulate same on tribal trust land); Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-55 (applying Montana to
state highway right-of-way crossing tribal trust land); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 441-45 (1989) (holding that tribe can
apply zoning regulations to nonmembers who live in “closed” portion of the reservation,
where the vast majority of land was held in trust for the tribe and devoted to restricted tribal
uses, but not to those who live in “open” portion, where tribal and member land was broken
up by many tracts owned in fee by non-members).
423. Hicks, 553 U.S. at 359; Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 328.
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contractual agreement) to be governed by tribal law.424 In Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. (the Court’s most recent case
concerning tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers425) Chief Justice
Roberts explicitly stated the Court’s concerns about tribal jurisdiction over
anyone but consenting members: “[N]onmembers have no part in tribal
government—they have no say in the laws and regulations that govern
tribal territory. Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly
imposed on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented . . .”426 The
Court employs a very narrow understanding of consent in these cases to
foreclose tribal power over everyone except those who affirmatively
volunteer to be governed by tribal law: tribal members consent by enrolling,
and non-members must consent to a specific exercise of jurisdiction in
order for it to be valid. Formal citizenship, for example, measures a
voluntary, active, and discardable form of community affiliation. Likewise,
Montana’s consensual relations exception has been interpreted to cover
mainly contractual agreements—another express, voluntary, and waivable
form of consent. Implicit in the Court’s formulation is the idea that if a
tribal government acts unfairly, this consent can be withheld or withdrawn:
a nonmember can avoid unfairness by not consenting to tribal jurisdiction,
and a member can avoid it by disenrolling.427 For a Court suspicious of the
legitimacy and stability of tribes as governments, formal citizenship is a
way to measure active, ongoing consent of certain people to be governed by
tribes, thus easing concerns that tribes may be exercising governmental
power over anyone except those who have voluntarily subjected themselves
to tribal laws.
This view of consent-based governance made its way back into the
Court’s jurisprudence on tribal criminal jurisdiction in Duro. The Duro
Court’s view that consent provides the only defensible basis for tribal
jurisdiction reflects the focus on consent in the civil jurisdiction cases.428
424. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (establishing consent exception and collecting prior cases
that exemplified its application).
425. As of the writing of this article, a lawsuit seeking to further restrict tribes’ civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers, even those who have arguably consented to jurisdiction, is
pending before the Court. See Opening Brief for the Petitioners, Dollar General Corp. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-1496 (Aug. 31, 2015).
426. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337.
427. In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court expressed particular concern about nonIndians because, even if they wanted to consent to governance, they could not enroll and
thus could never participate in the local tribal government. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S.
at 337.
428. Skibine, supra note 106, at 776-777.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1

No. 2]

TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

441

After Duro was overturned, the consent theme became less prevalent in
criminal jurisdiction cases. However, the Court has continued to refine and
explain the consent theme in its civil jurisdiction cases,429 suggesting that
the idea of consent still holds significant weight as a theoretical basis for
modern tribal jurisdiction.
By invoking a special theory of consent-based jurisdiction for tribal
courts, the Court has re-imagined tribal governments as membership
associations held together by nothing more than the voluntary assemblage
and active participation of their members.430 According to this vision, tribes
may exercise power over their members because those members are free to
renounce their tribal citizenship and abandon their tribal ties at any time.
This vision belies the reality of tribal cultures built on kinship and clanbased obligations, on fundamental ties among community members, and on
the relationship between the people and the particular territory they inhabit.
The community recognition standard that some tribes employ in the
criminal jurisdiction context, on the other hand, better reflects these
complex ties.
B. Subjects Without Rights
If formal citizenship carries with it certain rights, such as the right to
vote and the right to run for political office, the use of different standards
for citizenship and for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction may raise
concerns because it effectively creates a category of people who are subject
to tribal power but prohibited from participating in civic life via voting or
running for political office. Citizens are subject to tribal jurisdiction and can
exercise political rights. A larger class of secondary members are subject to
tribal jurisdiction, but are not eligible to enroll and so may lack those
political rights. This arrangement may seem to raise serious fairness
questions because the secondary members are subject to sovereign power of
a government in which they have no political voice. In such a structure, a
core group of enrolled individuals have the power to govern, while an
additional group of individuals remain subject to the government’s power
but are prohibited from participating. When the power at issue is criminal
jurisdiction, including the power to deprive a person of liberty, the concerns
raised by a two-tiered structure may be especially acute.
Resistance to the possibility of criminal jurisdiction without political
participation was an important part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Duro,
429. See supra text accompanying notes 426-427 (discussing Plains Commerce Bank).
430. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1023-24.
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but jurisdictional rules that encompass non-citizens are not unique to Indian
law. The United States has historically exercised criminal jurisdiction over
many classes of people who could not exercise full citizenship rights, or
who were not citizens at all, including African Americans until 1868 and
women until 1920. Today nationals, permanent residents, disenfranchised
felons, undocumented immigrants, and children under the age of eighteen
all comprise part of the national community, and are certainly subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of the federal and state governments431 even though
these classes of people lack a formal voice in the country’s political
process. But no one would suggest that the federal and state governments
lack criminal jurisdiction over them. This is partly because sovereigns
typically enjoy full territorial jurisdiction. Even when criminal jurisdiction
is tied to the relationship between individual and nation, as in the
extraterritorial context, however, it is not limited to citizens. At minimum,
extraterritorial jurisdiction extends to all “nationals.”432
Two-tiered membership structures already exist informally in most
tribes.433 Many people who live on reservations and participate in tribal
communities are ineligible for enrollment.434 Those community members
may live on tribal land or in tribal housing. They may attend tribal schools,
receive services at tribal clinics, enjoy the protection of tribal emergency
response personnel, and receive a range of other services from the tribe.
They may also have familial, community, and religious obligations. Many
participate actively in ceremonial life (which in some tribes is closely
connected to formal political life). They are members of the tribal
community in all senses except for the right of direct political participation.
Before formal enrollment rules, membership in a tribal community was
based on kinship, residence, and sometimes choice of affiliation. Kinship
sometimes included non-blood ties such as those gained via marriage,
adoption, or naturalization.435 For example, an outsider who was adopted or
married into the tribe may have become a tribal member for social
purposes, but may not have been permitted to participate in a clan-based
religious system.436 Because of the close link in many tribal communities
431. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 707 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
432. See supra note 3 (describing extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction).
433. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 271-282 (describing EBCI law).
434. See supra text accompanying notes 168-170 (describing people who may live in
community without being enrolled).
435. Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367, at 394.
436. Spruhan, supra note 67, at 82-85; see also COLIN CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR
ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 152-164 (1998).
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between religious leadership and political governance, outsiders without
clan status may have been excluded from political participation as well.
Some tribes today have formalized the two-tiered structure in their
constitutions or enrollment ordinances. These laws describe a category of
people who are subject to tribal power and may access certain tribal
services, but are expressly excluded from full membership. For example,
the Blackfeet Tribal Code recognizes a category of descendant members
who are eligible for certain tribal services and subject to criminal
jurisdiction, but who do not have the full political rights of enrolled
citizens.437 The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation
have created a class of “associate members” with a similar status.438 Some
may view this status as a form of second-class citizenship.439 A better
analogue, however, might be nationality or permanent resident status.
Nearly all nations have some form of recognized affiliation short of
citizenship. Like nationality laws, the two-tiered membership structure
employed by Blackfeet, Fort Peck, and others has the advantage of
providing clear notice to community members about their status, the rights
they do and do not enjoy, and whether they are subject to tribal jurisdiction.
There is certainly a strong argument that a society is better off if all
people who are subject to governmental power have an equal voice in that
government, but the appropriate place for that discussion is on the context
of debates about citizenship criteria, not in the context of rules that narrow
(describing varying levels of community integration experienced by captives and others
adopted into Indian tribes).
437. BLACKFEET CONST. amend. III; see supra note 210 (describing federal
determinations of Indian status in cases where defendants qualified as descendants under
Blackfeet tribal law).
438. FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 4, ch. 1, § 101(e) (1988),
available at http://www.fptc.org/ccoj/title_4/chapters/chapter1.pdf; see also Bailey, supra
note 215.
439. Because the key difference between a full member and a descendant is often one of
blood quantum (descendants are people whose blood quantum is not sufficient for
enrollment), this category may appear even more troubling. While I advocate here for a more
flexible conception of community membership for criminal jurisdiction purposes, I am
mindful of the potential problems created by such a two-tiered citizenship structure.
Criticism of such systems is one of the reasons tribal membership criteria are sites of
contestation as many Indian people (formally enrolled members and nonmembers) lobby
tribal governments to jettison restrictive membership rules. See, e.g., BLACKFEET
ENROLLMENT AMENDMENT REFORM (B.E.A.R.), http://blackfeetenrollmentamendment
reform.blogspot.com/ (last updated Jan. 8, 2015) (blog authored by Robert Juneau)
(dedicated to changing the Blackfeet enrollment ordinance by eliminating the blood quantum
requirement).
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tribal governmental power. When this contestation takes place in the
context of tribal enrollment rules, it is an example of tribal communities
exercising healthy self-governance, which often entails a process of dissent
and political change.440
A mismatch between the standards for citizenship and jurisdiction may
also be a reason for tribal courts to restrict a particular exercise of
governmental power. This article is primarily concerned with countering
the common assumption that federal law requires tribes to limit their
jurisdiction to people enrolled in a tribe, but a tribe could also choose to
limit its criminal jurisdiction to enrolled citizens for reasons related to how
it conceives of its own social and political community and how it chooses
to allocate rights among members. This is a legitimate approach and should
not be confused with a tribe assuming that federal law requires it to limit
jurisdiction to enrolled citizens.
The Phebus case illustrates the difference between these two approaches.
When the tribal appellate court ruled that the tribe could not prosecute a
former citizen who had been involuntarily disenrolled, it (incorrectly) cited
federal law as the reason for this limitation. However, the court may well
have had its own concerns about whether the tribe could fairly prosecute a
person in tribal court after revoking that person’s tribal citizenship. The
court could have reasoned that, as a matter of Las Vegas Paiute tribal law,
such a prosecution was inconsistent with principles of fairness, due process,
or inclusive citizenship rules. On the other hand, the court could have
determined, as the Navajo and EBCI tribal courts have done, that a person
who remains in the community and maintains certain ties to the community
can fairly be prosecuted for any crimes committed in that community,
regardless of the person’s formal citizenship status. In either case, the
question of what constitutes a sufficient connection to the tribal community
to make prosecution fair is a question of tribal law.

440. Addie C. Rolnick, Rewriting the End of a Sovereignty Story, PRAWFSBLAWG (June
18, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/rewriting-the-endof-a-sovereignty-story-santa-clara-pueblo-members-vote-to-change-patrilineal-membe.html
(describing decades-long internal struggle by Santa Clara Pueblo community members to
change their membership rules); see also Jill Doerfler, A Citizen’s Guide to the White Earth
Constitution: Highlights and Reflections, in GERALD VIZENOR & JILL DOERFLER, THE WHITE
EARTH NATION: RATIFICATION OF A NATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 81, 83-86 (2013)
(describing successful effort to eliminate blood quantum floor from enrollment rules).
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C. Strangers Enrolled in Other Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty by
Narrowing Jurisdiction?
The community recognition standard could in some cases narrow tribal
jurisdiction. The Duro fix has been interpreted as confirming tribal power
to prosecute and punish citizens of other tribes, regardless of their
relationship to the prosecuting tribe.441 Indeed, there is evidence that
Congress, recognizing that Indian people frequently live and work in other
tribal communities, was primarily concerned with closing a jurisdictional
gap over those people created by the Duro decision.442 The community
recognition standards articulated by tribes incorporate this idea: most of
those laws authorize prosecution of a person who is recognized as a
community member by any tribe, not just the prosecuting one.443
The standard outlined here, however, does not provide a justification for
prosecuting strangers to one community on the basis of their connection to
another. Under a principled approach to community recognition, it is
difficult to explain why a tribe should be able to extend criminal
jurisdiction over a complete stranger to its community just because that
stranger is affiliated with another tribe. Under the enrollment-based
interpretation of the Duro fix, any tribe could prosecute that person upon
proof of citizenship in another tribe. Under the community recognition
standard as expressed in most of the tribal codes described in Part II, a tribe
could also prosecute someone based on evidence (not necessarily
enrollment) of his affiliation with any other tribe. Under a strict
interpretation of community recognition, by contrast, a tribe could not
prosecute a nonmember Indian in the absence of a sufficient connection to
the prosecuting tribe. For strangers to the community who are members of
other tribes, the community recognition standard would result in narrower
tribal jurisdiction.
This may not be a significant contraction of tribal jurisdiction in practice
because most Indians from one tribe who come within the territory of
another tribe have some affiliation that likely would be sufficient under a
community recognition standard.444 Jurisdiction over these people would be
based on their connection to that community, rather than their status as
enrolled members of another tribe, but no net change in tribal jurisdiction
441. See supra Part I.C.1.
442. See supra Part I.B.2.
443. See supra note 289.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 346-348 (analyzing Means and Lara under
community recognition standard).
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would result. In the case of a stranger to the community who happens to be
enrolled in another tribe, the result could change.445
Federal courts have upheld Congress’ plenary power to restore
jurisdiction over Indians enrolled in other tribes, but have done so under the
mantle of rational basis scrutiny, assuming that any government
classification based on Indianness is reasonable as long as it is related to
Indian affairs—an explanation that is unsatisfying to some critics.446 The
courts are correct that Congress has the power to restore inter-tribal
jurisdiction, and this was likely an important goal of the Duro fix.
Extension of tribal criminal jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes
(enrolled or not) who are strangers to the prosecuting tribal community may
be independently justifiable for reasons not explored here, and merits a
separate inquiry.447 The community recognition standard, however, would
address the practical concerns regarding the large number of nonmember
Indians living and working in tribal communities described in the
legislative history of the Duro fix.448 To the extent that Congress intends
that tribes be able to exercise jurisdiction over strangers from other tribes,
the best approach would be to clarify the need for such jurisdiction and, if
jurisdiction is not also restored over all outsiders, explain why Indians and
non-Indians are treated differently. This jurisdiction would be based on a
separate theory, and would supplement the community recognition theory.
This is the approach embraced by most tribes who include a community
recognition standard in their codes.
Even in the absence of an independent justification for inter-tribal
jurisdiction over strangers, there are ways for tribes to ensure that intertribal jurisdiction continues. For example, tribes could easily enter into
cooperative agreements allowing for reciprocal criminal jurisdiction. Such
agreements are already used by many tribes to facilitate inter-jurisdictional
policing, prosecution, and detention between tribes and state and local

445. Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Mont. 2003), is a case in which a
community recognition standard could potentially result in no tribal jurisdiction. The court
discussed the thousands of nonmember Indians living on the Fort Berthold Reservation, but
the opinion does not clarify Morris’s connection, or lack of connection, to the tribe. Id. at
1135. If he were just passing through, a community recognition standard would not permit
him to be prosecuted just because other nonmember Indians lived in the community.
446. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Lara, Means, and Morris). But see Skibine, supra
note 106 (arguing that federal plenary power permits Congress to restore tribal jurisdiction
over Indians enrolled in other tribes even under a strict scrutiny framework).
447. See, e.g.., GOVER, supra note 388, at 11 (describing “inter-indigenous recognition”).
448. See Newton, supra note 112, at 109 n.7.
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governments.449 While it may require more effort than a simple federal rule
permitting inter-tribal jurisdiction, this approach would be more respectful
of tribal sovereign authority.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has twice attempted to draw a line defining the scope
of tribal criminal jurisdiction, and has twice been partially rejected by
Congress. In Oliphant, the Court drew a racial line,450 preserving tribal
jurisdiction over “Indians” but not over “non-Indians.”451 The Court’s
reasoning, however, focused on fairness and failed to provide much of an
explanation for why the Indian/non-Indian line answered those concerns.
Excluding all non-Indians from tribal jurisdiction while including all
Indians is both overly broad (it permits jurisdiction over complete strangers
who have Indian ancestry) and unduly narrow (it prohibits jurisdiction over
anyone lacking Indian ancestry, regardless of that person’s relationship to
the tribal community). The Oliphant Court’s racial line is better understood
as an imperfect proxy for cultural and social integration into a community.
This interpretation is bolstered by the 2013 VAWA amendments, which
provide that tribes may appropriately exercise jurisdiction over some nonIndians provided they have sufficient ties to the community.452 This partial
repeal of Oliphant suggests that Congress disagrees with the Court’s
overbroad assumption that all non-Indians will categorically lack sufficient
community ties.
Perhaps recognizing the inexactness of the racial line, the Court tried a
second time to draw this line in Duro by adopting a member/nonmember

449. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 104-05; David
H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American Indian
Tribes, 1 REV. OF CONST. STUD. 120, 152 (1993). Testifying in support of the Duro fix,
Representative George Miller invoked the rationale of inter-tribal consent, interpreting
widespread tribal support of the bill to mean that tribes “support letting other tribes have
jurisdiction over their people.” See supra note 110.
450. I use the term “racial” here to mean “based solely on ancestry,” which is the way the
Court most often defines the term in the context of Indian law. I have previously written
about how both “Indian” and “race” have many different meanings (both social and legal)
and the confusion that can result from overlapping meanings. See generally Rolnick, supra
note 13. While the Oliphant Court did not further define what it meant by “Indian” and
“non-Indian,” the decision is usually interpreted to at least bar tribal jurisdiction over people
without Indian ancestry.
451. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978).
452. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012).
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distinction.453 Membership in this context correlates to formal citizenship in
the prosecuting tribe.454 Because almost all tribes have clear enrollment
criteria, maintain lists of enrolled citizens, and issue certificates or
identification cards to verify a person’s enrollment, it is relatively easy to
determine whether a person is a citizen or not, so the Duro line is easy to
implement. But citizenship is also a poor proxy for community ties and
fairness. It is too narrow, as it excludes many different groups of people
who may be part of that tribe’s community: non-Indian people, Indians
from other tribes, Indians from that tribe who do not meet the tribe’s
enrollment criteria, people eligible to enroll who have not done so, people
who have chosen to disenroll but remain in the community, and people who
have been involuntarily disenrolled but remain in the community.
Moreover, Congress has clearly indicated its disagreement with the Court’s
attempt to draw the line at enrolled citizenship by legislatively reversing the
Court’s holding almost immediately.
This article has presented a third option for determining the scope of tribal
criminal jurisdiction by defining who is sufficiently affiliated with a tribal
community such that he or she is a fair subject of criminal prosecution. This
standard, which asks whether a defendant is recognized by the tribal
community as a member, is already employed by some tribes seeking to
balance acknowledgement of federal law limitations on tribal jurisdiction
with careful analysis of the proper scope of tribal criminal powers. This
standard also tracks the one used by Congress in VAWA. Compared to other
possible standards, the community recognition standard protects sovereignty
better, is more closely aligned with the functions of criminal jurisdiction, and
better reflects the current rules governing tribal jurisdiction. It is also a way to
make sense of the Oliphant prohibition on jurisdiction over non-Indian
outsiders, Congress’ confirmation of jurisdiction over the many nonmember
Indians living on reservations, and Congress’ recent restoration of jurisdiction
over non-Indian domestic violence offenders with ties to the tribe.
Because the community recognition standard avoids the citizenshipversus-blood dichotomy, it provides a new potential answer to the equal
453. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990).
454. The term “member” also has no static definition, but the Duro court described
membership in terms of consent and political participation, suggesting that membership in
this context means enrollment. Since the decision, tribal membership has often been equated
with formal enrollment in a tribe. While I argue here for a broader understanding of what
constitutes membership in a tribal community, I assume that others who use the term
“membership” mean to refer to formal citizenship (also called enrollment) unless they
specifically note otherwise.
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protection questions haunting Indian law. It does so by demonstrating that
legal Indianness is a political classification in the sense that it denotes
individuals who are affiliated with modern tribal governments, but that the
contours of individual affiliation with a political community are varied,
context-dependent, and not reducible to either ancestry or to a rigid
consent-based view of tribal citizenship. While this article has examined the
particular context of criminal jurisdiction, its critique of the over-reliance
on citizenship and its suggestion of an alternative way to define the
boundaries of tribes as political communities should encourage a
reevaluation of citizenship-based standards in all contexts.
Using community recognition as the federal standard for tribal
jurisdiction will not solve all the problems faced by tribes seeking to build
strong justice systems, protect their communities, and ensure law and order
within their territory. There is no doubt that when the Supreme Court
carved a gaping hole in tribes’ territorial jurisdiction, and Congress failed to
fully restore that jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty, tribal justice systems, and
tribal people were deeply affected. For this reason, a federal commission
appointed to study criminal justice in Indian country has rightly
recommended that tribes be given the option of reassuming exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over all offenders in their territory—a legislative
Oliphant fix.455
The standard proposed here is not a fix, but a reexamination and
reinterpretation of the existing limits. Like much of Indian law, modern
criminal jurisdiction rules may seem to be the result of policy shifts and
inconsistent decisions. The community recognition standard is an attempt to
identify the organizing principles that underlie what is commonly perceived
as a set of disconnected rules, and to do so by centering tribal law and tribal
courts.
This article is a call for tribal courts to examine their own jurisdiction via
tribal law, and for federal courts to follow their lead when reviewing their
jurisdiction—to recognize that the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction may
be different than the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. It is also a plea
to tribal courts not to cede any more of their inherent jurisdiction than is
absolutely required by federal law, and for federal courts to recognize this
as the correct approach. It is a long overdue attempt to examine tribal
criminal justice systems on their own terms, rather than treating them as
half-formed institutions necessary only to fill in the gaps left by other
governments.
455. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 23-27.
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